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CHAPTER I
Introduction
In this dissertation, I use empirical structural models to analyze how firms innovate, position
products and form relationships. The first chapter asks two questions: 1) whether, from a
welfare point of view, oligopolistic competition leads to too few or too many products in
a market, 2) how competition affects the composition of product offerings. The chapter
addresses these two questions in the context of the U.S. smartphone market. My co-author
and I find that there are too few products and a reduction in competition further decreases
the number of products and reduces product variety. These results suggest that merger
policies should be stricter when we take into account the effects of a merger on product
choice in addition to those on pricing.
The second chapter studies the effects of vertical integration on innovation in the chipset and
smartphone industry. I formulate and estimate a dynamic structural model of the upstream
chipset maker Qualcomm and downstream smartphone handset makers. The two sides make
dynamic investment decisions and negotiate chipset prices via Nash bargaining. Using the
estimates, I simulate market outcomes should Qualcomm merge with a downstream handset
maker. I find that the vertical merger would significantly increase innovation rates and
social welfare, driven primarily by the investment coordination of the two merged firms. I
1
also explore the roles of upstream product availability, downstream product substitution and
consumer price sensitivity.
The third chapter examines two-sided matching markets with transferrable utilities. Agents
in two-sided matching games vary in characteristics that are unobservable in typical data on
matching markets. My co-authors and I investigate the identification of the distribution of
unobserved characteristics using data on who matches with whom. In full generality, we con-
sider many-to-many matching and matching with trades. The distribution of match-specific
unobservables cannot be fully recovered without information on unmatched agents, but the
distribution of a combination of unobservables, which we call unobserved complementarities,
can be identified. Using data on unmatched agents restores identification. We estimate
the contribution of observables and unobservable complementarities to match production in
venture capital investments in biotechnology and medical firms.
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CHAPTER II
Competition, Product Proliferation and Welfare: A
Study of the U.S. Smartphone Market
with Ying Fan
2.1 Introduction
In many markets such as the printer market, the CPU market and the smartphone market,
firms typically offer multiple products across a wide spectrum of quality. In these markets,
product proliferation is an outcome of firms’ oligopolistic competition in product space. Does
such competition result in too few or too many products from a welfare point of view? How
does a change in competition affect the number and composition of product offerings? In
this paper, we study these two questions in the context of the U.S. smartphone industry.
For the first question, in theory, it is possible that oligopolistic competition results in either
excessive or insufficient product proliferation. On the one hand, a profit-maximizing firm will
have a product in the market as long as the profit gains are greater than the costs, but some
of the profit gains may come from business stealing. Because firms do not take into account
this negative externality, there may be too many products. On the other hand, unlike a social
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planner, firms do not internalize consumer surplus. If consumer surplus increases when a
product is added to the market, there may also be too few products. Therefore, whether
competition leads to too few or too many products in the market is an empirical question.
For the second question, the effect of a merger on product offerings is also theoretically
ambiguous. When two firms merge, the merged firm internalizes the business stealing effect
and thus may reduce its number of products. This is a direct effect. However, there may
also exist a countervail- ing indirect effect: a merger is likely to soften price competition. As
a result, the profit gains from adding a product may be larger, leading to an increase in the
number of products.
Combining these two research questions, this paper sheds light on how to adjust the leniency
of competition policies when product offerings are endogenous. If competition leads to too
many products and a merger reduces product offerings, then merger policies should be more
lenient. Conversely, if a merger reduces product offerings when there are already too few
products in the market, then merger policies should be stricter.
To study our research questions, we focus on the U.S. smartphone market for several reasons.
First, the smartphone industry has been one of the fastest growing industries in the world,
with billions of dollars at stake. Worldwide smartphone sales grew from 122 million units
in 2007 to 1.4 billion units in 2015 (Gartner (2007) and Gartner (2015)), with about 400
billion dollars in global revenue in 2015 (GfK (2016)). Second, product proliferation is
a prominent feature of this industry. For example, in the U.S. market during our sample
period, Samsung, on average, simultaneously offered 11 smartphones with substantial quality
and price variation.
In order to address our research questions and quantify welfare, we develop a structural
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model of consumer demand and firms’ product and price decisions. We describe the demand
side using a random coefficient discrete choice model, where product quality is a linear
function of a set of key product characteristics, and consumers have heterogeneous tastes
for quality. We describe the supply side using a static three-stage structural model. In the
first stage, smartphone firms choose products from a set of potential products, with each
product associated with a fixed cost in each period. In the second stage, these firms set their
wholesale prices for carriers based on the product portfolio of each firm as well as realized
demand and marginal cost shocks. In the third stage, carriers set their retail prices.
Our data come from the Investment Technology Group (ITG) Market Research. This data
set provides information on all smartphone products in the U.S. market between January
2009 and March 2013. For every month during this period, we observe both the price and
the quantity of each smartphone sold through each of the four national carriers in the U.S.
(i.e., AT&T, T-Mobile, Sprint, and Verizon). In addition, we observe key specifications of
each product, such as battery talk time and camera resolution.
Using these data, we estimate our model of smartphone demand and marginal cost following
an estimation procedure similar to that in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995a). The esti-
mation results are intuitive: on average, consumers prefer smartphones with longer battery
talk time, higher camera resolution, a more advanced chipset, a larger screen and a lighter
weight. We use these results to calculate a product quality index, a linear combination of
product characteristics weighted by the respective estimated demand coefficients. We then
use our quality index to propose a measure of product variety such that adding a product
identical to existing products in terms of the observed key characteristics (hence the quality
index) has no impact on our variety measure. Therefore, this measure allows us to distin-
guish “meaningful” product differentiation from obfuscation. Our results show that product
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variety within the U.S. smartphone market increases over time during our sample.
On the supply side, we find that marginal cost increases in quality and decreases over time.
We also obtain bounds on fixed costs. Specifically, we assume that the observed product
portfolio of a firm is profit maximizing in a Nash equilibrium. Consequently, removing or
adding a product should not increase the firm’s profit. Based on these conditions, for any
product in the market in a month, we obtain an upper bound of its fixed cost in that month;
and for any product not in the data in a given month, we obtain a lower bound.
Based on the estimated demand, marginal cost and fixed cost bounds, we conduct counter-
factual simulations to address our research questions. To answer the question of whether
there are too few or too many products in the market, we conduct two sets of counterfactual
simulations for March 2013, the last month in our sample period. In one set of counterfac-
tual simulations, we remove products while in the other set, we add products. To separate
product variety from product innovation, we remove (add) only products below the quality
frontier of each firm.1 Our results show that removing a product decreases total surplus,
even considering the maximum saving in the fixed cost. These results are robust no matter
which product or which two products we remove. In the second set of simulations, we add
a product that fills a gap in the quality spectrum. We find that consumer surplus, carrier
surplus, and smartphone firms’ total variable profit all increase. The change in total welfare
is the sum of these increases minus the fixed cost of the added product. We find that the
former is about 2.3 times the lower bound of the latter. Therefore, as long as the fixed cost
is not more than 2.3 times of its lower bound, total surplus should increase. To put this ratio
in perspective, note that the average upper bound is about 1.2 times of the average lower
bound we obtain in our estimation. Overall, these counterfactual simulation results suggest
1The next chapter focuses on innovation in the smartphone industry and its upstream chipset industry.
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that there are too few products under oligopolistic competition.
urning to the second research question of how a change in competition affects product offer-
ings, we simulate the effect of a hypothetical merger between Samsung and LG on product
offerings, prices, and welfare in March 2013. We also repeat the simulation for a Samsung-
Motorola merger and an LG-Motorola merger. Again, to separate product variety from
innovation, we allow firms to adjust only those products below their quality frontier. How-
ever, different from addressing the first research question, for which we only need to compute
the new pricing equilibrium given certain product offerings in the market, we now need to
compute the post-merger equilibrium in both product choice and pricing. Computing the
product-choice equilibrium is challenging because, in theory, a firm can drop any subset of
its current products or add any number of new products after a merger, leading to a large
action space. To keep the problem tractable, we restrict the set of potential products for
each firm to those offered by this firm in either February or March 2013, plus two additional
products that vary in quality. Even with this restriction, a firm’s action space can still be
prohibitively large. For example, the merged Samsung-LG entity has 31 potential products,
implying a choice set of 231 ⇡ 2.4 ⇥ 109 product portfolios. Therefore, to further deal with
this computational challenge, we use a heuristic algorithm to find a firm’s best-response
product portfolio given the portfolios of its competitors, and embed this optimization algo-
rithm in a best-response iteration to solve for the post-merger product-choice equilibrium.
Results from Monte Carlo simulations show that our algorithm performs well at least for
optimal product portfolio problems with a small number of potential products.2
2In the Monte Carlo simulations, we study product-choice problems where the number of potential prod-
ucts is small enough for us to enumerate all possible product portfolios and determine the optimal one. We
find that the failure rate for the heuristic algorithm (i.e., the percentage of simulations where the heuristic
algorithm fails to find the true optimal product portfolio) is always lower than 0.3%, regardless of the starting
point for the heuristic algorithm.
7
Using this algorithm, we find that after the Samsung-LG merger, the number of products
in the market decreases. In particular, the merged firm drops 3 products (out of a per-
merger combined total of 26 products) while competing firms altogether add one product.
This reduction in the overall number of products also decreases product variety. Due to
the decrease in product offerings and the accompanying increase in the prices, we find that
consumers are worse off and total welfare also decreases after the merger. These findings
hold for the other two mergers (Samsung-Motorola and LG-Motorola) as well.
In summary, we find that there are too few products in the market. We also find that a
reduction in competition as a result of a merger further decreases product variety. These
findings are robust to several variations to both the demand side and the supply side of
the model. The combination of these findings suggests that merger policies may have to be
stricter when we take into account the effect of a merger on product offerings in addition to
its effect on prices.
By studying the welfare implications of product proliferation and how competition affects
them, this paper contributes to the literature of endogenous product choice.3 Two papers
in the literature, Fan (2013a) and Berry et al. (forthcoming), are most closely related to
this paper. Fan (2013a) also studies the effect of a merger considering firms’ endogenous
product choices. However, whereas Fan (2013a) keeps the number of products fixed, our
model allows firms to adjust both the number and composition of products after a merger.4
Interestingly, despite the differences in focus and industries, the two papers make similar
3Examples in this literature include Seim (2006a), Draganska, Mazzeo and Seim (2009), Watson (2009),
Chu (2010), Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), Sweeting (2013), Eizenberg (2014a), Nosko (2014), Crawford
et al. (2015a), Orhun, Venkataraman and Chintagunta (2015) and Wollmann (2015). See Crawford (2012)
for a survey of this literature. Examples in the theoretical literature on this topic include Johnson and Myatt
(2003) and Shen, Yang and Ye (2016).
4Wollmann (2015) studies the importance of accounting for product entry in predicting price changes due
to different policies and thus also allows firms to adjust the number of products.
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policy recommendations: merger policies should be tougher when we take into account firms’
post-merger adjustments in their product portfolios, whether such adjustments only concern
the characteristics of a fixed set of products or also involve changes in the number of products.
In another study, Berry et al. (forthcoming) examine the optimal level of product variety in
a local radio market.5 Our study differs from their work by considering product variety in a
multi-product oligopoly setting instead of a single-product oligopoly setting. This difference
in market structure may explain why they find too much product variety in the local radio
market, but we find too few products in the U.S. smartphone industry. Compared to a single-
product firm, a multiple-product firm has an additional reason for not adding a product: to
avoid cannibalization. As a result, in a market with multiple-product firms, it is more likely
that there are too few products.
This paper is also related to the stream of research that studies the smartphone industry.
For example, Sinkinson (2014) studies the motivations behind the exclusive contract between
Apple and AT&T for the early iPhones. In another study, Zhu, Liu and Chintagunta (2015)
quantify the welfare effects of this exclusive contract. Luo (2015) examines the operation
system network effect. Finally, my next chapter studies the effect of vertical integration
on innovation in the smartphone industry and its upstream chipset industry. We comple-
ment these papers by studying the welfare implications of product choices and the effects of
competition with endogenous product choice.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the data in Section 2.2. We
develop the model of the smartphone market in Section 2.3 and present the estimation results
in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 first describes counterfactual simulations and then discusses the
5Thomas (2011) studies a similar question from the firm perspective and finds that decentralized decision
making by multinational firms leads to too many products in the sense that a firm’s profit would increase
with fewer products.
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results. We discuss the robustness of the results in Section 2.6. Finally, we conclude in
Section 2.7.
2.2 Data
Our data come from the Investment Technology Group (ITG) Market Research. This data set
covers all smartphones sold in the U.S. market between January 2009 and March 2013. For
every carrier in the U.S. and every month during our sample period, we observe the price
and sales for each smartphone sold through that carrier in that month. We also observe
key specifications of each product such as battery talk time and camera resolution. The
price information provided by the ITG for the four major national carriers (AT&T, Verizon,
Sprint, and T-Mobile) is the so-called subsidized price or the average price for a smartphone
device that a carrier charges a consumer who uses this carrier’s network service.6 Note
that the subsidized price for a smartphone is not the true cost of buying the smartphone
because the consumer also needs to pay for the service plan. As will be explained later, we
include carrier/year-specific fixed effects in the model to capture the average service cost for a
consumer. Furthermore, since non- major or fringe carriers often provide only prepaid service
plans and serve only one regional market, we drop these observations from our analyses.7
In the end, our sample consists of 3256 observations, each of which is a smartphone/carrier/month
combination. Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics on the quantity, price and product
characteristics. From Table 2.1, we can see that the average monthly sales of a product are
6The average is taken over transactions in a month. Note that the carrier fee structure is relatively stable
during our sample period. In April 2013 (right after our sample period), however, T-Mobile launched an
“Uncarrier” campaign, which abandoned service contracts and subsidies for devices. Other carriers followed
suit.
7The total U.S. market share of these fringe carriers in terms of smartphones sold is about 10%.
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around 77,000 while the standard deviation of the monthly sales is about twice the mean.
We also find a sizable variation in price across observations: the price is 122 dollars on aver-
age, with a standard deviation of 85. For each product, we observe product characteristics
such as battery talk time, camera resolution, screen size measured by the diagonal of the
screen, and weight. We also observe the generation of the chipset used by each product. For
example, there are five Apple smartphones in our data (i.e., iPhone 3G, iPhone 3Gs, iPhone
4, iPhone 4s and iPhone 5), each of which uses a chipset of a different generation. The stan-
dard deviations of these product characteristics are about 17% to 47% of their corresponding
means, indicating a wide variety of products across our sample.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Quantity (1000) 77.54 146.04 0.04 1419
Price ($) 122.16 85.24 0a 406.9
Battery Talk Time (hours) 7.08 2.93 3 22
Camera Resolution (megapixel) 4.65 2.18 0b 13
Chipset Generation 2 0.23 0.42 0 1
Chipset Generation 3 0.25 0.43 0 1
Chipset Generation 4 0.14 0.34 0 1
Chipset Generation 5 0.09 0.29 0 1
Screen Size (inch) 3.44 0.73 2.20 5.54
Weight (gram) 135.31 22.72 89.5 193
Observations (smartphone/carrier/months) 3256
aFour observations in our sample have a 0 price
bOne product in our sample (BlackBerry 8830) does not have a camera
There are 18 smartphone firms and 260 smartphones in the sample. Table 2.2 lists the top
six firms according to their average monthly smartphone sales: Apple, Samsung, BlackBerry,
HTC, Motorola and LG. From Table 2.2, we see that Apple is the undisputed leader in the
industry, with an average monthly sales of about 2 million units, followed by Samsung with
an average monthly sales of 0.76 million. The table also shows that all of these six firms offer
11
Table 2.2: List of Top Six Smartphone Firms
Firm Headquarters Avg. Monthly Salesa Avg. Number
(million units) of Productsa
Apple U.S. 1.99 2.10
Samsung Korea 0.76 11.08
BlackBerry Canada 0.61 8.33
HTC Taiwan 0.60 10.35
Motorola U.S. 0.46 7.90
LG Korea 0.33 6.76
aAveraged across months.
multiple products simultaneously. For example, on average, Samsung offers 11 products in
a given month, followed by HTC with an average of 10 products in a given month.
Table 2.3 shows that the multiple products offered by a firm have different qualities and
prices. In this table, we report two within-(firm/month) dispersion measures for price and
product characteristics. To calculate within-(firm/month) price dispersion, for example, we
first compute the standard deviation of price across all observations of a given firm in a
given month. We set the standard deviation to 0 for firm/months with a single observa-
tion. We then take the average of these standard deviations across all 557 firm/months
in the sample, and report this average in Column 1 of Table 2.3. Similarly, we compute
the difference between the highest and the lowest price among all observations in the same
firm/month and take the average across firm/months to obtain the average range within a
firm/month, as shown in Column 2. We find that the average within-(firm/month) standard
deviation in price is 42.42 dollars, which is about 1/2 of the overall standard deviation of
price across all observations (see Table 2.1), implying that within-(firm/month) variation is
an important component of total price variation. The within-(firm/month) variation of prod-
uct characteristics is also significant. For example, Column 2 for chipset generation shows
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that smartphone firms on average simultaneously offer products whose chipsets are one gen-
eration apart. Overall, Table 2.3 provides evidence for product proliferation in smartphone
industry.
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics on Quality and Price Dispersion within a Firm/Month
Average Std. Dev. Average Range
Price ($) 42.42 122.50
Battery Talk Time (hours) 1.04 3.10
Camera Resolution (megapixel) 0.81 2.16
Chipset Generation 0.36 0.93
Screen Size (inch) 0.21 0.61
Weight (gram) 11.12 32.23
2.3 Model
2.3.1 Demand
In this section, we develop our model. We begin with the demand side, which we describe
using a random-coefficient discrete choice model. Since our data are aggregated at the smart-
phone/carrier/month level, we assume that a consumer’s choice is a smartphone/carrier
combination, indexed by j. Furthermore, we assume that the utility that consumer i gets
from purchasing j in period t is:
uijt =  iqj   ↵pjt +  m(j) + c(j)t + ⇠jt + "ijt, (2.3.1)
where qj is a quality index which depends on the observable product characteristics xj as
qj = xj✓, where ✓ are parameters to be estimated. The random coefficient  i captures
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consumers’ heterogeneous tastes for quality and is assumed to follow a normal distribution
with mean   and variance  2. Since we cannot separately identify  ,   and ✓ as they enter
the utility function as  ✓ and  ✓, we normalize the first dimension of ✓ to be 1. Finally, we
denote the price of j in period t by pjt.
To capture consumers’ average taste for a brand, we include a brand fixed effect,  m(j),
where m(j) represents the smartphone firm (i.e., the brand) of j. To capture the average
quality and cost of carrier c’s network service in period t as well as a general time trend
in consumers’ tastes for smartphones, we include a carrier/year fixed effect.8 Finally, to
capture seasonality in demand, we include a quarter fixed effect. For simplicity of notation,
we denote both the carrier/year fixed effect and the quarter fixed effect by one term c(j)t,
where c(j) represents the carrier of choice j. The term ⇠jt represents a demand shock, and
the error term "ijt captures consumer i’s idiosyncratic taste, which is assumed to be i.i.d.
and to follow a type-I extreme value distribution. We normalize the mean utility of the
outside option to be 0. Thus, the utility of the outside option is ui0t = "i0t.
Under the type-I extreme value distributional assumption of "ijt, we can express the market
share of choice j in period t as:
sjt (qt,pt, ⇠t) =
ˆ
exp
 
 iqj   ↵pjt +  m(j) + c(j)t + ⇠jt
 
1 +
P
j02Jt exp
 
 iqj0   ↵pj0t +  m(j0) + c(j0)t + ⇠j0t
 dF ( i) , (2.3.2)
where Jt denotes the set of all products in period t, qt = (qj, j 2 Jt) is a vector of the quality
indices of all products in the market, and pt and ⇠t are analogously defined. Finally, F ( i)
8By using fixed effects to capture service plan features and prices, we implicitly assume that they are
exogenous. We do so for two reasons. First, we do not have data on carriers’ service plans. It is also difficult
to compare service plans provided by different carriers as they differ in many dimensions. Second, a carrier
typically does not redesign its service plans when a new smartphone is introduced to the market. Thus,
it is plausible to assume that carriers’ service plans are exogenous to smartphone firms’ product and price
decisions
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is the distribution function of the random coefficient  i.
Following Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995b), we define the mean utility of j in period t as
 jt =  qj   ↵pjt +  m(j) + c(j)t + ⇠jt, (2.3.3)
and invert it out based on equation (2.3.2).
2.3.2 Supply
The supply side of the model is described by a static three-stage game. In the first stage, firms
choose their products. Next, after observing the demand and the marginal cost shocks, firms
choose the wholesale prices charged to the carriers. Finally, carriers chooses the subsidized
retail prices. We describe these three stages in reverse order.
Decisions on Prices
At the third stage, carriers observe the set of products available on each carrier (denoted
by Jct), the wholesale prices (wjt) and the demand shocks (⇠jt). They choose the retail
prices (pjt) to maximize their respective profit. Suppose that the profit that carrier c obtains
through its service is bct per consumer. Carrier c’s profit for each unit of a product sold is
therefore pjt+bct wjt. We do not observe bct or wjt. But we can invert out w˜jt = wjt  bc(j)t
from the first-order condition on the price pjt. Specifically, carrier c’s profit-maximizing
problem is
max
pjt,j2Jct
X
j2Jct
Nsjt (qt,pt, ⇠t) (pjt   w˜jt) , (2.3.4)
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where N is the market size. The first-order condition allows us to invert out w˜jt as:
w˜jt = pjt + [ 
 1
ct sct]jt, (2.3.5)
where ct represents a |Jct|⇥|Jct|matrix whose (j, j0) element is @sj0t@pjt , and sct = (sjt, j 2 Jct).
We denote the equilibrium of this stage by p⇤jt (w˜t, qt, ⇠t), where w˜t = (w˜jt, j 2 Jt) and (qt,
⇠t) have been analogously defined in Section 2.3.
At the second stage, smartphone firms choose the wholesale prices that they charge carriers
after observing the demand shocks and the marginal cost shocks. We assume that marginal
cost depends on the quality of a product (qj), time fixed effects ( t), and a jt-specific shock
(⌘jt).9 Specifically, we assume that the marginal cost is mcjt =  t +  1exp (qj) + ⌘jt. Let
m˜cjt = mcjt   bc(j)t, and  ˜ct =  t   bct. With these notations, we can re-write the marginal
cost as
m˜cjt =  ˜c(j)t +  1 exp (qj) + ⌘jt. (2.3.6)
A smartphone firm m’s profit-maximizing problem is therefore
max
w˜jt,j2Jmt
X
j2Jmt
(w˜jt   m˜cjt)Nsjt (qt,p⇤t (w˜t, qt, ⇠t) , ⇠t) , (2.3.7)
where Jmt represents the choices offered by firm m in period t. The first-order condition is
sjt +
X
j02Jmt
(w˜j0t   m˜cj0t)
 X
j002Jt
@sj0t
@pj00t
@p⇤j00t
@w˜jt
!
= 0, (2.3.8)
9Note that j indexes a smartphone/carrier combination. Therefore, the marginal cost shock is at the
smartphone/carrier/time level. Marginal cost may vary across carriers because different radio technologies
are used for products sold by different carriers. Moreover, carriers sometimes require firms to preload different
softwares on a smartphone, which may come with different costs.
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or equivalently,
w˜jt +
⇥
  1mtsmt
⇤
jt
=  ˜c(j)t +  1 exp (qj) + ⌘jt, (2.3.9)
where smt = (sjt, j 2 Jmt), and  mt represents a |Jmt|⇥ |Jmt| matrix whose (j, j0) element
is⇣P
j002Jt
@sj0t
@pj00t
@p⇤
j00t
@w˜jt
⌘
. Combining equations (2.3.5) and (2.3.9) yields
pjt + [ 
 1
ct sct]jt +
⇥
  1mtsmt
⇤
jt
=  ˜c(j)t +  1 exp (qj) + ⌘jt, (2.3.10)
which we bring to the data for estimation.
As can be seen from equation (2.3.10), this pricing model is a simple linear pricing model,
which implies double marginalization. In Section 2.6, we consider several alternative pricing
models for robustness analyses.
2.4 Estimation
Table 2.4 reports the estimation results on demand and marginal cost. Our demand estima-
tion results indicate that consumers on average favor products with longer battery talk time,
higher camera resolution, a more advanced chipset, a larger screen and a lighter weight.
For example, we find that a one-hour increase in battery talk time is equivalent to a price
decrease of 6.5 dollars for an average consumer. Similarly, a one-megapixel increase in
camera resolution is equivalent to a price decrease of 10.9 dollars, while an increase in the
screen size by 0.1 inches is equivalent to a price decrease of 11.7 dollars. Finally, we find
that each generation upgrade is equivalent to a price drop between 30 to 78 dollars. The
estimated standard deviation of consumers’ taste for quality is about 40% of the average
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taste, suggesting that consumers are heterogenous in their willingness-to-pay for quality. In
our estimation, we include Apple, BlackBerry and Samsung dummies and group all other
brands as a baseline brand in the utility function. Our estimates show that there is a
large premium for Apple (417 dollars), followed by BlackBerry, and then Samsung.10 Our
estimation results also suggest that there is an advantage to be a flagship product, which
is probably related to firms’ differential advertising spending on flagship versus non-flagship
products.
Table 2.5 reports the price semi-elasticities for top-five products on AT&T in March 2013:
Motorola’s Atrix HD, Samsung’s Galaxy S III and Apple’s iPhone 4, iPhone 4s and iPhone
5. The table shows that a $10 increase in the price of a product leads to about 6% decrease
in its demand.11 Unsurprisingly, the own price semi-elasticities are larger than the cross
semi-elasticities.
We construct the quality index for each product based on the estimated coefficients of the
product characteristics. Table 2.6 reports the elasticities of quality based on the estimated
quality index, again for the top-five AT&T products in March 2013. Across all five products,
we see that a 1% increase in the quality index corresponds to about a 5% to 8% increase in
sales.
To see the evolution of smartphone quality over time, we divide the brand fixed effects by
the mean taste for quality and then add it to the quality index. In Figure 2.4.1, we plot
the maximum and median of this index across all products in each month. We also plot
the maximum of this index for Apple and Samsung, respectively. Figure 2.4.1 shows that
10Note that even though the estimated BlackBerry-dummy coefficient is larger than that of Samsung,
considering the product characteristics, the average quality of Samsung products in a month is generally
higher than that of BlackBerry products, especially later in our sample.
11Given that we have data on only the subsidized retail price, which is not the actual price for a consumer
to buy a smartphone, we do not compute the price elasticity.
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the Apple quality frontier line perfectly coincides with the industry quality frontier line and
that this line experiences a discrete jump whenever a new iPhone product is introduced,
confirming the perception that iPhone products drive the quality frontier. Figure 2.4.1
also shows that the median quality index stays at a relatively constant distance from the
frontier and that Samsung has narrowed the quality gap between its smartphone products
and Apple’s iPhones.
Figure 2.4.1: Smartphone Quality over Time
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We use the same quality index used in Figure 2.4.1 to construct a measure of product variety
and show its evolution over time. Specifically, we measure product variety in a market
with n products as
hPn
k=2
 
q(k)   q(k 1) 1/2i2, where q(1) < · · · < q(n) are the qualities of
the n products sorted in an ascending order. Note that this measure resembles the CES
utility function, and has three desirable properties. First, given the quality range (i.e.,
q(n)   q(1)), this measure is maximized when products are equidistant. The maximum is
(n  1)  q(n)   q(1) . Second, this maximum is increasing in the number of products n and
the quality range
 
q(n)   q(1) . Third, adding a product identical to one of the existing
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products in terms of the key observable characteristics (and hence also in terms of the
quality index) has no impact on the product variety measure. In other words, if firms take
a strategy of obfuscation, i.e., add products that differ from existing products only in trivial
features such as names or colors, our product variety measure will recognize such a strategy
and will not count such products in measuring variety.
Given the first property of the product variety measure, we can give the following “as if”
interpretation to the measure: a value of x for the product variety measure is as if there are
x/(q(n)  q(1))+1 equidistant products. In Figure 2.4.2, we plot the number of smartphones,
our measure of product variety, and the “as if” number of equidistant products every month
during our sample. Figure 2.4.2(a) shows that the number of smartphones available in the
market increases over time, from 33 in January 2009 to 70 in March 2013. This increase is
accompanied by an increase in both the product variety measure (see Figure 2.4.2(b)) and
the “as if” number of equidistant products (see Figure 2.4.2(c)), indicating that the increase
in the number of smartphones is not completely driven by obfuscation.
On the supply side, we find that marginal cost increases in product quality. Though not
reported in Table 2.4, the estimated carrier/year fixed effects indicate that marginal cost is
decreasing over time.12 Based on the estimates of the demand and marginal cost functions,
we obtain an upper bound of the fixed cost for each non-flagship smartphone/month combi-
nation in the data. The average upper bound, averaged across all such smartphone/month
combinations, is 6.16 million dollars.13 Figure 2.4.3(a) plots these upper bounds. The hori-
12It should be noted that the estimated marginal cost is, in fact, a smartphone firm’s marginal cost minus
the carrier’s per-consumer service profit. The estimated time trend, therefore, accounts for changes in the
marginal cost of smartphones as well as changes in the service profit of a carrier.
13As mentioned, 14 non-flagship smartphones are sold through several carriers. In reporting this statistic,
we divide the upper bound for each smartphone/month by the corresponding number of carriers. When we
do not do so, this average upper bound becomes 6.58.
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Figure 2.4.2: Product Variety over Time
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zontal axis represents the quality of a product, the same quality index in Figure 2.4.1. The
vertical axis represents the upper bound of the fixed cost. Figure 2.4.3(a) suggests that
the upper bound of the fixed cost is positively correlated with product quality. In Figure
2.4.3(b), we plot the lower bounds for discontinued non-flagship products.14 The average
lower bound is 5.27 million dollars.
14There are 7 smartphone/month combinations where a product is discontinued from multiple carriers. For
these smartphone/months, we report the lower bound of the fixed cost of having this smartphone provided
through each carrier separately.
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Figure 2.4.3: Bounds of Fixed Costs (Million $)
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2.5 Counterfactual Simulations
In this section, we conduct counterfactual simulations to address the two research questions
of interest. In all counterfactual simulations, we keep the set of flagship products as fixed
and only allow the number and the composition of non-flagship products to be adjusted.15
Therefore, for simplicity of exposition, a product in this section refers to a non-flagship
product whenever it is not explicitly specified.
15In a robustness analysis where we allow firms to also adjust old flagship products, we obtain the same
results, i.e., we find that firms do not adjust these products.
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2.5.1 Are there too few or too many products?
There are two reasons why product offerings in an oligopoly market are inefficient. First,
given the competitors’ products, a firm chooses to offer a product as long as the marginal
profit from doing so is positive. However, the firm does not consider the potential negative
externality from stealing market share when making its decisions. As a result, there might
be too many products in the market from a welfare point of view. Second, consumer surplus
is not part of a firm’s objective function. If consumer surplus increases when a product is
added to the market, there might also be too few products. Because of these two poten-
tially countervailing forces, whether there are too few or too many products is an empirical
question.
To address this question, we first conduct counterfactual simulations where we remove a
product.16 Specifically, for March 2013, the last month of our data, we remove the lowest-
quality product in the month, solve for the new pricing equilibrium, and then compute
the corresponding consumer surplus and producer surplus. We repeat this counterfactual
simulation removing the median (highest)-quality product, and report the results in Table
2.7. Each column of the table corresponds to a simulation where a different product is
removed. In the first three rows of the table, we report changes in consumer surplus, carrier
surplus (i.e., the sum of carriers’ profits) and the sum of smartphone firms’ variable profits.
All three measures are expectations over the demand and the marginal cost shocks. In
the last row, we report the upper bound of the removed product’s fixed cost, which is the
maximum possible saving in fixed costs.
The results across all three columns of Table 2.7 show that consumers are worse off when a
16For any product removed, we remove it from all carriers.
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product is removed. This is partially due to changes in prices after the product is a removed,
but mainly because of the direct effect of removing the product. Specifically, when we hold
the prices of the remaining products fixed, we find that changes in consumer surplus are
(-0.94, -2.19, -11.57) million dollars across the three columns, which account for most of the
total change in consumer surplus. To put these changes in consumer surplus in perspective,
note that the average monthly sales of a product is 77540 units and the average subsidized
price is 122 dollars (see Table 2.1). Considering an average service plan price of 60 dollars
per months over 24 months, consumers pay a total of (60⇥ 24+ 122)⇥ 77540 dollars, which
is about 10 times the consumer surplus from removing the highest-quality product.
Carriers’ profits also drop. As for smartphone firms, the comparison of the third row and the
last row shows that if the fixed cost is at its upper bound, the total smartphone producer
surplus increases after a product is removed. This result confirms the intuition that because
firms do not internalize the business stealing effect, there may be excessive product prolif-
eration, especially if the fixed cost is high. However, this effect is dominated by the effect
of product offerings on consumer surplus: summing over the four rows of Table 2.7, we see
that removing a product leads to a decrease in total welfare, even considering the maximum
possible saving in the fixed cost.
Comparing results across the three columns, we can see that the changes in all welfare
measures become larger as we move from removing the lowest to the highest-quality product.
The main conclusion, however, remains the same: total welfare decreases even considering
the maximum possible saving in the fixed cost. In fact, when we repeat the above exercise
for each of the 54 products in March 2013, we find that our results hold in all 54 simulations.
Specifically,  (consumer surplus),  (carrier surplus) and  (smartphone producer variable
profits) are always negative; the sum of them plus the upper bound of the removed product’s
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fixed cost is always negative. These results indicate that removing any product in the market
leads to a decrease in total welfare, even considering the maximum possible saving in the
fixed cost. Finally, because it is a theoretical possibility that removing multiple products
together may increase total welfare, we have also repeated the exercise removing any two
products and find that the conclusion still holds.
In summary, the above results suggest that removing any one or two of the existing products
in this market is welfare-decreasing. However, does adding a product lead to an increase in
welfare? To answer this question, we consider adding a product that fills a gap in the quality
spectrum. Specifically, we plot the qualities of the products in March 2013 in Figure 2.5.1,
find the largest gap in quality above 4 (the gap between 5.72 and 6.05) and add a product
whose quality is at the midpoint of the gap (5.88).
Figure 2.5.1: Quality of Products in March 2013
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We conduct four simulations where this product is added to Samsung’s, LG’s, HTC’s or
Motorola’s product portfolio, respectively. After Apple, they are the four largest smartphone
firms in March 2013 according to their sales in that month. In all four simulations, we choose
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Sprint, the carrier with the least number of products, as the carrier. The simulation results
are presented in Table 2.8, each column of which represents a different simulation.
Not surprisingly, consumers are better-off with the additional product in the market (Row
1). Carriers also earn more profits (Row 2). Smartphone firms’ total variable profit increases
(Row 3). For the added product, we obtain a lower bound on its fixed cost, which is reported
in Row 4 of Table 2.8. The ratio of the sum of the first three rows to the last is around
2.3 for all four simulations. This implies that as long as the fixed cost is not more than 2.3
times of its estimated lower bound, the sum of the first three rows minus the fixed cost of
the added product (i.e., the change in total welfare) is positive. To put the number 2.3 in
perspective, note that the average upper bound and the average lower bound we report in
Section 2.4 are, respectively, 6.16 and 5.17, with a ratio of 1.2.
Overall, our simulation results from removing products and adding a product suggest that
there are too few products. As mentioned, there are two countervailing forces: firms do
not consider the business-stealing externality, which may lead to excessive product offerings;
firms do not consider consumer surplus, which may lead to insufficient product proliferation.
Our results suggest that the second effect dominates the first.
2.5.2 How does competition affect product offerings?
To study how competition affects product offerings, we simulate the effect of a hypothetical
merger between Samsung and LG in March 2013, the second and the third largest smartphone
firms in terms of sales in that month, following Apple. In the appendix of the paper version
of the chapter, we show the effects of a Samsung-Motorola merger and an LG-Motorola
merger, where Motorola is the fourth largest smartphone firm in March 2013. In these
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merger simulations, we compute the post-merger equilibrium in both product offerings and
pricing. In contrast, in Section 2.5.1, we only need to compute the new pricing equilibrium
for given product offerings in the market.
Computing the post-merger product-choice equilibrium can be challenging because the product-
choice action space for a firm can be very large. A firm can choose to drop any set of products
or add any number of products after the merger. To keep the problem tractable, we restrict
the set of potential products for each firm in the merger simulations to be the firm’s prod-
ucts in the data in either March or February 2013, plus two additional potential products
that fill gaps in the quality spectrum.17 As shown in the plot of the qualities of products in
March 2013 (Figure 2.5.1), the quality spectrum exhibits gaps between 5.72 and 6.05 and
between 6.40 and 6.64. We find the respective midpoints of these gaps (5.88 and 6.52) and
allow each firm to add a product whose quality is either 5.88 or 6.52. These two products
can be sold through any of the four carriers in the sample. Products in February or March
2013 are sold through their respective carriers observed in the data. In sum, with this set of
potential products, our simulation allows a firm to drop any subset of its existing products,
add back any subset of its discontinued products, add one or two additional products, or use
a combination of the above three types of adjustments.
Even with this restricted set of potential products, the choice set for a firm can still be too
large. This is because a smartphone firm chooses a product portfolio, which is a subset
(of any size) of the potential products. In other words, the choice set of a firm is the
17Since we do not have an estimate of the brand effect for the merged Samsung-LG entity, in the merger
simulation, we assign the Samsung brand effect to products originally offered by Samsung before the merger,
and the LG brand effect to those originally offered by LG. To be consistent, we allow four additional potential
products for the merged firm Samsung-LG, two of which carry the Samsung brand effect and two of which
carry the LG brand effect. In the appendix of the paper version of the chapter, we repeat the merger
simulation by assuming that the post-merger Samsung-LG brand effect is the average of the pre-merger
Samsung and LG brand effects. The results are robust to this alternative assumption.
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power set of its potential products. For example, the merged Samsung-LG entity has 31
potential products, and thus a choice set of 231 (⇡ 2.4⇥ 109) product portfolios. Moreover,
to compute the profit of each product portfolio, we need to compute the corresponding pricing
equilibrium, making the computational burden prohibitively high. To address this issue, we
use a heuristic algorithm to compute a firm’s optimal product portfolio given its competitors’
product portfolios. This algorithm is then embedded in a best-response iteration to solve for
the post-merge product-choice equilibrium.
We use firm m as an example to describe the heuristic algorithm for a firm’s optimal product
portfolio problem, and depict the algorithm in Figure 2.5.2.
Figure 2.5.2: Algorithm for Computing the Best-Response Product Portfolio
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Compute 𝑚’s profit from one-product deviations from 𝒥𝑚0  Let 𝒥𝑚1  be the highest-profit portfolio among these deviating portfolios 
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 Stop, 𝒥𝑚∗ = 𝒥𝑚0  Update, 𝒥𝑚0 = 𝒥𝑚1  
Let J¯m represent firm m’s potential products (for example, J¯m = {j1, ..., jn}). We start
with a portfolio J 0m ✓ J¯m (for example, J 0m = {j1, ..., jn1} where n1  n). We compute
firm m’s profit from each of the following deviations from J 0m: J 0m\ {jk} , k = 1, ..., n1 or
J 0m [ {jk} , k = n1 + 1, ..., n. Note that each deviation differs from J 0m in only one product:
either a product in J 0m is removed or a potential product not in J 0m is added. Let J 1m be the
highest-profit deviating product portfolio. If firm m’s profit corresponding to J 1m is smaller
than that corresponding to J 0m, this procedure stops and returns J 0m as the best response.
Otherwise, we compute m’s profit from any one-product deviation from J 1m by either adding
a potential product to or dropping a product from J 1m. We continue this process until firm
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m’s profit no longer increases. This algorithm allows us to translate a problem growing
exponentially in the number of potential products into one growing linearly in it.18
In this algorithm, even though we impose a one-product deviation restriction in each step
of the algorithm, the optimal product portfolio found by the algorithm can be very different
from the starting portfolio in both product number and composition. This is because each
step of the algorithm leads to a one-product deviation and strictly increases profit prior to
convergence. Therefore, as long as the algorithm does not converge after only one step, it
yields a product portfolio that deviates from the starting product portfolio by more than
one product. Note that product composition can also change as the algorithm drops one
product in one step and adds another in a later step.
To evaluate the performance of the algorithm, we conduct Monte Carlo simulations, as
discussed in the appendix of the paper version of the chapter. These simulations suggest
that our algorithm works well, at least for relatively small problems where we can solve
for the true optimal product portfolio without using the heuristic algorithm. Given that
we impose a one-product deviation restriction in each step, we also check and confirm that
no firm has a two-product profitable deviation at the equilibrium found by the heuristic
algorithm in our merger simulations below.
We embed this algorithm in a best-response iteration, where firms take turns updating to
their best-response product portfolio. We repeat this iteration until no firm has an incentive
to deviate. In the iteration, we loop firms according to their monthly sales in March 2013,
either ascending or descending. These two best-response iterations yield the same equilibrium
18? uses a similar idea to avoid excessive computation burden in studying firm acquisition problems.
Specifically, he assumes that when a firm decides on which set of firms to acquire, it makes a sequential
decision of whether to acquire each firm according to a pre-specified sequence of potential acquirees. Our
algorithm is less restrictive: in each step, a firm evaluates all one-product deviations simultaneously rather
than being constrained to one such deviation determined by a pre-specified sequence.
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in our merger simulations.
As for fixed costs, we draw the fixed cost for each potential product from a range consistent
with the bounds obtained in the estimation and report the average merger effects, averaged
over different sets of fixed-cost draws. Specifically, for each product in the data, we have
obtained an upper bound of its fixed cost (denoted by F¯j˜t). For such a product, we randomly
draw five fixed-cost values from the range
⇥
0.5F¯j˜t, F¯j˜t
⇤
. Similarly, for each potential product
not in the data, we have obtained a lower bound of its fixed cost F j˜t. We draw five fixed-cost
values from
⇥
F j˜t, 5F j˜t
⇤
. In the appendix of the paper version of the chapter, we consider two
alternative ranges for the fixed costs. In one alternative, we fix the length of the range to
be (F¯  F ), where F¯ = 6.16 and F = 5.27 are the average upper and lower bounds reported
in Section 2.4. In the other alternative, we define the range according to the quality of a
product. Our merger simulation results are robust to these two alternative fixed-cost ranges.
Table 2.9 presents the baseline merger simulation results. These results show an average
decrease of 2.50 products after the merger, mainly driven by the merged firm dropping
products: the average change for the merged firm is -3.40 while that for the non-merging
firms is 0.80. We also find that the merged firm drops products across the quality spectrum
except the very top. Specifically, we find that the average number of products dropped
from each quality quartile (below the pre-merger 25% quality quantile, [25%, 50%), [50%,
75%), and above 75%) is 0.6, 1, 1, and 0, respectively. Overall, the product variety measure
decreases by 21.41 (from 360.25). We use the following back-of-the-envelope calculation to
understand the magnitude of such a change. Before the merger, the range of the quality
spectrum is 6.68. The pre-merger product variety measure (360.25) is “as if” there are
54.93 equidistant products (360.25/6.68 + 1), while the post-merger product variety measure
(338.84) is “as if” there are 51.72 equidistant products. Therefore, a change of -21.41 in the
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product variety measure is equivalent to a decrease of about 3.21 in the number of “as if”
equidistant products.
Regarding changes in quality and price, we find little change in the sales-weighted average
quality in the market after the merger, but an increase in the sales-weighted average retail
price of 1.42 dollars. This is largely due to price increases for the merged firm’s products.
Specifically, the results in Row (9) of Table 2.9 show that the sales-weighted average retail
price of the merged firm’s products increases by about 8.87 dollars. Overall, sales for the
merged firm decreases and that for the non-merging firms increases, with a net change of
-87,526 units. The decrease in product offerings and the increase in prices eventually lead
to a reduction in consumer surplus by around 28 million dollars. Carriers are also worse
off. The total smartphone profit, however, increases by around 13.39 million dollars, among
them, 1.74 million dollars are attributed to the increase in the merged firm’s profit and
the remaining 11.64 million dollars are due to changes in non-merging firms’ profits with
an average increase of 1.06 million dollars per non-merging firm. Despite the increase in
smartphone producer surplus, overall welfare decreases by around 30.84 million dollars.
In summary, the results from this counterfactual simulation show that a reduction in com-
petition leads to a decrease in the number of products across the quality spectrum. This
decrease is accompanied by an increase in prices, leading to a decline in consumer and car-
rier surplus and eventually a reduction in overall welfare, despite an increase in smartphone
producer surplus. Our simulations of other mergers yield similar results (see the appendix
of the paper version of the chapter for the Samsung-Motorola and LG-Motorola merger).
The combination of our findings in the previous section (i.e., the market contains too few
products) and our findings in this section (i.e., a merger further reduces product offerings)
suggests that merger policies should be stricter when we take into account the effect of a
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merger on product offerings.
This conclusion is also consistent with a merger simulation where we keep the set of products
fixed and allow firms to adjust only prices after the merger. In such a merger simulation, we
find that the changes in consumer surplus, carrier profit, and smartphone firm profit are all
smaller (in absolute value). They are -19.46, -10.83 and 8.98 million dollars, respectively. In
contrast, they are -28.11, -16.58 and 13.39 million dollars when post-merger adjustments in
both product offerings and prices are allowed. The decrease in total surplus is also smaller,
again suggesting that the merger policy should be stricter considering firms’ endogenous
product choice.
2.6 Robustness Analyses
In this section, we conduct three robustness analyses. We change the demand side of the
model in the first two robustness analyses and the supply side in the third. For each robust-
ness analysis, we both re-estimate the model and repeat the counterfactual simulations.
On the demand side, one concern with our discrete choice model is that the assumption
of independent idiosyncratic shocks may lead us to overestimate the effect of removing or
adding a product on consumer surplus. To address this concern, we conduct two robustness
analyses where we add more random coefficients in order to allow greater correlation among
the utilities that a consumer gets from different products.
In the first robustness analysis, we add a random coefficient for the Apple dummy variable
and allow this random coefficient to be correlated with the quality random coefficient. The
estimation results in Table 2.10 indicate that the standard deviation of the Apple-dummy
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random coefficient is 2.625 and that this random coefficient is highly correlated with the
quality random coefficient (the estimated correlation is 0.991). Unfortunately, both estimates
are statistically insignificant. For the parameters common to both models, both the estimates
and the statistical significance levels are robust. More importantly, the results from the
counterfactual simulations, which allow us to address our research questions, are also robust
(see Tables 2.11). For example, we still find that removing a product reduces total surplus
even considering the maximum possible saving in the fixed cost, that adding a product
increases total surplus as long as the fixed cost is not much higher than its lower bound and
that a merger leads to a reduction in product offerings and eventually a decrease in total
welfare.
In the second robustness analysis, we add a random coefficient for each carrier dummy
variable. In Table 2.12, we show the estimation results show that the standard deviations of
all carrier dummy variable coefficients, except that for T-Mobile, are small and statistically
insignificant. The estimates for the parameters common to the two models are robust as are
counterfactual simulation results (see Table 2.13).
On the supply side, in the pricing model of the baseline specification, we assume that smart-
phone firms and carriers make their pricing decisions sequentially: smartphone firms make
decisions on wholesale prices before carriers make decisions on retail prices. It is possible that
they make the pricing decisions jointly. This is especially likely for Apple and AT&T during
the time when they had an exclusive contract (i.e., AT&T was the sole seller for iPhones
before February 2011). In the third robustness analysis, we allow Apple and AT&T to set
their pre-February 2011 iPhones prices jointly to maximize their joint profit from iPhones.19
19At the same time, other carriers choose their retail prices to maximize their profits and AT&T chooses
its retail prices for its non-iPhone products to maximize its profit from non-iPhone products.
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Specifically, we take the demand estimates from the baseline model, re-estimate the marginal
cost functions and fixed cost bounds and repeat the counterfactual simulations. Our results
inTable 2.14 indicate that our findings remain robust.
In the appendix of the paper version of the chapter, we present the results of additional
robustness analyses. First, we consider a model where all smartphone firms and all car-
riers jointly set retail prices. We also provide a uniform framework following Villas-Boas
and Hellerstein (2006) to discuss the differences between the baseline model and these two
alternative pricing models. Finally, we show that our results are robust to two additional
deviations to the simple linear pricing model.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, my co-author and I study how oligopolistic competition impacts product
offerings in the U.S. smartphone market. To this end, we develop and estimate a model for
the demand and supply of smartphones. We first conduct counterfactual simulations where
we add or remove products to determine whether there are too few or too many products in
the market. We then use merger simulations to study the effects of competition on product
offerings, prices, and overall welfare. Our findings show that there are too few products in the
market and that a reduction in competition decreases product number and product variety
and reduces total welfare. These results suggest that merger policies should be stricter when
we take into account the effect of a merger on product choice.
We conclude by highlighting a few caveats. First, similar to many papers in the endogenous
product choice literature, our paper uses a static model to describe consumer demand and
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firm behavior.20 On the supply side, this modeling choice is somewhat justifiable as we
focus on non-flagship products which presumably do not involve a large sunk cost such
as the R&D cost. However, consumers may be dynamic, which will lead to firm dynamic
behavior. For example, it may be costly for consumers to switch from one carrier to another.
Given such frictions, firms may consider how their decisions in the current period affect their
payoffs in the future. Note that, in a reduced-form way, our carrier/year fixed effects in the
utility function capture an average switching cost.21 Similarly, our estimated fixed cost in
a reduced-form way captures both the true fixed cost and the effect of a product on future
firm profits. That said, we acknowledge that we keep the carrier/year fixed effect and the
fixed cost constant in the counterfactual simulations and therefore do not discuss industry
dynamics.
Second, our model does not explain the choice of a carrier by a smartphone firm. As a
result, we do not discuss the effect of competition on the carrier choice for each product,
which may affect the pricing equilibrium, and thus a smartphone firm’s product offerings.
We could expand our definition of potential products for each firm to allow firms to choose
carriers.22 However, given that doing so increases the computational burden substantially
and that in the data, we do not observe smartphone firms moving one product from one
carrier to another, we leave this for future research.
20See, for example, Seim (2006b), Fan (2013b), Eizenberg (2014b), and Crawford, Shcherbakov and Shum
(2015a).
21For instance, the fixed effect for Verizon in a year captures its opponents’ market shares in the previous
year, which determines the proportion of consumers who have to pay switching costs to buy a Verizon
product this year. Therefore, this fixed effect somewhat captures the average switching cost for consumers
to buy a Verizon product.
22For example, we could add the combination of a firm’s products in March 2013 with all carriers as
additional potential products for the firm.
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Table 2.4: Estimation Results
Parameter Std. Error
Demand
Quality coefficient
Battery Talk Time (hours) 0.056⇤⇤⇤ 0.013
Camera Resolution (megapixel) 0.093⇤⇤⇤ 0.036
Chipset Generation 2 0.460⇤⇤⇤ 0.113
Chipset Generation 3 0.718⇤⇤⇤ 0.147
Chipset Generation 4 1.055⇤⇤⇤ 0.200
Chipset Generation5 1.674⇤⇤⇤ 0.280
Screen Size (inch) 1
Weight (gram) -0.002⇤ 0.001
Quality random coefficient
Mean 0.779⇤⇤⇤ 0.128
Std. Dev. 0.300⇤⇤⇤ 0.079
Price ($) -0.007⇤⇤⇤ 0.002
Apple 2.779⇤⇤⇤ 0.094
BlackBerry 1.237⇤⇤⇤ 0.121
Samsung 0.338⇤⇤⇤ 0.069
Flagship? 0.597⇤⇤⇤ 0.065
Carrier/Year and Quarter Fixed Effects Yes
Marginal Cost ($)
exp(quality/10) 518.521⇤⇤⇤ 2.504
Apple -30.221⇤⇤⇤ 0.115
BlackBerry 98.749⇤⇤⇤ 0.433
Samsung -20.413⇤⇤⇤ 0.131
Carrier/Year Fixed Effects Yes
* indicates 90% level of significance. *** indicates 99% level of significance.
Table 2.5: Demand Semi-Elasticities with Respect to Price
Atrix HD Galaxy S III iPhone 4 iPhone 4s iPhone 5
Atrix HD -6.600 0.089 0.160 0.213 0.398
Galaxy S III 0.065 -6.570 0.163 0.217 0.409
iPhone 4 0.047 0.066 -6.526 0.175 0.309
iPhone 4s 0.052 0.073 0.145 -6.476 0.337
iPhone 5 0.058 0.083 0.155 0.203 -6.289
Note: Top-five products on AT&T in in March 2013. (Row i, Column j): percentage
change in market share of product j with a $10 change in product i’s retail price.
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Table 2.6: Demand Elasticities with Respect to Quality
Atrix HD Galaxy S III iPhone 4 iPhone 4s iPhone 5
Atrix HD 7.875 -0.125 -0.148 -0.224 -0.488
Galaxy S III -0.087 8.207 -0.152 -0.23 -0.506
iPhone 4 -0.059 -0.086 5.168 -0.173 -0.357
iPhone 4s -0.066 -0.098 -0.129 5.906 -0.397
iPhone 5 -0.077 -0.114 -0.141 -0.21 6.762
Note: Top-five products on AT&T in in March 2013. (Row i, Column j): percentage
change in market share of product j with a 1 percentage change in product i’s quality.
Table 2.7: Welfare Changes when a Product is Removed, March 2013 (million $)
Removed product Lowest-quality Median Highest
 (consumer surplus) -0.92 -2.52 -12.67
 (carrier surplus) -0.83 -1.39 -9.13
 (smartphone producer variable profits) -0.50 -0.90 -3.24
Upper bound of savings in fixed costs 0.94 2.19 12.14
Table 2.8: Welfare Changes when a Product is Added, March 2013 (million $)
HTC LG Motorola Samsung
 (consumer surplus) 2.43 2.43 2.51 2.79
 (carrier surplus) 1.26 1.27 1.29 1.53
 (smartphone producer variable profits) 1.04 1.03 1.00 1.64
Lower bound of added fixed costs 2.10 2.11 2.13 2.62
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Table 2.9: The Effect of Samsung-LG Merger, March 2013
Variable Pre-merger Post-merger Change
(1) Number of Non-flagship Products 54 51.40 -2.60
(2) merged firm 26 22.60 -3.40
(3) non-merging firms 28 28.80 0.80
(4) Variety 360.25 338.84 -21.41
(5) Sales-weighted avg quality 8.40 8.42 0.02
(6) merged firm 7.32 7.34 0.02
(7) non-merging firms 6.25 6.25 0.0003
(8) Sales-weighted avg price ($) 110.00 111.43 1.42
(9) merged firm 156.08 164.95 8.87
(10) non-merging firms 91.23 91.51 0.28
(11) Total sales 7,002,268 6,914,742 -87,526
(12) merged firm 2,027,077 1,875,141 -151,936
(13) non-merging firms 4,975,192 5,039,601 64,410
(14) Consumer surplus (million $) 1681.21 1653.10 -28.11
(15) Carrier profit (million $) 1266.42 1249.84 -16.58
(16) Smartphone firm profit (million $) 1115.45 1128.83 13.39
(17) merged firm 270.90 272.64 1.74
(18) non-merging firms 844.55 856.20 11.64
Note: except in Rows (1) - (3), all variables are computed based on all products, including both
the flagship products and the non-flagship products.
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Table 2.10: Robustness Analysis: Allowing an Apple Random Coefficient
Parameter Std. Error
Demand
Quality coefficient
Battery Talk Time (hours) 0.052⇤⇤⇤ 0.016
Camera Resolution (megapixel) 0.109⇤⇤⇤ 0.046
Chipset Generation 2 0.444⇤⇤⇤ 0.137
Chipset Generation 3 0.743⇤⇤⇤ 0.180
Chipset Generation 4 1.145⇤⇤⇤ 0.261
Chipset Generation5 1.857⇤⇤⇤ 0.385
Screen Size (inch) 1
Weight (gram) -0.002⇤ 0.002
Quality random coefficient
Std. Dev., Quality 0.214⇤⇤ 0.104
Std. Dev., Apple FE 2.625 2.248
Correlation 0.991 1.559
Price ($) -0.006 0.079
Apple 0.030 2.059
BlackBerry 1.149⇤⇤⇤ 0.132
Samsung 0.337⇤⇤⇤ 0.069
Flagship? 0.592⇤⇤⇤ 0.069
Carrier/Year and Quarter Fixed Effects Yes
Marginal Cost ($)
exp(quality/10) 544.583⇤⇤⇤ 2.908
Apple -252.177⇤⇤⇤ 0.150
BlackBerry 104.275⇤⇤⇤ 0.510
Samsung -20.101⇤⇤⇤ 0.151
Carrier/Year Fixed Effects Yes
*** indicates 99% level of significance.
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Table 2.11: Robustness Analysis: Allowing an Apple Random Coefficient. Simulation
Removed product Lowest-quality Median Highest
 (consumer surplus) -1.13 -3.14 -7.45
 (carrier surplus) -1.03 -2.08 -4.20
 (smartphone producer variable profits) -0.68 -1.14 -1.89
Upper bound of savings in fixed costs 1.16 2.70 5.82
HTC LG Motorola Samsung
 (consumer surplus) 2.67 2.68 2.72 3.18
 (carrier surplus) 1.72 1.73 1.75 2.11
 (smartphone producer variable profits) 1.20 1.20 1.18 1.85
Lower bound of added fixed costs 2.34 2.35 2.36 2.98
Variable Pre-merger Post-merger Change
Number of non-flagship products 54 46.60 -7.40
Variety 324.84 283.61 -41.23
Sales-weighted avg quality 6.879 6.882 0.003
Sales-weighted avg price ($) 94.62 99.63 5.01
Total sales 7,398,499 7,190,089 -208,409
Consumer surplus (million $) 2632.84 2563.01 -69.83
Carrier profit (million $) 1648.47 1605.85 -42.63
Smartphone firm profit (million $) 1776.96 1811.47 34.52
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Table 2.12: Robustness Analysis: Allowing Carrier Random Coefficients
Parameter Std. Error
Demand
Quality coefficient
Battery Talk Time (hours) 0.067⇤⇤ 0.032
Camera Resolution (megapixel) 0.112⇤⇤⇤ 0.043
Chipset Generation 2 0.456⇤⇤⇤ 0.177
Chipset Generation 3 0.780⇤⇤⇤ 0.229
Chipset Generation 4 1.097⇤⇤⇤ 0.275
Chipset Generation5 1.786⇤⇤⇤ 0.373
Screen Size (inch) 1
Weight (gram) -0.001 0.002
Std. Dev. of Random Coefficients
Quality 0.349⇤ 0.213
AT&T 0.018 23.410
Sprint 0.394 33.860
T-Mobile 4.241⇤⇤ 1.997
Verizon 0.394 33.860
Price ($) -0.008⇤⇤⇤ 0.003
Apple 2.741⇤⇤⇤ 0.192
BlackBerry 1.253⇤⇤⇤ 0.175
Samsung 0.335⇤⇤⇤ 0.076
Flagship? 0.587⇤⇤⇤ 0.114
Carrier/year and quarter dummies Yes
Marginal Cost ($)
Exp(quality/10) 2.816⇤⇤⇤ 163.3324
Apple 0.134⇤⇤⇤ -351.291
BlackBerry 0.521⇤⇤⇤ 167.6449
Samsung 0.148⇤⇤⇤ -193.061
Carrier/year dummies Yes
* indicates 90% level of significance. ** indicates 95% level of significance.
*** indicates 99% level of significance.
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Table 2.13: Robustness Analysis: Allowing Carrier Random Coefficients, Simulation
Removed product Lowest-quality Median Highest
 (consumer surplus) -0.99 -2.39 -10.54
 (carrier surplus) -1.15 -1.40 -10.38
 (smartphone producer variable profits) -0.12 -0.66 -0.56
Upper bound of savings in fixed costs 0.96 2.05 10.42
HTC LG Motorola Samsung
 (consumer surplus) 1.96 1.92 2.03 2.44
 (carrier surplus) 0.95 0.95 0.99 1.26
 (smartphone producer variable profits) 0.8 0.81 0.77 1.34
Lower bound of added fixed costs 1.62 1.61 1.66 2.18
Variable Pre-merger Post-merger Change
Number of non-flagship products 54 28.80 -25.20
Variety 379.09 232.45 -146.64
Sales-weighted avg quality 8.38 8.44 0.05
Sales-weighted avg price ($) 94.71 102.50 7.80
Total sales 7,893,045 7,697,927 -195,118
Consumer surplus (million $) 2230.96 2171.69 -59.26
Carrier profit (million $) 1577.60 1559.69 -17.91
Smartphone firm profit (million $) 1299.89 1376.39 76.51
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Table 2.14: Robustness Analysis: Apple and AT&T Joint Price Setting before February 2011
Parameter Std. Error
Exp(quality/10) 460.828⇤⇤⇤ 2.274
Apple 6.473⇤⇤⇤ 0.107
BlackBerry 86.426⇤⇤⇤ 0.393
Samsung -17.546⇤⇤⇤ 0.119
Carrier/year dummies Yes
*** indicates 99% level of significance.
Removed product Lowest-quality Median Highest
 (consumer surplus) -0.80 -2.59 -14.08
 (carrier surplus) -0.72 -1.43 -10.22
 (smartphone producer variable profits) -0.47 -1.00 -4.22
Upper bound of savings in fixed costs 0.83 2.29 13.93
HTC LG Motorola Samsung
 (consumer surplus) 2.41 2.41 2.49 2.61
 (carrier surplus) 1.26 1.27 1.29 1.44
 (smartphone producer variable profits) 1.11 1.11 1.08 1.66
Lower bound of added fixed costs 2.13 2.14 2.17 2.52
Variable Pre-merger Post-merger Change
Number of non-flagship products 54 51.60 -2.40
Variety 360.25 339.96 -20.29
Sales-weighted avg quality 8.34 8.36 0.02
Sales-weighted avg price ($) 128.08 130.32 2.24
Total sales 6,792,576 6,697,845 -94,731
Consumer surplus (million $) 1632.88 1602.54 -30.34
Carrier profit (million $) 1225.29 1208.31 -16.97
Smartphone firm profit (million $) 1044.85 1058.08 13.23
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CHAPTER III
Does Vertical Integration Increase Innovation?
3.1 Introduction
In vertical industries, upstream and downstream innovations are often complementary. Up-
stream firms upgrade the core technologies essential to enhance performance, and down-
stream firms combine the new technology with new designs in the next generation of con-
sumer products. There are many examples, such as traction batteries (upstream) and electric
vehicles (downstream) and CPU’s (upstream) and personal computers (downstream). Given
the prevalence of vertical structures, this paper studies the effects of vertical integration on
pricing, innovation and welfare.
There is a large theoretical literature on vertical integration.23 Theory suggests that vertical
integration may affect both investment and price decisions. Vertical integration may be pro-
investment by aligning the investment incentives of the merged firms. Firms also set prices
differently when an upstream firm is merged with a downstream firm, producing the well
known efficiency trade-off between two pricing forces: on one hand, double marginalization
23Examples of surveys include Perry (1989), Holmström and Roberts (1998), Tirole (1999) and ? and
Aghion and Holden (2011). The list is far from exhaustive.
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is reduced within the integrated firm, which may charge consumers lower prices; on the
other hand, the integrated firm has an incentive to charge higher prices to downstream rivals
(raising rivals’ cost or the foreclosure effect). However, predictions of the net effects on firm
profits may depend on the nature of downstream product competition and how firms set
prices,24 and because investment is driven by the marginal value of investment, i.e. a firm’s
post-investment profit less the pre-investment profit, it is unclear how the price effects of
vertical integration affect investment.
Understanding the relative magnitudes and the interaction of the investment coordination
effects and price effects of vertical integration is crucial for policies and regulations. For
example, the potential tradeoff between one firm’s innovation and industry-wide innovation
was a key issue in the European antitrust case against Microsoft in 2004. Microsoft owned
the popular proprietary operating systems used on computer servers and foreclosed other
server software companies. Microsoft argued in its defense that the foreclosure would in-
crease its own innovation. The European Commission, however, believed that if Microsoft
were to provide downstream rivals (server software producers) with reasonable access to its
upstream technology (operating system), “the positive impact on the level of innovation in
the whole industry outweighed the negative impact of the dominant undertaking’s incentives
to innovate”.25 The court ruled against Microsoft. In effect, the authorities believed that
preventing foreclosures would increase the innovation of other downstream firms, and the
benefits would be greater than the potential increase of the integrated firm’s innovation.
In this paper, I use an empirical model of pricing and dynamic investment to study the
investment coordination and price effects of vertical integration in the context of the chipset
24Predictions can be more definitive in some more special cases, such as Riordan (1998).
25Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-3825 (Ct. First Instance).
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and smartphone industry. The main novelty is the specification of both dynamic upstream
and downstream firms. The upstream industry consists of a dominant firm (“Qualcomm”)
and a fringe, and the downstream firms are a finite number of handset makers. Qualcomm
invests to increase the quality of its chipsets. Similarly, downstream handset makers invest
to increase the quality of their handsets, but some handset makers are constrained by Qual-
comm’s chipset quality. Handset makers also choose the proportion of handsets that use
Qualcomm chipsets. A handset maker’s sunk cost of innovation depends on the amount of
quality increase and the proportion of handsets using Qualcomm. The dynamic game of in-
novation determines the set of products in every period. Conditional on the set of products,
Qualcomm and handset makers first negotiate chipset prices via Nash bargaining. Handset
makers then take the chipset prices as given, set retail prices and sell to the consumers.
Firms’ period profits are determined by the subgame perfect equilibrium of the overall static
pricing game. When deciding whether to innovate, firms weigh the gains in the present dis-
counted values of future profits due to innovation against the sunk costs, and the dynamic
decisions form a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
The model is estimated on a data set of the US smartphone market from 2009 to 2013. The
estimation procedure has three steps. First, price and quantity data allow me to estimate a
static random coefficient logit model of consumer demand for smartphones. I refer to a linear
combination of product characteristics, where the weights are given by the estimated demand
coefficients, as the quality index of the products,26 and I use this index to construct the
quality frontiers of Qualcomm and handset makers, detailed in Section 3.5. Next, I recover
chipset prices and non-chipset marginal costs of smartphones using data on chipset markups
and firms’ equilibrium pricing strategies. The first two steps do not involve estimating
26The demand model is the same as Fan and Yang (2016)
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the dynamic model. The estimates and the pricing equilibrium assumption imply firms’
period profit functions. In the last step, I use the estimated period profit functions and
the evolution of quality frontiers of Qualcomm and handset makers to estimate the cost
function of innovation. To keep the computation tractable, I estimate a dynamic game
among the upstream Qualcomm and three handset makers: Apple, Samsung and HTC, the
top three handset makers by revenue. The three handset makers account for 70.2% of the
total revenue during the sample period. Consistent with data, I assume that Apple only
uses its own chipsets, while HTC only uses Qualcomm chipsets. Samsung can adjust the
proportion of its handsets using Qualcomm chipsets. Samsung and HTC are constrained
by Qualcomm chipset quality, while Apple is not (it can innovate to a quality level not yet
reached by Qualcomm). I use the method of simulated moments to estimate the model.
The dynamic model is solved for every trial of parameters. To ensure the existence and
uniqueness of the dynamic equilibrium, I make two assumptions: 1) the dynamic game has
a finite horizon, and 2) firms make investment decisions sequentially within every period.27
I examine the counterfactual should Qualcomm merge with HTC, a key handset maker
that primarily uses Qualcomm chipsets. Using the model, I simulate the net effects of
vertical integration and decompose the net effects into the investment coordination effects
and price effects. In the main specification, I find that upstream innovation, defined as
the average increase of quality per period, increases by 38%, and the innovation rate of
the integrated handset maker increases by 23%. The increase primarily comes from the
investment coordination of Qualcomm and HTC: the integrated firm internalizes the marginal
value of HTC innovation for Qualcomm and the marginal value of Qualcomm innovation for
HTC. The price effects also increase the integrated firm’s innovation, but are much smaller
27The related robustness checks are discussed in the appendix of the paper version of the chapter.
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than the investment coordination effects. Moreover, Samsung is less often constrained by
the upstream innovation, and Samsung innovation increases by 26%, while Apple innovation
increases by 21%. Primarily due to the increase in innovation, consumer surplus increases by
over 20%. In addition, while the raising rivals’ cost effect increases Samsung’s retail prices,
the elimination of double marginalization lowers HTC prices, and the overall price effects
increase the consumer surplus. The total consumer and producer surplus (variable profits)
increases by over 18%. The findings thus suggest that vertical integration policies should
fully take into account a vertical merger’s dynamic implications and in particular the effects
of investment coordination, which may be much larger than the price effects.
Contributions and Related Literature This paper’s dynamic model of innovation is
grounded in the theory of incomplete contracts. Specifically, I assume that vertically sepa-
rated firms cannot contract on the amount of investment prior to the realization of invest-
ment. The assumption rules out the possibility that vertically separated firms can sign a
“cooperative” contract, where one side agrees to make investment in exchange for a future
transfer. The investment coordination effect studied in the counterfactual exercise quantifies
the efficiency gains of allowing Qualcomm and HTC to overcome the non-contractibility of
investment. Lafontaine and Slade (2007) surveys the empirical literature on vertical integra-
tion. Examples of empirical work that examines the competitive effects of vertical integration
using reduced form analyses includes Waterman and Weiss (1996), Chipty (2001), Hastings
(2004), Hastings and Gilbert (2005), Chen and Waterman (2007) and Hortacsu and Syverson
(2007), to name a few. Static structural models have also been used to understand the effects
of vertical integration in, for example, Asker (2004), Brenkers and Verboven (2006), Houde
(2012) and Crawford, Lee, Whinston and Yurukoglu (2015b). The model in this paper endo-
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genizes both the dynamic investment decisions as well as the pricing of intermediate goods. I
contribute to the growing literature that analyzes innovation with dynamic oligopoly models
(Ericson and Pakes (1995), Goettler and Gordon (2011), Borkovsky (2012), Igami (2015) and
others) by modeling the complementarity of innovations between the upstream and down-
stream firms. The static model of product competition is built on the empirical bilateral
bargaining framework developed in Horn and Wolinsky (1988). This type of models has been
widely used to analyze the pricing of services and physical goods in vertical industries. Ex-
amples include Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), Grennan (2013), Gowrisankaran, Nevo and
Town (2014), Ho and Lee (2015) and Crawford, Lee, Whinston and Yurukoglu (2015b). Like
many papers in this literature, I assume that firms in my model use linear price contracts.
Another strand of the empirical structural literature on vertical relations studies the pricing
and welfare effects of different upstream-downstream relationships (examples include Sudhir
(2001), Villas-Boas (2007) and Mortimer (2008)).
Closely related to this paper, Crawford, Lee, Whinston and Yurukoglu (2015b) studies how
vertical integration affects program carriage choices, prices and ultimately welfare in the
US television market using a multi-stage static model. I focus on the dynamic process of
innovation, where firms have rational expectations about the future evolution of the indus-
try. An interesting feature of the model in this paper is that the states and actions of the
upstream firm (Qualcomm’s quality level and its investment to increase the quality) do not
directly affect the current period profit of itself or downstream firms, and Qualcomm is solely
motivated to innovate by the expectation that downstream firms will innovate and adopt
Qualcomm chipsets in the future.
Lastly, I examine how different definitions of the disagreement point in the bargaining game
may affect counterfactual predictions. Many structural empirical studies assume that prod-
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ucts whose prices are negotiated would be dropped at the point of disagreement. I also con-
sider alternative definitions, where a downstream firm switches to an alternative upstream
product if the negotiation breaks down. I find that, while the main conclusions are robust,
the bargaining model where handset makers drop products at the point of disagreement pre-
dicts larger price changes in the counterfactual scenario of vertical integration, even when
different bargaining models are estimated on the same data set. The exercise suggests that
researchers should conduct robustness checks regarding the definitions of the disagreement
point, when there is no additional institutional knowledge to support the use of a particular
model.
Road Map In the rest of the paper, I first describe the institutional setting and data in
Section 3.2. Next, I detail the dynamic model of innovation in Section 3.3 and the static
model of bargaining and pricing in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 discusses the estimation of the
model, and Section 3.6 reports the counterfactual experiments.
3.2 Industry and Data
The key upstream firm in this industry, Qualcomm, produces application chipsets.28 This
chipset is the CPU of a smartphone, but it may also combine the functions of a GPU,
modem and other components (Yang et al. (2014)). The price of a chipset is usually between
$16 to $40 (Woyke (2014)). According to reports published by iHS, a tear-down company
that tracks component prices, the chipset accounts for 10 to 20% of the material cost of a
28Sometime a smartphone modem is also called a communication chipset. Throughout this paper a chipset
always means the application chipset.
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smartphone.29
Qualcomm is the most important company in the upstream chipset industry. In 2009, 53% of
non-Apple smartphones sold in the US carried a Qualcomm chipset, and the figure increased
to 72% in the first quarter of 2013. Although Qualcomm is able to capture the lion’s share of
the chipset market, there is no lack of competition. iPhone 4s and later models use Apple’s
own A series chipsets. Samsung uses its Exynos series chipsets on some of its handsets. There
are also a large number of independent chipset makers, such as MediaTek (Taiwan), Texas
Instruments (US) and NVIDIA (US). Compared with its competition, one of Qualcomm’s
advantages is its ability to combine many components (including the modem, GPS, GPU and
others) onto a single chipset. By using Qualcomm chipsets, handset makers may save the
development cost and the cost of procuring and combining other components. In addition,
an integrated chipset saves energy and thus extends battery life, and the more compact
design may also save space and allow handset makers to install additional components and
add functionality. Much like the role of CPU for personal computers, chipsets are central to
the performance of smartphones, because many of the metrics that consumers value, such
as processing power (CPU), support of fast network (modem), graphic processing (GPU)
and energy efficiency, are determined by the chipset. The innovations of chipsets center on
improving all components within the processor without sacrificing too much energy efficiency
or significantly increasing manufacturing costs (Yeap (2013)).
Qualcomm products are categorized in multiple generations released over time. Snapdragon
S1, the first generation of chipsets observed in the data, was released in October 2008.
Generation S2, S3 and S4 are released in April 2010, October 2010 and January 2012. S4
29iHS publishes the marginal cost estimates of select handsets through its press releases. I have collected
its published data, which are available upon request.
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is the last generation observed in the data. A later generation typically features significant
gains in performance (more cores and higher frequency) and energy efficiency. Following
Qualcomm’s release of a new generation, its competitors release comparable products. Table
3.15 reports the origins of chipsets used in major non-Apple handset makers.
Table 3.15: Chipset Origin, % of Handset Maker Retail Revenues, 2009 to 1st Quarter 2013
Samsung HTC Motorola LG BlackBerry
Qualcomm 33.93 99.60 14.73 94.10 51.10
Samsung 62.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TI 2.68 0.21 74.18 5.05 0.00
NVIDIA 0.47 0.10 8.70 0.85 0.00
Other 0.40 0.09 2.39 0.00 48.90
The downstream smartphone industry is relatively concentrated. From 2009 to 2012, the top
three handset makers were Apple, Samsung and HTC as measured by retail sales revenues,
and they accounted for 70% of the US market. Most smartphones in the US are sold through
the four major national wireless carriers, AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile and Sprint. Over time,
handset makers adopt new chipsets in new phones and provide many additional improve-
ments, such as larger and clearer screens, longer talk time, and higher definition cameras.
Handset makers spend billions of dollars on combining new technologies and designing new
phones. It is worth noting that the chipset quality nonetheless plays a central role in this
process. For example, several times more power is consumed by GPU and CPU than the
display when a smartphone is used to play video games (Chen et al. (2013)). A smart-
phone maker would not be able to use large screens for its phones without first obtaining
energy-efficient chipsets.
Smartphone sales are driven by the release of new products. I plot the monthly retail
sales revenues in Figure 3.2.1. The sales spikes tend to coincide with the release of flagship
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products. The innovation of Qualcomm, marked by the release of new generation of chipsets,
occurs 2 to 6 months before handset makers adopt the chipsets.
Figure 3.2.1: Handset Maker Monthly Sales Revenues
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The data set includes the aggregate sales, retail prices and characteristics of smartphones
sold through the four national carriers, from January 2009 to March 2013.30 The observation
is at the handset-carrier-month level. The US market accounts for about 15% of the global
shipment in Q4 2011 (Gartner (2012)), but is likely more important to the high end handset
makers. For example, it is reported that the US market accounted for over 40% of Apple’s
revenue in 2010.31 Throughout the analysis, I assume that the US market accounts for a
constant proportion of the world market. While I do not observe chipset prices directly, I
collect the accounting gross margin data of Qualcomm from its quarterly financial reports.
I use the data as the sales-weighted average markup of Qualcomm chipsets. The average
30Smartphone quantity and price data are acquired from the ITG Market Research, and the chipset
information is scrapped from technology websites and press releases.
31CSI Market.
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markup data allow me to impute product-specific chipset prices, detailed in Section 3.5.
Additional data and institutional details of the smartphone industry can be found in Fan
and Yang (2016).
3.3 A Dynamic Model of Upstream and Downstream In-
novation
Time is discrete t = 1, 2, . . . , T . The upstream consists of Qualcomm and a non-strategic
fringe. Downstream firms are comprised of a finite number of firms N . The Qualcomm
state variable is the quality frontier qQ. The state variables of a handset maker n include
the proportion of n’s handsets using Qualcomm and n’s quality frontier, sn = {⌘n, qn}, ⌘n 2
(0, 1). The industry state consists of s =
 
t, qQ, {⌘n, qn}n2N
 
. The empirical game estimated
later would include Apple and HTC whose ⌘’s are fixed, and Apple is not constrained by
Qualcomm innovation. To simplify the presentation of the model, I assume in this section
that all handset makers can adjust their proportions of handsets using Qualcomm, and are
constrained by Qualcomm’s quality frontier.
In every period, Qualcomm chooses quality increments of its quality frontier,
aQ 2 {0, , 2 , . . . , K1 }, and the next period Qualcomm state transitions to qQt+1 = qQt +aQ.
The action in data that corresponds with Qualcomm innovation is its release of new chipsets.
A handset maker also chooses quality increments anq 2 {0,  , 2 , . . . , K2 }. If n does not in-
novate (anq = 0), the proportion stays the same. If n innovates (anq > 0), n also chooses its
proportion of handsets using Qualcomm from a discrete set, an⌘ 2 {⌘1, ⌘2, . . . , ⌘K3}, at the
new quality level qnt+1 = qnt + anq . n’s state transition can be summarized as the following:
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when n takes action an =
 
anq , a
n
⌘
 
, the next period state becomes
8>><>>:
qnt+1 = q
n
t+1 + a
n
q , ⌘
n
t+1 = a
n
⌘ , if anq > 0
qnt+1 = q
n
t , ⌘
n
t+1 = ⌘
n
t , if anq = 0
The action in data corresponding with handset maker n’s innovation is the launch of a
handset whose quality is higher than any of n’s previous handsets.
The game starts in t = 1. In every period, firms first receive period profits ⇡t (st), and make
dynamic decisions sequentially. Qualcomm moves first, and handset makers move in the
sequence n1, . . . nN :
• Qualcomm draws i.i.d cost shock "Qt , takes action aQt and pays a sunk cost of CQ
⇣
aQt , "
Q
t
⌘
.
• Handset maker n1 observes Qualcomm’s decision, draws i.i.d cost shock "n1t , takes
action an1 and pays Cn1 (an1t , "
n1
t )
...
• Handset maker nN observes all previous actions, draws i.i.d cost shocks "nNt , takes
action anN and pays CnN (anN , "nNt ).
The dynamic optimization problem of Qualcomm in period t solves
max
aQ
⇣
 CQ
⇣
aQ, "Qt
⌘
+  E
⇣
V Qt+1 (st+1) |st
⌘⌘
,
where the expectation is taken over the action probabilities of firms who have not moved in
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period t. The value function of Qualcomm satisfies the Bellman equation
V Qt (st) = ⇡
Q (st) +
ˆ
"Qt
n
 CQ
⇣
aQ?, "Qt
⌘
+  E
⇣
V Qt+1 (st+1) |st
⌘o
, (3.3.1)
where the strategy aQ? is a function of its own cost shock. Similarly, a handset maker n
solves
max
an
  Cn (an, "nt ) +  E  V nt+1 (st+1)   aN (n), st    ,
but subject to the constraint that qnt + anq  qQt+1. aN (n) denotes the actions of firms that
have moved before n. The Bellman equation of n is identical to (3.3.1), with the superscript
Q replaced by n. Also note that n’s strategy is a function of its shocks and the actions of
firms that have moved. Players in this game have private information and move sequentially,
and I solve for the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBE). The last period value function
is specified as VT =
⇡ (sT )
1    .
While the assumptions of a finite horizon and sequential moves are quite strong, they provide
three crucial benefits: 1) the dynamic equilibrium is unique, 2) solving the dynamic game
does not involve value function iterations and suffers no convergence problem (Egesdal, Lai
and Su (2015)), 3) the finite horizon assumption also helps to capture the non-stationarity
in data (Igami (2015)). I explore the robustness of both assumptions in the appendix of the
paper version of the chapter.
The investment cost is specified as
CQ
⇣
aQ, "Qt
⌘
=
8>><>>:
0, aQ = 0
exp
⇣
 Q0 +
⇣
 Q1 +  
Q"Qt
⌘
aQ
⌘
aQ > 0
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Cn (an, "nt ) =
8>><>>:
0, anq = 0
exp
 
 n0 + ( 
n
1 +  
n"qt ) a
n
q +  
n
2 a
n
⌘
 
anq > 0
The cost shocks " follow the standard normal distribution.
In this model, I assume that dynamic innovation decisions are not contractible. Therefore it
is not possible that HTC enters into a contract with Qualcomm about Qualcomm innovation
before Qualcomm’s innovation is realized. Such contracts would effectively achieve vertical
integration. Grossman and Hart (1986) suggests that without investment coordination,
two vertically separated firms would invest below the socially optimal level because neither
firm fully internalizes the benefit of investment on the other. Central to the concept of
“incompleteness” is the difficulty of communicating a firm’s investment decisions to others
before the realization of the investment. Indeed, while the technology capability of a firm is
abstracted into a scalar q in the model, coordinating innovations in the real world potentially
would require the chipset maker and handset maker to agree on the joint development of many
dimensions of the technology. Identifying and agreeing to the exact nature of innovation
may be hard enough. The legal costs of writing down contracts that enumerate all aspects
of cooperative development could be high. Enforcement may be hard, because in the case
of contract violations, firms may need to disclose proprietary designs in a legal proceeding.
Given these considerations, I assume that firms cannot contract on future innovation.32
32The ex ante communication difficulty may be overcome in an infinite horizon dynamic game. There
may exist a PBE where firms condition strategies on past actions and Qualcomm may be able to credibly
slow down innovation and “punish” HTC, if HTC does not pay Qualcomm a transfer after a Qualcomm
innovation. The additional assumptions of a finite horizon and sequential moves rule out this possibility:
the game admits a unique solution, which can be obtained via backward induction. In this equilibrium, the
downstream firms would never voluntarily pay Qualcomm a transfer.
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3.4 Bargaining Model
The profit function ⇡ (st) is given by a static model of bargaining. I assume that prices are
set in the following order:
1. Qualcomm and handset makers negotiate chipset prices via Nash bargaining.
2. Handset makers take the chipset prices and other components of the marginal cost as
given, set retail prices and sell to consumers.
I start with the demand function.
3.4.1 Consumer Demand
I model the consumer demand for smartphones using a random coefficient logit model (Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes (1995a)). Index consumers by i and handsets by j. The utility of
consumer i purchasing handset j in period t is
uijt =  0iqj   ↵pjt + ✓n(j) + c(j)t + ⇠jt + ✏icjt
=  ¯0qj   ↵pjt + ✓n(j) + c(j)t + ⇠jt| {z }
µjt
+ ⌫iqj + ✏ijt
where qj = xj  is the linear quality index of handset characteristics,  0i is a normally
distributed scalar random coefficient that captures the heterogeneous tastes for quality:  0i =
 0+ ⌫i, ⌫i ⇠ N (0, 1), pjt is the retail price of the smartphone, ✓n is the handset maker fixed
effect, ct is the carrier-year fixed effect plus quarter fixed effect that captures carrier service
heterogeneity and the values of time-varying outside options (this term is referred to as
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carrier-time fixed effects in the rest of the paper), ⇠jt is the unobserved product quality,
and ✏ijt is an i.i.d type I extreme value shock. Smartphone characteristics in xj include
the screen size, camera resolution and chipset generation fixed effects. The mean portion of
the consumer utility function is collected in the term µjt, and the utility of no purchase is
normalized to zero plus an i.i.d type I extreme value shock ✏i;t. The demand for j is given
by
Djt = D0
ˆ
exp (µjt +  ⌫iqj)
1 +
P
j02Jt exp (µj0t +  ⌫iqj0)
dF⌫i ,
where Jt is the set of all products available in period t, D0 is the market size and F⌫i is the
CDF of ⌫i. I next discuss the pricing of smartphones and chipsets.
3.4.2 Prices of the Smartphones
Denote the set of handset maker n’s product as Jnt. Given the chipset prices  jt and other
parts of the marginal cost !jt, handset maker n sets wholesale prices wjt, 8j 2 Jnt, to
maximize its profit X
j2Jnt
(wjt    jt   !jt)Djt.
The non-chipset marginal cost of a smartphone is specified as a function of observed char-
acteristics plus a shock:
!jt ⌘  q exp (qjt) +  n(j) +  Q(j) + ⇣c(j)t| {z }
quality, handset maker FE
use Qualcomm?
carrier-time FE
+ {jt|{z}
shock
. (3.4.1)
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Carrier pricing of handsets can be complex. To simplify computation, I assume that the
carrier subsidy on product j is specified as
rjt =  ˜q exp (qjt) +  ˜n(j) +  ˜Q(j) + ⇣˜c(j)t + {˜jt,
such that the retail price satisfies pj = wjt   rjt. Handset maker n’s profit maximization
problem can be re-written as
max
pj ,j2Jnt
X
j2Jnt
(pjt    jt   (!jt   rjt))Djt.
Given this equivalence, I assume that handset makers choose retail prices directly. To save
notation, I re-define !jt as !jt   rjt, and correspondingly, the coefficients in the non-chipset
component   as    ˜ and the shock { as { {˜. Equilibrium retail prices satisfy the following
first order condition:
sjt +
X
j02Jnt
(pj0t    j0t   !j0t) @sj0t
@pjt
= 0, 8j0 2 Jnt.
In vector notation similar to Eizenberg (2014a), the vector of retail prices p satisfies
p     ! = (L ⇤ ) 1 s, (3.4.2)
where L is a |Jt| ⇥ |Jt| product origin matrix (Ljj0 = 1 if both j and j0 belong to Jnt and
0 otherwise),  jj0 is the derivative of the demand for j0 with respect to the price of j, and
⇤ represents element-by-element multiplication. If the price equilibrium is unique at this
stage, the derived demand for chipsets on handset j is well defined. However, there may be
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multiple Nash-Bertrand equilibria under logit demand with random coefficients and multi-
product firms (Echenique and Komunjer (2007)). To select an equilibrium, I use (3.4.2) as a
fixed point mapping to solve for the equilibrium iteratively. The starting point is the price
of the product in data that is closest in quality. Denote D? = D (p? ( ,!)) as the derived
demand for chipsets.
3.4.3 Nash Bargaining and Chipset Prices
The bargaining game in the first stage of the static game determines the equilibrium chipset
prices between Qualcomm and handset makers. I first write down Qualcomm’s profit func-
tion. Qualcomm earns profits from chipset sales:
⇡Qt ( ) =
X
j2JQt
 
 jt    
 
D?jt
where JQt is the set of handsets using Qualcomm chipsets and  is the marginal cost for
Qualcomm to manufacture a chipset.33 The chipset prices are set in a bargaining equilibrium.
Qualcomm negotiates with each handset maker n separately. Denote the vector of chipset
prices specific to a Qualcomm-n bargaining pair as  nt = ( jt, j 2 JQt \ Jnt).
Definition 1. Chipset prices  nt for all products in JQt \ Jnt are set to maximize the
Nash product corresponding with the bargaining pair of Qualcomm and handset maker n,
conditional on other chipset prices   nt:
h
⇡Qt
 
 nt,  nt
   ⇡˜Qt    nt i⌧t · ⇥⇡nt   nt,  nt   ⇡˜nt    nt ⇤1 ⌧t ,
33In reality, Qualcomm does not own any chipset manufacturing facility, and it outsources the production
to dedicated fabrication plants.
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where ⇡˜ is the disagreement payoff, and ⌧t is the bargaining weight.34
Many papers using empirical bargaining games such as Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012),
Grennan (2013) and Crawford et al. (2015b) employ the assumption that, at the disagreement
point, products in JQt\Jnt are dropped, and firms earn profits from the rest of the products
with the remaining products’ chipset prices fixed and downstream equilibrium recalculated.
In absence of Qualcomm’s chipset competitors, there is reason to believe that the bargaining
weight ⌧ should be close to 0.5: Collard-Wexler, Gowrisankaran and Lee (2014) interprets
the parameter as the relative discount factor, and the discount factors are likely equal across
agents.35 However, as Qualcomm’s competitors are able to offer substitutable chipsets, this
weight is unlikely to be 0.5. Another plausible disagreement point definition may be that,
while the bargaining weight is fixed at 0.5, handset makers switch to an outside alternative
temporarily. I therefore consider three types of disagreement payoffs:
1. n switches to a non-Qualcomm source and does not pay chipset prices to Qualcomm,
but the qualities of products in JQt \Jnt decrease by q¯t, their chipset prices are set to
0, and Qualcomm does not provide chipsets for these products. Chipset prices of other
products are held fixed, and the downstream equilibrium is recalculated. ⌧t = 0.5.
q¯t = q¯ +  q$t. $t is standard normal i.i.d across time, and (q¯,  q) are parameters to
be estimated.
2. n switches to a non-Qualcomm source and does not pay chipset prices to Qualcomm,
but procures chipsets for products in JQt \Jnt at a price  ¯t, and Qualcomm does not
34Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) shows that alternative definitions of a bargaining pair do not strongly
affect their counterfactual equilibrium price predictions.
35This parameter may also reflect differences of bargaining abilities due to, for example, the access to
information (Grennan and Swanson (2016)).
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provide chipsets for these products. The qualities of these products do not change.
Chipset prices of other products are held fixed, and the downstream equilibrium is
recalculated. ⌧t = 0.5.  ¯t =  ¯ +   $t. $t is standard normal i.i.d across time, and 
 ¯,   
 
are parameters to be estimated.
3. Products in JQt\Jnt are dropped, and firms earn profits from the rest of the products.
Chipset prices of other products are held fixed, and the downstream equilibrium is re-
calculated. The bargaining weight is an unknown parameter ⌧t 2 (0, 1) to be estimated.
⌧¯t = ⌧¯ +  ⌧$t. $t is standard normal i.i.d across time, and (⌧¯ ,  ⌧ ) are parameters to
be estimated.
In the bargaining equilibrium, the vector of all Qualcomm chipset prices  satisfies the
following first order condition:
 =  +⇥ 1 , (3.4.3)
where ⇥ and   are defined (differently) for each bargaining model in the appendix of the
paper version of the chapter.36
It should be noted that the assumption of linear contracts between handset makers and
Qualcomm is not completely innocuous. This assumption introduces double marginalization,
an inefficiency that vertical integration can reduce. Unfortunately, contracts and contracting
processes are confidential, and it is hard to obtain detailed information on these procurement
agreements. I nonetheless was able to download from SEC a copy of modem procurement
contract (with numbers redacted) between Qualcomm and a client (not a smartphone maker).
The contract specifies the unit price, quantity and date of delivery. If two vertical monopolies
36There may also be multiple bargaining equilibria. To define the period profit for each firm, I use (3.4.3)
as a fixed point mapping to iteratively solve for the equilibrium chipset prices, starting from 1.2 .
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can contract on both the price and quantity and firms have complete information about
downstream demand, there may exist a contract equivalent to a lump sum transfer agreement
that avoids double marginalization. On the other hand, if firms in fact only negotiate prices
and the quantity is given by the demand function, the agreement is a linear contract. Without
knowing which is the case, I follow the many papers in the literature of empirical bargaining
games and assume that firms use linear contracts. Future work will explore alternative
specifications.
3.4.4 Period Profit
Collect the number of products, product qualities, chipset origins, the bargaining parameter
(q¯t, ⌧t or  ¯t) and carrier-time fixed effects in a vector y. Using the equilibrium selection
rules above, Qualcomm and handset maker profits can be written as a function of y, demand
shocks and marginal cost shocks, ⇡Qt (y, ⇠,{) and ⇡nt (y, ⇠,{). Note that y does not include
the state variable of Qualcomm.
In this paper, I focus on how firms adjust quality frontiers, and assume that y is a realization
from the distribution g (Y ; st, ✓): the set of products is a stationary distribution conditional
on the state variables defined in Section 3.3.37 The specification of g (·) is in the appendix
of the paper version of the chapter. In particular, the distribution is based on handset
makers’ state variables alone. As qn increases, the highest and average qualities of n’s
smartphones increase; at a higher ⌘n, a larger number of n’s handsets use Qualcomm. Firms
use ⇡Q (st) ⌘ EY,⇠,{|st
⇣
⇡Qt (Y, ⇠,{)
⌘
and ⇡n (st) ⌘ EY,⇠,{|st (⇡nt (Y, ⇠,{)) to make dynamic
innovation decisions.
37See Fan and Yang (2016) for a study on product variety.
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The assumptions of the static demand and pricing and the stationarity of product distri-
bution allow the period profits to be computed separately from the dynamic game. The
integration of ⇡Qt (Y, ⇠,{) and ⇡nt (Y, ⇠,{) over the distribution of products, demand shocks
and cost shocks is time-consuming but only needs to be done once, because the random vari-
ables are distributed i.i.d over time. No knowledge of the innovation costs or the dynamic
equilibrium is required to compute period profits. The profits are then taken as input to
the estimation and simulation of the dynamic game. In reality, smartphones may be both
durable goods and network goods (Sinkinson (2014) and Luo (2014)). While the framework
in this paper does not include dynamic consumers and endogenous network effects, the de-
mand function partially captures both effects with ct, and the model implicitly assumes
that the two effects are exogenous.
3.5 Estimation
3.5.1 Demand and Smartphone Marginal Cost
Demand is estimated using standard BLP instruments on the full sample from January 2009
to March 2013. Each month is treated as an independent market. The estimates of the
demand model are presented in the left panel of Table 3.16. The characteristics xj used to
construct the quality index include the screen size,38 chipset generation, camera resolution,
weight and the talking time on full battery. The screen size coefficient is normalized to be 1.
The chipset generation fixed effect corresponds with each generation of Qualcomm chipsets
and comparable products. Generation 1 corresponds with phones that do not use chipsets
38The screen size is measured as the diagonal length of the phone, as is standard in this industry, and the
unit is inch.
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or use uncategorized old chipsets, and the coefficient is normalized to be 0. The brand fixed
effects of Apple, Samsung and BlackBerry are also included. The detailed definitions of
variables and interpretations of the coefficients are documented in Fan and Yang (2016).
The demand estimates are reasonably intuitive, with higher generation, camera resolution,
lower weights and longer battery talk time contributing positively to the index. The Apple
brand fixed effect in the demand function is large, worth over $400 to consumers.
Using the estimates, the quality index of a product is constructed as qj = xj . I construct the
quality frontier of a handset maker in period t as the highest quality in and before period t,
maxt0t qj, j 2 Jnt0 . Because the sales of a handset maker are driven by its flagship products,
and these flagship products often have the highest quality, this construction captures the
essence of handset maker innovation. To construct the frontier corresponding with each
generation’s Qualcomm chipsets, I use the highest quality of handsets using that generation’s
chipsets plus 0.25. For example, the highest quality handset that uses generation 4 is Galaxy
Note, and its quality is 7.17. The generation 4 chipset quality is then 7.42. It is possible
that the observed handsets on a generation’s chipsets never “reach the full potential”, and
a handset maker could use the chipset to produce a phone whose quality may be much
higher than 7.17. My construction may seem conservative, but a 0.25 increase in quality
is nontrivial, because it is almost the size of the increase of the generation coefficient from
generation 2 to 3 and from 3 to 4.
I now discuss how to estimate the marginal cost function (3.4.1). Given the estimated
demand function and observed prices, the full marginal cost ! +  can be inverted using
the first order condition (3.4.2). To estimate the coefficients in (3.4.1), I need to break out
the chipset prices  . To impute  , I rely on the average Qualcomm markup data in its
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Table 3.16: Demand Side Estimates
Est Se
 
Screen Size (inch) 1 -
Chipset Generation 2 0.460 0.113
Chipset Generation 3 0.718 0.147
Chipset Generation 4 1.055 0.200
Chipset Generation 5 1.674 0.280
Camera Resolution (megapixel) 0.093 0.036
Weight (gram) -0.002 0.001
Battery Talk Time (hours) 0.056 0.013
  Std, Quality 0.300 0.079
 ¯0 Mean, Quality 0.779 0.128
↵ Price ($) 0.007 0.002
✓n Apple 2.779 0.094
Carrier-time and other brand fixed effects included
Table 3.17: Supply Side Estimates
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Est Se Est Se Est Se
 q exp (quality/10) ($) 425.884 2.818 425.968 2.818 425.308 2.816
 Q Use Qualcomm? ($) -12.537 0.266 -12.745 0.266 -12.738 0.266
Carrier-time and brand fixed effects included
quarterly financial reports39 and the equilibrium first order conditions corresponding with
the Nash product, (3.4.3). I set Qualcomm’s marginal cost of manufacturing a chipset to be
$20. Consider Bargaining Model 1. For every q¯, I can solve for a vector of chipset prices
consistent with the observed retail prices using (3.4.3) in every t. If the solution is unique,
then there exists a one-to-one relationship between q¯ and the vector of equilibrium chipset
prices. Because a vector of chipset prices implies a unique sales-weighted average Qualcomm
39This figure is defined as 1-(cost of goods sold/total revenue), which does not include fixed and sunk costs
such as administrative overhead and R&D. Nevo (2001) argues that this is an upper bound on the markup.
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Table 3.18: Bargaining Parameters and Mean Chipset Prices
Bargaining Parameter Estimatesa
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Est Se Est Se Est Se
q¯ 0.222 0.015  ¯ ($) 57.884 2.510 ⌧ 0.097 0.006
 q 0.062 0.011   ($) 10.340 1.828  ⌧ 0.025 0.004
Mean Chipset Prices ($)b
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
36.746 36.749 36.700
a: mean and standard deviations are calculated from inverted q¯t,  ¯t or ⌧t specific to
each quarter on a sample of 17 quarters.
b: averaged over all imputed chipset prices of Samsung and HTC.
chipset markup, there exists a one-to-one relationship between q¯ and the average Qualcomm
markup. I use this relationship to invert a q¯t for every period. In practice, I can always
obtain a unique solution when solving for the chipset prices from multiple starting points.
Table 3.17 shows that the marginal cost estimates from three different bargaining models are
consistent. The non-chipset components’ costs increase with the quality of the smartphone.
Using a Qualcomm chipset saves $12 to $13 in marginal cost for the non-chipset part of the
phone. An alternative interpretation is that it costs about $12 to acquire a non-Qualcomm
chipset. The estimates of the bargaining parameters are presented in Table 3.18. The
financial reports I used are quarterly, and the sample includes 17 quarters. For every quarter,
depending on the bargaining model, I invert a q¯t,  ¯t or ⌧t by matching the (un-discounted)
sales-weighted average Qualcomm markup of the quarter with the gross margin data. I
assume that the random variables are normal and distributed i.i.d over quarters, and I
estimate the mean and standard deviation using the 17 observations. During the inversion
process, I use a minimization algorithm to match markup with data. I run the algorithm
from 10 different starting points and always find a unique solution. The average Qualcomm
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chipset prices are about $37. Notably, the mean bargaining weight in Model 3 is close to 0,
implying that Qualcomm bargaining power is low, consistent with the fact that Qualcomm
faces competition from other chipset makers.
3.5.2 Sunk Cost of Innovation
The estimates of the static pricing game allow me to simulate period profits at any given point
in the state space. For any parameter value of the sunk cost function, I am able to solve for
the unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. I therefore employ a nested fixed point simulated
estimator that matches moments from the model with data. To limit the computational
burden, I estimate a dynamic game of Qualcomm and the three top handset makers: Apple,
Samsung and HTC. I assume that the order of moves is Qualcomm, HTC, Samsung and
Apple. This order is chosen so that the two firms using Qualcomm are the first to react to
Qualcomm’s actions. Apple is assumed to always use non-Qualcomm chipsets
 
⌘A = 0
 
and
not constrained by Qualcomm quality frontier; HTC innovation is constrained by Qualcomm,
and always chooses ⌘HTC = 1: the chipsets of all HTC phones are supplied by Qualcomm
and their prices are determined in the bargaining equilibrium; Samsung innovation is also
constrained by Qualcomm, but can adjust the proportion of Qualcomm chipsets used on
Samsung handsets. It should be noted that Samsung uses its own chipsets in some of its
flagship smartphones. However, these smartphones are typically launched much later than
the corresponding Qualcomm generation. For example, Samsung Note II (the 5th chipset
generation) using Samsung’s own Exynos chipsets was launched in Oct 2012, while the
corresponding generation of Qualcomm chipsets was launched in January 2012, and the first
smartphone using Qualcomm’s generation 5 chipsets was launched in April 2012. The model
is solved by backward induction from the last period of data, March 2013. Additional details
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are provided in the appendix of the paper version of the chapter, where I also check the
sensitivity of the assumptions of a finite horizon and sequential moves. In the first exercise,
I solve the model from August 2013, with the carrier-time fixed effects in the period profit
functions for April to August 2013 extrapolated from demand estimates in earlier periods.
In the second exercise, I reverse the order of downstream firms’ moves, and firms move in
the sequence of Qualcomm, Apple, Samsung and HTC.
To underscore the importance of potential cost heterogeneity, I estimate a firm specific
intercept  0. I also estimate a different  1 specific to Apple, Samsung and Qualcomm. I
restrict  HTC1 =  
Samsung
1 , and I also restrict  Apple =  Samsung =  HTC and estimate a
different  Qualcomm, giving me a total of 10 parameters to estimate. I use the following
moments:
1. mean innovation rates, defined as ı¯ = (qT   q1) /T ;
2. variance of innovation rates,
PT 1
t=1 (qt+1   qt   ı¯)2 /T ;
3. the mean distance from Qualcomm frontier to the maximum of HTC and Samsung’s
frontiers,
⇣PT
t=1
⇣
qQt  max
 
qSt , q
H
t
 ⌘⌘
/T ;
4. the mean proportion of Qualcomm chipsets on Samsung products,
PT
t=1 ⌘t/T .
There are exactly 10 moments for 10 parameters: the exact identification case also helps to
diagnose the performance of the minimizer of the objective function, because the minimum
is 0. I use the genetic algorithm to minimize the objective function.
The moments are sensitive to the parameters.  n0 ’s are mainly identified by the mean in-
novation rates. Both the mean and variance of innovation rates react sharply to changes
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in  n1 . The distance between Qualcomm and the maximum of HTC and Samsung frontiers
is sensitive to  Q1 and  handset. The mean innovation rates of Samsung and Qualcomm and
the mean proportion of Qualcomm chipsets are sensitive to  Samsung2 . The mean innovation
rates of Samsung, HTC and Qualcomm and the mean proportion of Qualcomm chipsets are
sensitive to  Q.40
Table 3.19: Estimates of Innovation Costs
Bargaining Model 1 2 3
Est Se Est Se Est Se
 n0
Apple -0.28 0.22 -0.28 0.62 -0.28 0.48
Samsung -0.07 1.39 -0.07 1.79 -0.07 1.63
HTC -0.14 0.30 -0.17 0.41 -0.14 0.64
Qualcomm -4.78 0.68 -4.78 0.35 -4.78 0.94
 n1
Apple 2.68 0.26 2.68 0.41 2.68 0.98
HTC/Samsung 1.55 0.00 1.55 0.01 1.55 0.09
Qualcomm 0.41 0.21 0.41 0.17 0.41 0.85
 n2 Samsung -4.00 0.93 -4.39 0.84 -4.00 0.70
 n
Handset Makers 1.60 0.12 1.60 0.28 1.60 0.41
Qualcomm 0.44 0.78 0.43 0.87 0.44 0.77
The estimates based on the period profit functions of each bargaining model are reported
in Table 3.19. The intercept estimates  0 are small and close to 0 except for Qualcomm.
The estimates show that increasing one unit of quality (0.25) is more costly for Apple than
for Samsung and HTC, and using a higher proportion of Qualcomm chipsets reduces the
innovation sunk costs. The estimates are consistent with the possibility that Qualcomm is
more likely to work with a customer that primarily uses Qualcomm chipsets to reduce the
handset maker’s development costs.
To put the parameters in perspective, I simulate the dynamic model at the estimated param-
40Gentzkow and Shapiro (2014) provides a (standardized) sensitivity measure to formally quantify this
type of discussion.
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eter value 120 times, starting from January 2009. For the simplicity of presentation, I only
discuss the results using Bargaining Model 1 (handset makers’ product qualities decrease at
the disagreement point); the results from the other two models are very similar. The evo-
lution of qualities, averaged across all simulation paths, is displayed alongside the observed
data in Fig. 3.5.1. While the simulation does not capture the “lumpiness” of the innovation
process in data,41 it does approximate the trend reasonably well. The simulated average
total investment expenditures of Apple, Samsung, HTC and Qualcomm from 2009 to 2012
are 29.71, 7.45, 3.60 and 0.69 billion dollars. To examine whether these figures are sensible, I
sum up the operating expenses42 in Apple and HTC’s financial reports4344, discounted by an
annual rate of 0.9912 = 0.89. Apple and HTC’s total accounting expenditures were $41.68
and $6.83 billion dollars during the period. As discussed earlier, the US market may account
for as much as 40% of Apple revenues, and the accounting figures match the simulation in
scale.
3.6 Counterfactual Simulation
I investigate the effects of a Qualcomm-HTC merger. HTC is a natural choice for this
counterfactual because of its high dependence on Qualcomm chipsets. Moreover, Apple, the
unconstrained handset maker, and Samsung, which can flexibly adjust the proportion of its
handsets using Qualcomm, are a pair of downstream rival firms that would realistically react
to a vertical merger. Samsung may decrease the use of Qualcomm chipsets because of the
41Averaging across a large number of simulation paths would erase all lumpiness.
42This item in the financial report includes R&D, selling, general and administrative costs but does not
include the manufacturing costs of the goods sold.
43Samsung and Qualcomm have major operations outside the application chipset and smartphone industry,
and the expenses in their accounting reports are less relevant.
44HTC’s fiscal year coincides with the calendar year, and Apple’s ends in September.
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Figure 3.5.1: Quality Evolution, Adjusted for Handset Maker Fixed Effects
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raising rivals’ cost incentive, but if the integrated firm innovates faster, it may also increase its
use of Qualcomm chipsets to reduce development costs and increase innovation. In the first
part of the section, I simulate the effects of vertical integration and decompose the effects into
the investment coordination effects and price effects. In the second part, I analyze how the
parameter estimates drive the results. Specifically, I focus on the parameters that govern the
upstream product (chipset) availability from non-Qualcomm producers, the substitution of
the downstream products and the price sensitivity of the consumers. I simulate the baseline
and every counterfactual scenario 1200 times for the period of January 2010 to December
2011, starting from the state of January 2010 in data.
3.6.1 Vertical Integration
Vertical integration has two effects. First, the integrated firms invest to maximize the joint
value function, internalizing the marginal effect of HTC innovation on Qualcomm and vice
versa. Secondly, the integrated firm reduces double marginalization within the merged par-
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ties but may raise the rival’s (Samsung) costs. With the first effect, the new dynamic
programming problem for Qualcomm and HTC becomes
maxaQ
  CQ  aQ, "Q +  E  V V It+1 (st+1)   aQ, st   
maxaHTC
  CHTC  aHTC , "HTC +  E  V V It+1 (st+1)   aQ, aN (HTC), st   , (3.6.1)
and the Bellman equation for the joint firm is
V V It (st) = ⇡˜
V I + E
  CQ  aQ?, "Q   CHTC  aHTC?, "HTC +  V V It+1 (st+1) |st   , (3.6.2)
where the expectation is taken over
 
"Q, "HTC
 
, the corresponding strategies of Qualcomm
and HTC, and the action probabilities of their rivals. ⇡˜V I is the sum of ⇡˜Q and ⇡˜HTC , the
joint equilibrium profit under vertical integration. The first order conditions that define the
new equilibrium prices in the static pricing game are outlined in the appendix of the paper
version of the chapter.
I conduct three sets of simulations: baseline, investment coordination only, and full vertical
integration with both investment coordination and price effects. The purpose of the sec-
ond simulation is to parse out the investment coordination effect. Specifically, I simulate
the outcomes where firms still price their products as if they were still separate, but Qual-
comm and HTC pool their profits when making dynamic investment decisions: i.e. I replace
⇡˜V I = ⇡˜Q + ⇡˜HTC with ⇡Q + ⇡HTC . The difference between this simulation and the baseline
simulation shows the net investment coordination effects, while the difference between this
simulation and the full vertical integration simulation shows the additional price effects.
Table 3.20 reports the simulation based on static profits given by Bargaining Model 1. The
first column (baseline) reports the simulation results at the estimated parameters, and the
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second column reports the results where Qualcomm and HTC coordinate investment but
not pricing. The fourth column reports the results when Qualcomm and HTC coordinate
both investment and pricing (full VI). The third column reports the percent change from the
baseline to investment coordination-only, which shows the investment coordination effect of
VI, and the last column reports the percentage change from investment coordination-only
to the full VI case, reflecting the price effects of VI.
Table 3.20: Counterfactual Results, Jan 2010 to Dec 2011, Model 1
Baseline VI, investment Percent Change VI Percent Change
coordination only
Apple 0.06 0.07 20.69% 0.07 -0.24%
Innovation Rate: Samsung 0.10 0.12 26.32% 0.12 1.07%
(qT   q1) /T HTC 0.10 0.12 22.59% 0.12 0.45%
Qualcomm 0.09 0.13 38.21% 0.13 0.72%
Producer Surplus Apple 5.84 6.57 12.36% 6.55 -0.27%
($ billion) Samsung 2.86 3.43 19.86% 3.46 0.91%
HTC+Qualcomm 0.78 1.03 31.17% 1.04 1.33%
Consumer Surplus 8.91 10.59 18.89% 10.69 0.95%
($ billion)
CS+PS 18.4 21.62 17.49% 21.75 0.59%
($ billion)
% Using Samsung 39.52% 51.71% 30.83% 51.88% 0.32%
Qualcomm
Apple 17.66 25.34 43.45% 25.22 -0.45%
Investment Samsung 3.47 3.09 -10.82% 3.09 -0.09%
($ billion) HTC 1.80 2.98 65.88% 3.02 1.45%
Qualcomm 0.37 0.91 144.08% 0.93 1.73%
Apple 102.76 116.68 13.54% 116.47 -0.18%
Retail Price ($) Samsung 121.18 143.95 18.79% 145.42 1.02%
HTC 115.36 135.38 17.36% 120.64 -10.88%
Chipset Price ($)
Samsung 39.03 39.08 0.12% 39.71 1.61%
HTC 38.63 38.72 0.24% - -
The first main observation is that vertical integration substantially increases the innovation
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of all firms, in particular that of Qualcomm. Qualcomm and HTC innovate faster, because
they each internalize the marginal value of one’s innovation on the other. To visualize
the magnitude of the effect, I examine the first order difference, V (q +  )   V (q), where
  = 0.25. To simplify notation, I denote the first order difference as
@V
@q
. I plot the baseline
@V Q
@qQ
,
@V Q
@qHTC
,
@V HTC
@qQ
, and
@V HTC
@qHTC
in Fig. 3.6.1, where Apple and Samsung quality levels
are fixed at 4.5 and 6.5. Per unit increase of Qualcomm or HTC quality, HTC value function
would increase in the range of 0.5 to 1.5 billion dollars. Per unit increase of HTC quality
increases Qualcomm value function by about 0.05 to 0.15 billion dollars, and the effect of
Qualcomm’s own quality change is slightly larger.
Figure 3.6.1: Marginal Effects of Qualities on HTC and Qualcomm Value Functions
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Samsung also innovates faster and is less constrained by Qualcomm. The average number
of months that qSamsung = qQ is reduced from 3.23 months to 1.25 months. Furthermore, an
examination of the second order difference shows that in equilibrium, being constrained by
76
Qualcomm is less harmful to Samsung. Denote this second order difference as
@2V Samsung
@qQ@qSamsung
,
similar to the notation above. I normalize Samsung’s marginal value of innovation to 0 when
Samsung is constrained. If it is profitable for Samsung to innovate, but Samsung is unable
to carry it out because of the Qualcomm constraint, then Samsung’s marginal value of
innovation should increase sharply (from 0) when Samsung becomes unconstrained. In this
case,
@2V Samsung
@qQ@qSamsung
should be positive, and a larger value implies greater harm from the
constraint, because Samsung likely has to delay more profitable innovations. In Fig. 3.6.2, I
plot the second order difference using Samsung’s baseline and VI value functions. Apple and
HTC qualities are fixed at 5.5 and 6, so Samsung is likely constrained if qQ qSamsung is close
to 0.45 At the baseline, the second order derivative is indeed positive and large, suggesting
that Samsung is likely to miss profitable innovation opportunities when constrained. As
Qualcomm innovates faster in the case of VI, the magnitude of the second order difference
decreases.
Apple’s faster innovation results from the long-run equilibrium changes in the competition. I
plot the increase of Apple’s marginal value of innovation from the baseline to the case of VI,✓
dV A
dqA
◆
V I
 
✓
dV A
dqA
◆
baseline
in Fig. 3.6.3. The quality of Qualcomm is fixed at 0.75 above
Samsung, and the quality of HTC at 6. While
✓
dV A
dqA
◆
V I
 
✓
dV A
dqA
◆
baseline
does not strongly
respond to different levels of Samsung quality, it is large, increasing and concave in Apple
quality.
The second observation is that investment coordination effects account for almost all the
changes due to VI. The price effects are only about 1% of the investment coordination
effects. While the magnitude is small, the price effects decrease Apple innovation while
45Note that Samsung can be constrained even if qQ   qSamsung > 0: Samsung can choose the size of its
quality increase, and may want to increase its quality greater than qQ   qSamsung.
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Figure 3.6.2: Marginal Effect of Qualcomm Quality on the Marginal Value of Samsung
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increasing other firms’ innovation. The decrease of Apple innovation is intuitive, because on
average, chipset prices increase with smartphone qualities, and higher quality HTC products
see a larger decrease in marginal costs with the elimination of double marginalization, which
may also reduce retail prices of higher quality products more than of lower quality products.
This downward pricing pressure thus reduces Apple’s expected returns from innovation. On
the other hand, Samsung is able to adjust the proportion of handsets using Qualcomm,
and a higher proportion reduces innovation costs. Recall that Samsung faces the tradeoff
between increasing its usage of Qualcomm chipsets, which leads to lower innovation costs,
faster innovation and higher profits in the long run, and decreasing the usage of Qualcomm
chipsets, which may lead to slower innovation but higher profits in the short run. The
simulation shows that Samsung chooses to respond to the price effects by increasing the
Qualcomm chipset usage to innovate faster. Both the investment coordination effects and
78
Figure 3.6.3: Change of Apple Marginal Value Function due to the Qualcomm-HTC Merger
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the price effects reduce the overall Samsung innovation costs.
Lastly, vertical integration significantly increases consumer and producer surplus. While
much of the increase comes from the investment coordination effects, the price effects also
increase both surpluses. I report sales-weighted average retail prices and chipset prices
(averaged over sales of handsets using a Qualcomm chipset). The elimination of double
marginalization decreases HTC retail prices, while the effect of raising rivals’ cost and Sam-
sung’ faster innovation (due to the price effects) increase Samsung’s prices. In particular,
while higher quality products may be priced higher, HTC retail prices decrease by almost
11% even when price effects increase HTC innovation.
Turning to the predictions using Bargaining Model 2 and 3 in Table 3.21 and 3.22, I find
that Model 2 (replacing the Qualcomm chipset with an alternative at cost  ¯ at the point
of disagreement) predicts changes similar in magnitudes. However, the more “traditional”
Bargaining Model 3, where handset makers drop products at the point of disagreement,
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predicts much larger price effects of vertical integration, although the qualitative effects are
consistent with model 1 and 2. Nonetheless, this exercise suggests that researchers should
conduct robustness checks or look for external validation when defining the disagreement
point: different definitions of the disagreement point may generate different predictions for
a counterfactual exercise, even when the models are estimated on the same data set.
Table 3.21: Baseline and Counterfactual Results based on Bargaining Model 2
Baseline VI, investment Percent Change VI Percent Change
coordination only
Apple 0.06 0.07 19.63% 0.07 -0.28%
Innovation Rate: Samsung 0.09 0.12 29.97% 0.12 0.96%
(qT   q1) /T HTC 0.10 0.12 22.97% 0.12 0.27%
Qualcomm 0.09 0.13 41.04% 0.13 0.55%
Producer Surplus Apple 5.84 6.52 11.50% 6.50 -0.22%
($ billion) Samsung 2.69 3.40 26.21% 3.41 0.38%
HTC+Qualcomm 0.79 1.05 32.59% 1.05 0.85%
Consumer Surplus 8.74 10.53 20.49% 10.61 0.75%
($ billion)
CS+PS 18.06 21.49 18.96% 21.58 0.40%
($ billion)
% Using Samsung 37.82% 52.85% 39.73% 51.72% -2.13%
Qualcomm
Apple 17.57 24.86 41.50% 24.73 -0.50%
Investment Samsung 3.43 2.94 -14.39% 2.95 0.49%
($ billion) HTC 1.77 2.87 62.48% 2.91 1.29%
Qualcomm 0.37 0.94 156.00% 0.96 1.57%
Apple 102.76 115.88 12.76% 115.68 -0.17%
Retail Price ($) Samsung 113.86 143.15 25.72% 143.19 0.03%
HTC 117.70 137.48 16.81% 122.17 -11.14%
Chipset Price ($)
Samsung 39.09 39.14 0.11% 39.69 1.41%
HTC 39.09 39.11 0.06% - -
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Table 3.22: Baseline and Counterfactual Results based on Model 3
Baseline VI, investment Percent Change VI Percent Change
coordination only
Apple 0.06 0.07 20.03% 0.07 -0.51%
Innovation Rate: Samsung 0.09 0.12 32.85% 0.13 3.39%
(qT   q1) /T HTC 0.10 0.13 20.07% 0.13 2.58%
Qualcomm 0.10 0.13 36.35% 0.13 2.04%
Producer Surplus Apple 5.88 6.54 11.30% 6.48 -0.95%
($ billion) Samsung 2.47 3.40 37.60% 3.54 4.08%
HTC+Qualcomm 0.82 1.05 28.16% 1.14 8.22%
Consumer Surplus 8.58 10.57 23.22% 10.80 2.14%
($ billion)
CS+PS 18.4 21.62 17.49% 21.75 0.59%
($ billion)
% Using Samsung 45.46% 51.40% 13.06% 55.39% 7.77%
Qualcomm
Apple 17.45 24.84 42.39% 24.59 -1.01%
Investment Samsung 3.76 2.71 -27.96% 2.93 8.14%
($ billion) HTC 1.82 2.82 55.14% 3.20 13.38%
Qualcomm 0.41 0.95 133.08% 1.04 8.76%
Apple 103.31 116.36 12.63% 115.63 -0.63%
Retail Price ($) Samsung 106.89 140.80 31.72% 152.57 8.36%
HTC 119.19 136.96 14.91% 126.24 -7.83%
Chipset Price ($)
Samsung 37.46 37.79 0.87% 44.60 18.03%
HTC 37.49 37.69 0.53% - -
3.6.2 Comparative Statics
The previous section has shown that the effects of VI on innovation are large, positive and
driven by the investment coordination effects. In this section, I explore how the parameters
that govern the price effects may change the results using Bargaining Model 1. In particular,
I examine the effects of three parameters: the decrease in quality at the point of disagreement
q¯, consumer taste dispersion parameter   and the price coefficient ↵. Increasing q¯ allows
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Qualcomm to negotiate a higher chipset prices and reduces handset maker profits. Higher
  increases the proportion of consumers with a high willingness to pay for quality, thus
likely increasing demand, but it also increases substitution between similar quality products
and may increase the raising rivals’ cost incentives. Higher price coefficients reduce the
consumption of smartphones and likely would reduce the smartphone markups and chipset
prices. In the counterfactuals in Table 3.23, I increase one of the parameters by 10% in each
of the three simulations.
At higher q¯, the price effects either reduce innovation or have a smaller positive impact on
the innovation of all handset makers. The price effects reduce the innovation of Apple from
-0.24% to -0.36%, which suggests that Qualcomm’s higher bargaining ability has a larger
negative impact on the marginal value of rival innovation. HTC innovation attributable to
the price effects is proportionally smaller, suggesting that with higher upstream bargaining
ability, the marginal value of downstream innovation for the integrated firm is smaller.
The innovation rates are higher when   is increased by 10% at the baseline, but the gains
due to the vertical integration are smaller. The price effects have a larger negative impact on
Apple innovation, and larger positive impact on the innovation of other firms, consistent with
the intuition that price effects are stronger with a higher degree of downstream competition.
In both scenarios, differently from Table 3.20, Samsung uses a smaller proportion of Qual-
comm chipsets even when Samsung innovation increases due to the price effects, which
suggests that Samsung innovates faster not because of the savings of the innovation costs,
but because of reduced payments to the integrated firm.
Increasing consumers’ price sensitivity reduces the innovation rates at the baseline level, but
the increase in innovation due to the investment coordination effects is similar to Table 3.20
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in magnitude. The price effects become proportionally smaller. As consumers become more
price sensitive, Qualcomm and handset makers set prices closer to the marginal cost, limiting
the effects of eliminating double marginalization and raising rivals’ cost.
The analysis above helps to identify situations where the price effects may affect innovation
more strongly: poor upstream substitutes, high degree of downstream market competition
and low consumer price sensitivity. However, even when the price effects are larger, they are
unlikely to dominate the coordination effects, and do not necessarily decrease rival down-
stream firms’ innovation.
Table 3.23: Comparative Statics. Innovation Rate: (qT   q1) /T
Baseline VI, investment Percent Change VI Percent Change
coordination only
q¯
Apple 0.06 0.07 23.21% 0.07 -0.36%
Samsung 0.10 0.12 26.68% 0.12 0.72%
HTC 0.10 0.12 23.25% 0.12 0.07%
Qualcomm 0.10 0.13 36.30% 0.13 1.07%
% of Samsung 36.15% 49.56% 37.12% 48.51% -2.13%
using Qualcomm
 
Apple 0.08 0.09 11.98% 0.09 -1.18%
Samsung 0.10 0.12 19.51% 0.12 1.43%
HTC 0.11 0.13 17.86% 0.13 1.17%
Qualcomm 0.10 0.13 27.52% 0.13 1.06%
% of Samsung 36.76% 55.57% 51.18% 55.25% -0.57%
using Qualcomm
↵
Apple 0.05 0.05 3.70% 0.05 0.00%
Samsung 0.07 0.11 50.12% 0.11 0.62%
HTC 0.08 0.11 39.91% 0.11 0.47%
Qualcomm 0.07 0.12 72.46% 0.12 0.58%
% of Samsung 37.15% 44.88% 20.81% 44.97% 0.20%
using Qualcomm
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3.7 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper estimates a new model that combines bilateral bargaining with dynamic inno-
vation to analyze the impact of vertical integration on innovation, pricing and welfare in
the chipset and smartphone industry. Using the estimated model, I simulate the counterfac-
tual experiment of a vertical merger, and find that vertical integration increases innovation
primarily through the channel of investment coordination. The results suggest that the dy-
namic effect of vertical integration may be large, providing support for giving more weight
to this factor a in a vertical merger review.
Several simplifying assumptions underlie the model. Most importantly, I abstract away from
vertical integration’s effects on the cost primitives. Given the possibility of cost reduction
in the case of a successful merger, the results here are a lower bound on the positive impact
of vertical integration. Secondly, I model the pricing game without considering the strategic
roles of carriers. In some sense the approach follows the CPU literature such as Goettler
and Gordon (2011) and Nosko (2014) that abstracts from the role of downstream computer
assemblers. In practice, I find that equilibrium prices may not exist for a three stage pricing
game, where Qualcomm and handset makers first negotiate chipset prices, then handset
makers sell to the carriers, and carriers sell to the consumers. On the other hand, Fan and
Yang (2016) finds that the response of smartphone variety to a market structure change such
as a horizontal merger is not sensitive to various assumptions of carrier conduct. Thirdly, I
do not consider serially correlated unobserved cost variables, which may be a concern given
that the data frequency is monthly. Omitting these variables would bias the estimates of
the innovation costs. However, including such a cost component does not change any of the
economic argument why innovation increases with a vertical merger. Fourthly, I assume that
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Qualcomm and handset makers use linear contracts. I will explore alternative assumptions
in the future. The paper also does not discuss patent issues in this industry. Qualcomm
collects percentage fees (1 to 5%) of the wholesale smartphone prices because of its many
communication technology patents. These fees form a large part of the overall Qualcomm
profits, but are not directly related to Qualcomm’s efforts in application chipset innovation.
Lastly, vertical integration may also affect innovation through an information channel: during
product development, downstream firms may need to interact with upstream firms, and
vertical integration could change the integrated firm’s incentive to protect or exploit the
proprietary information of rival downstream firms (Allain, Chambolle and Rey (2011)). The
integrated firm may imitate its downstream rivals and equilibrium innovation rates may be
reduced.
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CHAPTER IV
Unobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Games with an
Application to Venture Capital
with Jeremy T. Fox and David H. Hsu
4.1 Introduction
Matching games model the sorting of agents to each other. Men sort to women in mar-
riage based on characteristics such as income, schooling, personality and physical appear-
ance, with more desirable men typically matching to more desirable women. Upstream
firms sort to downstream firms based on the product qualities and capacities of each of the
firms. This paper is partially motivated by such applications in industrial organization and
entrepreneurial finance, where downstream firms pay upstream firms money, and thus it
is reasonable to work with transferable utility matching games Koopmans and Beckmann
(1957); Gale (1960); Shapley and Shubik (1971); Becker (1973). In particular, we explore an
empirical application in corporate finance and management, where the upstream firms are
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venture capitalists and the downstream firms are entrepreneurial biotech and medical firms.
There has been recent interest in the structural estimation of (both transferable utility and
non-transferable utility) matching games.46 The papers we cite are unified in estimating
some aspect of the preferences of agents in a matching game from data on who matches with
whom as well as the observed characteristics of agents or of matches. The sorting patterns
in the data combined with assumptions about equilibrium inform the researcher about the
structural primitives in the market, namely some function that transforms an agent’s own
characteristics and its potential partner’s characteristics into some notion of utility or output.
These papers are related to, but are not special cases of, papers estimating discrete, non-
cooperative (Nash) games, like the entry literature in industrial organization and the discrete
outcomes peer effects literature.47 Matching games typically use the cooperative solution
concept of pairwise stability.48
The empirical literature cited previously structurally estimates how various structural or
equilibrium objects, such as payoffs or preferences, are functions of the characteristics of
agents observed in the data. For example, Choo and Siow (2006) study the marriage market
in the United States and estimate how the equilibrium payoffs of men for women vary by
the ages of the man and the woman. Sørensen (2007) studies the matching of venture
46See, among others: Dagsvik (2000); Boyd et al. (2003); Choo and Siow (2006); Sørensen (2007); Fox
(2016); Gordon and Knight (2009); Chen and Song (2013); Ho (2009); Park (2013); Yang et al. (2009); Logan
et al. (2008); Levine (2009); Baccara et al. (2012); Siow (2015); Salanié and Galichon (2012); Chiappori et al.
(2015); Weese (2015); Christakis et al. (2010); Echenique et al. (2013); Menzel (2015); Uetake and Watanabe
(2012); Agarwal (2015); Agarwal and Diamond (2014); Akkus et al. (2015).
47See, among others: Berry (1992); Bresnahan and Reiss (1991); Mazzeo (2002); Tamer (2003); Bajari et
al. (2010); Seim (2006a); Brock and Durlauf (2007); de Paula and Tang (2012).
48Transferable utility matching games (particularly those with “contracts” or “trades” that specify endoge-
nous product attributes) are equivalent to models of hedonic equilibrium (Brown and Rosen, 1982; Ekeland
et al., 2003; Heckman et al., 2010; Chiappori et al., 2010). Unlike the empirical literature on hedonic equi-
librium, the estimation approaches in most matching papers do not rely on data on equilibrium prices or
transfers. Compared to the current work, the hedonic papers do not allow for unobserved characteristics.
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capitalists to entrepreneurs as a function of observed venture capitalist experience. Fox
(2016) studies matching between automotive assemblers (downstream firms) and car parts
suppliers (upstream firms) and asks how observed specialization measures in the portfolios
of car parts sourced or supplied contribute to agent profit functions.
The above papers all use data on a relatively limited set of agent characteristics. In Choo and
Siow (2006), personality and physical attractiveness are not measured, even though those
characteristics are likely important in determining the equilibrium pattern of marriages.
Similarly, in Fox (2016) each firm’s product quality is not directly measured and is only
indirectly inferred. In Sørensen (2007), the unobserved ability of each venture capitalist and
the business prospects of each entrepreneurial firm are not measured. If matching based on
observed characteristics is found to be important, it is a reasonable conjecture that match-
ing based on unobserved characteristics is also important. Our empirical work on biotech
and medical venture capital investments complements the earlier work by Sørensen (2007)
on venture capital; we estimate distributions of functions of match-specific unobservables.
Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) provide empirical evidence that farmers and landlords sort
on unobservables such as risk aversion and monitoring ability, without formally estimating
a matching game or the distribution of these unobservables.
Our discussion of the empirical applications cited above suggests that unobserved character-
istics are potentially important. As the consistency of estimation procedures for matching
games depends on assumptions on the unobservables, empirical conclusions might be more
robust if the estimated matching games allow richly specified distributions of unobserved
agent heterogeneity. This paper investigates what data on the sorting patterns between
agents can tell us about the distributions of unobserved agent characteristics relevant for
sorting. In particular, we study the nonparametric identification of distributions of unob-
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served agent heterogeneity in two-sided matching games. With the distribution of unob-
servables, the researcher can explain sorting and construct counterfactual predictions about
market assignments. This paper allows for this empirically relevant heterogeneity in partner
preferences using data on only observed matches (who matches with whom), not data from,
say, an online dating site on rejected profiles (Hitsch, Hortaçsu and Ariely, 2010) or on equi-
librium transfers, such as wages in a labor market (Eeckhout and Kircher, 2011). Transfers
are often confidential data in firm contracts (Fox (2016)) and are rarely observed in marriage
data Becker (1973).
In the following specific sense, this paper on identification is ahead of the empirical matching
literature because, when this paper was first written, no empirical papers had parametri-
cally estimated distributions of unobserved agent characteristics, or of match characteristics
without assuming independence across matches, in matching games. Thus, this paper seeks
to introduce a new topic for economic investigation, rather than to simply loosen parametric
restrictions in an existing empirical literature. This paper contributes to the literature on
the nonparametric (allowing infinite dimensional objects) identification of transferable utility
matching games (Fox, 2010; Graham, 2011). Our paper is distinguished because of its focus
on identifying distributions of unobservables, rather than mostly deterministic functions of
observables. Our focus in identification on using data on many markets with finite numbers
of agents in each (transferable utility) market follows Fox (2010).49
49In addition to our study of identifying distributions of unobservables, there are many modeling differences
between our paper and the literature on transferable utility matching games following the approach of Choo
and Siow (2006), including Salanié and Galichon (2012), Chiappori, Salanié and Weiss (2015), Graham (2011)
and Fox (2016). We use data on many markets with finite numbers of players and different realizations of
observables and unobservables in each market; the Choo and Siow (2006) approach has been applied to
one large market with an infinity of agents. We require at least one continuous, observable characteristic
per match or per agent; the Choo and Siow (2006) literature allows only a finite number of observable
characteristic values. The production functions corresponding to these finite unobservables are usually
recoverable without further functional form assumptions; we require a particular match or agent characteristic
89
We first consider a baseline model, which is stripped down to focus on the key problem
of identifying distributions of heterogeneity from sorting data. In our baseline transferable
utility matching game, the primitive that governs sorting is the matrix that collects the
production values for each potential match in a matching market. The production level of
each match is additively separable in observable and unobservable terms. The observable
term is a match-specific characteristic. The unknown primitive is therefore the distribution
(representing randomness across markets) of the matrix that collects the unobservable terms
in the production of each match in a market. We call this distribution the distribution of
match-specific unobservables. Match-specific unobservables nest many special cases, such as
agent-specific unobservables.
We first show that that the distribution of match-specific unobservables is not identified in
a one-to-one matching game with data on who matches with whom but without data on
unmatched or single agents. We provide two main theoretical results and many extensions.
Our first main theoretical result states that the distribution of a change of variables of
the unobservables, the distribution of what we call unobserved complementarities, is
identified. We precisely define unobserved complementarities below. Our identification proof
works by tracing the joint (across possible matches in a market) cumulative distribution
function of these unobserved complementarities using the match-specific observables. We
also show that knowledge of the distribution of unobserved complementarities is sufficient
for computing assignment probabilities. Our second main theoretical result says that the
distribution of the primitively specified, match-specific unobservables is actually identified
when unmatched agents are observed in the data.
to enter production additively separably. Unobservables in the Choo and Siow (2006) literature are typically
i.i.d. shocks for the finite observable types rather than unobserved agent characteristics or unobserved
preferences on observed, ordered characteristics, such as random coefficients. This is one interpretation of
the “separability” assumption of Chiappori, Salanié and Weiss.
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Our main theoretical results can be intuitively understood by reference to a classic result in
Becker (1973). He studies sorting in two-sided, transferable utility matching games where
agents have scalar characteristics (types). He shows that high-type agents match to high-type
agents if the types of agents are complements in the production of matches. Many production
functions for match output exhibit complementarities. Say in Becker (1973)’s model male and
female types are xm and xw, respectively. A production function with horizontal preferences,
such as   (xm   xw)2, and one with vertical preferences, such as 2xmxw, can both have the
same cross-partial derivative, here 2. Becker (1973)’s result that complementarities alone
drive sorting means that data on sorting cannot tell these two production functions apart.
In our more general class of matching games, we cannot identify the distribution of match-
specific unobservables. However, we can identify the distribution of our notion of unobserved
complementarities. These results are analogous to Becker (1973)’s results, for a more general
class of matching games.
Our second main theoretical result uses data on unmatched agents. In a matching game,
agents can unilaterally decide to be single or not. If all other agents are single and hence
available to match, the fact that one particular agent is single can only be explained by
the production of all matches involving that agent being less than the production from
being single. This type of direct comparison between the production of being single and
the production of being matched is analogous to the way identification proceeds in discrete
Nash games, where the payoff of a player’s observed (in the data) strategy must be higher
than strategies not chosen, given the strategies of rivals. Thus, the availability of data on
unmatched agents introduces an element of individual rationality that maps directly into the
data and is therefore useful for identification of the primitive distribution of match-specific
characteristics.
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Many empirical researchers might be tempted to specify a parametric distribution of match-
specific unobservables. Our theoretical results together suggest that estimating a matching
model with a parametric distribution of match-specific unobservables will not necessarily
lead to credible estimates without using data on unmatched agents, as a more general non-
parametrically specified distribution is not identified. Also, we present an example of a
multivariate normal distribution of match-specific characteristics whose parameters are not
parametrically identified. One could instead impose a parametric distribution for unobserved
complementarities, as we do in our empirical work on biotech and medical venture capital.
We examine several extensions to the baseline model that add more empirical realism. Our
baseline model imposes additive separability between unobservables and observables in the
production of a match. We examine an extension where additional observed characteristics
enter match production and these characteristics may, for example, have random coefficients
on them, reflecting the random preferences of agents for partner characteristics. For ex-
ample, observationally identical men are often observed to marry observationally distinct
women. One important hypothesis is that these men have heterogeneous preferences for the
observable characteristics of women. In a model with random preferences, we identify the
distribution of unobserved complementarities conditional on the characteristics of agents and
matches other than the match-specific characteristics used in the baseline model. Identifying
a distribution of unobservables conditional on observables follows identification work using
special regressors in the multinomial choice literature (Lewbel, 2000; Matzkin, 2007; Berry
and Haile, 2009).
In another extension, we identify fixed-across-markets but heterogeneous-within-a-market
coefficients on the match-specific characteristics used in the baseline model. This relaxes
the assumption that the match-specific characteristics enter the production of each match
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in the same manner. Another extension considers models where key observables vary at the
agent and not the match level and enter match production multiplicatively. We can identify
the distribution of unobserved complementarities if match unobservables are equal to the
product of agent unobservables.
Our results on one-to-one, two-sided matching games extend naturally to many-to-many
matching (Kelso Jr and Crawford (1982); Roth and Sotomayor (1990); Sotomayor (1999)).
Our application to venture capital uses the many-to-one special case. We discuss another
extension to the model of matching with trades in Hatfield et al. (2013), who significantly
generalize Crawford and Knoer (1981). In matching with the trades, the same agent can
make so-called trades both as a buyer and a seller and can have complicated preferences
over the set of trades. An individual trade generalizes a match in that a trade can list other
specifications, such as the number of startup board seats given to a venture capitalist. The
matching with trades model has many special cases and is the most general model we provide
identification results for.
We use our theoretical results to motivate an empirical investigation into matching between
biotech and medical entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. Venture capital is a key way
entrepreneurial innovation is funded. We use detailed data on the observed matches between
entrepreneurial startups and venture capitalist firms over a ten year period. We collect
information on the geographic locations of both startups and venture capitalists, on the
patent stocks of startups, and on the past experience of venture capitalists in various biotech
and medical sectors. Despite these observed characteristics being as detailed as any data set
on venture capital that could realistically be collected by academic researchers, we find that
the distribution of unobserved complementarities suggests that unobserved characteristics
play a large role in match production.
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4.2 Baseline Identification Results
We mainly analyze a two-sided, one-to-one matching game with transferable utility Koop-
mans and Beckmann (1957); Gale (1960); Shapley and Shubik (1971); Becker (1973); Roth
and Sotomayor (1990, Chapter 8). This section imposes that all agents must be matched in
order to focus purely on the identification coming from agent sorting and not from the indi-
vidual rationality decision to be single. We also use a simple space of explanatory variables.
We change these assumptions in later sections.
4.2.1 Baseline Model
We use the terms “agents” and “firms” interchangeably. In a one-to-one matching game, an
upstream firm u matches with a downstream firm d. In biotech and medical venture capi-
tal, upstream firms are venture capitalists and downstream firms are biotech entrepreneurs.
Upstream firm u and downstream firm d can form a match (u, d). The monetary transfer
from d to u is denoted as tu,d; we will not require data on the transfers. The production
or total profit from a match hu, di is
zu,d + eu,d, (4.2.1)
where zu,d is a scalar match-specific characteristic observed in the data and eu,d is a scalar
match-specific characteristic unobserved in the data, but observable to all firms in the match-
ing game. In our empirical work on venture capital, one match-specific characteristic zu,d
is the distance between the headquarters of firms u and d.50 The match-specific, unob-
50Distance zu,d is always positive and likely enters match production with a negative sign; we can always
construct a new regressor z˜u,d =   (zu,d   E [zu,d]) that enters with a positive sign and has mean zero.
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served characteristic eu,d generalizes special cases such as eu,d = eu · ed, where eu and ed are
unobserved upstream and downstream firm characteristics, respectively. We allow a match-
specific coefficient on each zu,d and, separately, use only agent-specific explanatory variables
below.
We can more primitively model production for a match hu, di as the sum of the profit of u
and the profit of d, where the possibly negative transfer tu,d between d and u enters additively
separably into both individual profits and therefore cancels in their sum.51
However, only production levels matter for the matches that form, and we will not attempt
to identify upstream firm profits separately from downstream firm profits.
There are N firms on each side of the market. N can also represent the set {1, . . . , N}. In
this section, there can be no unmatched firms. The matrix
0BBBB@
z1,1 + e1,1 · · · z1,N + e1,N
... . . .
...
zN,1 + eN,1 · · · zN,N + eN,N
1CCCCA
describes the production of all matches in a market, where the rows are upstream firms and
the columns are downstream firms. Let
E =
0BBBB@
e1,1 · · · e1,N
... . . .
...
eN,1 · · · eN,N
1CCCCA , Z =
0BBBB@
z1,1 · · · z1,N
... . . .
...
zN,1 · · · zN,N
1CCCCA
51If the profit of u at some market outcome is ⇡uu,d+tu,d and the profit of d is ⇡du,d tu,d, then the production
of the match hu, di is equal to ⇡uu,d + ⇡du,d = zu,d + eu,d. We will not attempt to learn the distributions of
the unobservable portions of ⇡uu,d and ⇡du,d separately (Fox, 2010).
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be the matrices of unobservables and observables, respectively, in a market.52
A feasible one-to-one assignment A is a set of matches A = {hu1, d1i , . . . , huN , dNi}, where
for this section each firm is matched exactly once. There are N ! feasible assignments. An
outcome is a list of matches and transfers between matched agents:
{hu1, d1, tu1,d1i , . . . , huN , dN , tuN ,dN i} .
An outcome is pairwise stable if it is robust to deviations by pairs of two firms, as defined
in references such as Roth and Sotomayor (1990, Chapter 8).53 An assignment A is called
pairwise stable if there exists an underlying outcome (including transfers) that is pairwise
stable.
The literature cited previously proves that the existence of a pairwise stable assignment is
guaranteed and that an assignment A is pairwise stable if and only if it maximizes the sum
of production
s (A;E,Z) =
X
hu,di2A
(zu,d + eu,d) .
If zu,d or eu,d have continuous support, s (A;E,Z) has a unique maximizer with probability
1 and therefore the pairwise stable assignment is unique with probability 1. The sum
of the unobserved production of assignment A relative to the particular assignment
A1 = {h1, 1i , . . . , hN,Ni} is
s˜ (A;E) =
X
hu,di2A
eu,d  
X
hu,di2A1
eu,d. (4.2.2)
52Because the scalar zu,d is an element of the matrix Z, we do not use upper and lower case letters (or other
notation) to distinguish random variables and their realizations. Whether we refer to a random variable or
its realization should be clear from context.
53We omit standard definitions here that can be easily found in the literature.
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A market is defined to be the pair (E,Z); agents in a market can match and agents in
different markets cannot. A researcher observes the assignment A and the match-specific
characteristics Z for many markets. In other words, in each matching market the researcher
observes who matches with whom A and the characteristics Z of the realized and potential
matches. This allows the identification of Pr (A | Z), the probability of assignment A being
the pairwise stable assignment given the market-level match characteristics Z. Researchers
do not observe transfers, which are often part of confidential contracts.
Z is independent of the unobservable matrix E. We assume that Z has full and product
support, meaning that any Z 2 RN2 is observed.54 Each match characteristic zu,d enters
production additively, the sign and coefficient on each zu,d in production is common across
matches (normalized to be 1), each zhu,di has large support, and Z is independent of E.55
Similar large support explanatory variables have been used to prove point identification in
the binary and multinomial choice literature (Manski, 1988; Ichimura and Thompson, 1998;
Lewbel, 1998, 2000; Matzkin, 2007; Gautier and Kitamura, 2013; Berry and Haile, 2009; Fox
and Gandhi, 2016). In this literature, failure to have large support often results in set rather
than point identification of the distribution of heterogeneity.56 We discuss the failure of the
54The example of the match-characteristic distance may not vary independently over all of RN2 because
distance is computed using the agent-specific characteristics latitude and longitude. In our empirical work,
we use a second match-specific characteristic that conceptually can vary independently in N2 dimensions:
the past experience of a venture capitalist with investments in the four-digit sector of a startup. Experience
in a sector varies independently in N2 dimensions if all startups are in different four-digit sectors.
55We could in principle address the statistical dependence of E and Z with instrumental variables. We do
not explore this. We should mention that the eu,d and zu,d for the realized matches in the pairwise stable
assignment A will likely be statistically dependent because of the conditioning on the dependent variable A,
part of the outcome to the game.
56Consider a binary choice model of buying a can of soda (or not) where the large support regressor is the
(negative) price of the soda, which varies across the dataset. If we assume that consumers’ willingnesses to
pay for the can of soda are bounded by $0 and $10, we can point identify the distribution of the willingness
to pay for soda if observable prices range between $0 and $10. If prices range only between $0 and $5, we can
identify the fraction of consumers with values above $5 by seeing the fraction who purchase at $5. We cannot
identify the fraction with values above $6, or any value greater than $5. If we do not restrict the support
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support condition in our matching context below. In this paper, we use large support match
characteristics in part to focus on reasons specific to matching games for the failure of point
identification.57
4.2.2 Data Generating Process
The unknown primitive whose identification we first explore is the CDF G (E), which reflects
how the match unobservables vary across matching markets. We do not restrict the support
of E and we do not assume independence across the eu,d’s within matching markets. Hence,
we allow for many special cases, such as the case eu,d = eu · ed mentioned earlier.
The probability of assignment A occurring given the match characteristics Z is
Pr (A | Z; G) =
ˆ
E
1 [A pairwise stable assignment | Z,E] dG (E) , (4.2.3)
where 1 [A pairwise stable assignment | Z,E] is equal to 1 when A is a pairwise stable assign-
ment for the market (E,Z).
The distribution G is said to be identified whenever, for G1 6= G2, Pr (A | Z; G1) 6=
Pr (A | Z; G2) for some pair (A,Z). G1 and G2 give a different probability for at least
one assignment A given Z. If G has continuous and full support so that all probabilities
Pr (A | Z; G) are nonzero (for every (A,Z), s (A;E,Z) will be maximized by a range of E)
of the willingness to pay, we need prices to vary across all of R (including negative prices if consumers may
have negative willingnesses to pay) for point identification of the distribution of the willingness to pay for
soda.
57Our use of large support and the use of large support in most of the literature on binary and multinomial
choice does not constitute identification at infinity as used in certain proofs to study Nash games by, for
example, Tamer (2003). Identification at infinity in a Nash game uses only extreme values of regressors for
all but one player to, in effect, turn a multi-player game into a single-player decision problem. We use large
explanatory variable values only to identify the tails of distributions of heterogeneity.
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and continuous in the elements of Z, the existence of one such pair (A,Z) implies that a set
of Z with positive measure satisfies Pr (A | Z; G1) 6= Pr (A | Z; G2).
All of our positive identification results will be constructive, in that we can trace a dis-
tribution such as G (E) using variation in an object such as Z. Also, our identification
arguments can be used to prove the consistency of a nonparametric mixtures estimator for
a distribution G of heterogeneous unobservables E, as Fox, il Kim and Yang (2015) show
for a particular, computationally simple mixtures estimator.58 Other mixtures estimators
can be used, including maximum simulated likelihood, the EM algorithm, NPMLE, and
MCMC.59 In the empirical work to biotech venture capital, we use the simulated method
of moments in a parametric model, because of the large numbers of firms in our matching
markets (McFadden, 1989; Pakes and Pollard, 1989).
4.2.3 Non-Identification of the Distribution of Match-Specific Char-
acteristics
As maximizing s (A;E,Z) determines the assignment seen in the data, the ordering of
s (A;E,Z) across assignments A as a function of E and Z is a key input to identification.
We can add a constant to the production of all matches involving the same upstream firm
and the ordering of the production s (A;E,Z) of all assignments will remain the same. This
non-identification result is unsurprising: the differential production of matches and hence
58The proof of consistency in Fox, il Kim and Yang (2015) for one estimator requires the heterogeneous
unobservable (such as E) to have compact support, which is not required here for identification. A second
estimator in Fox, il Kim and Yang (2015) allows the support of E to be Rdim(E).
59For large markets, these estimators all have computational problems arising from the combinatorics
underlying the set of matching game assignments. Fox (2016) uses a maximum score estimator to avoid
these computational problems, but does not estimate a distribution of unobservables. Our identification
arguments do not address computational issues. Likewise, random variables such as E are of large dimension
and nonparametrically estimating a CDF such as G (E) will result in a data curse of dimensionality.
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assignments governs the identity of the pairwise stable assignment in any market.
We will show another non-identification result. Consider the two realizations of matrices of
unobservables
E1 =
0BBBBBBB@
e1,1 e1,2 · · · e1,N
e2,1 e2,2 · · · e2,N
...
... . . .
...
eN,1 eN,2 · · · eN,N
1CCCCCCCA , E2 =
0BBBBBBB@
e1,1 e1,2 + 1 · · · e1,N
e2,1   1 e2,2 + 1  1 · · · e2,N   1
...
... . . .
...
eN,1 eN,2 + 1 · · · eN,N
1CCCCCCCA .
It is easy to verify that s (A;E1, Z) = s (A;E2, Z) for all A, Z, which means that the pairwise
stable assignment A is the same for E1 and E2, for any Z. Therefore it is not possible to
separately identify the relative frequencies of E1 and E2 in the data generating process; the
support of the random matrix E is too flexible.
We summarize the two counterexamples in the following non-identification proposition.
Proposition 2. The distribution G (E) of market-level unobserved match characteristics is
not identified in a matching game where all agents must be matched.
Consider a simple case focusing on two upstream firms and two downstream firms. If we
see the matches hu1, d1i and hu2, d2i in the data, we cannot know whether this assignment
forms because hu1, d1i has high production, hu2, d2i has high production, hu1, d2i has low
production, or hu2, d1i has low production. The non-identification result implies that para-
metric estimation of G (E) under these assumptions may not be well founded, in that the
generalization removing the parametric restrictions is not identified.
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4.2.4 Unobserved Assignment Production
The pairwise stable assignment Amaximizes the function s (A;E,Z) =
P
hu,di2A (zu,d + eu,d).
This looks like a single agent, the social planner, maximizing a utility function. Rough
intuition from the multinomial choice literature, cited earlier, suggests that the distribution
H
⇣
S˜
⌘
of
S˜ = (s˜ (A2;E) , . . . , s˜ (AN !;E)) =
0@ X
hu,di2A2
eu,d  
X
hu,di2A1
eu,d, . . . ,
X
hu,di2AN !
eu,d  
X
hu,di2A1
eu,d
1A
might be identified, where the long vector S˜ collects the unobserved production of N !   1
assignments relative to the reference assignment A1 = {h1, 1i , . . . , hN,Ni}. Directly citing
the multinomial choice literature requires a vector of N !  1 assignment-specific observables
with support RN ! 1, where a hypothetical assignment-specific observable would enter only
s (A;E,Z) for a particular A. Assignment-specific observables do not exist in our matching
game. However, the distribution of H
⇣
S˜
⌘
is identified using only the variation in match-
specific characteristics Z assumed earlier.
Lemma 3. The distribution H
⇣
S˜
⌘
of unobserved production for all assignments is identi-
fied.
The proof, in the appendix of the paper version of the chapter, shows that large and product
support on Z allows us to traceH
⇣
S˜
⌘
. The identification argument is therefore constructive.
Failure of large and product support results in partial identification of H
⇣
S˜
⌘
.
Example 4. For a running example, consider the case N = 3. The matrix of match
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characteristics is
E =
0BBBB@
e1,1 e1,2 e1,3
e2,1 e2,2 e2,3
e3,1 e3,2 e3,3
1CCCCA .
There are six possible assignments,
A1 = {h1, 1i, h2, 2i, h3, 3i}
A2 = {h1, 2i, h2, 1i, h3, 3i}
A3 = {h1, 3i, h2, 2i, h3, 1i}
A4 = {h1, 2i, h2, 3i, h3, 1i}
A5 = {h1, 1i, h2, 3i, h3, 2i}
A6 = {h1, 3i, h2, 1i, h3, 2i}
(4.2.4)
and
S˜ =
0BBBBBBBBBB@
s˜ (A2;E)
s˜ (A3;E)
s˜ (A4;E)
s˜ (A5;E)
s˜ (A6;E)
1CCCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBBB@
e1,2 + e2,1 + e3,3   (e1,1 + e2,2 + e3,3)
e1,3 + e2,2 + e3,1   (e1,1 + e2,2 + e3,3)
e1,2 + e2,3 + e3,1   (e1,1 + e2,2 + e3,3)
e1,1 + e2,3 + e3,2   (e1,1 + e2,2 + e3,3)
e1,3 + e2,1 + e3,2   (e1,1 + e2,2 + e3,3)
1CCCCCCCCCCA
. (4.2.5)
Lemma 3 states that the distribution H
⇣
S˜
⌘
is identified using variation in
Z =
0BBBB@
z1,1 z1,2 z1,3
z2,1 z2,2 z2,3
z3,1 z3,2 z3,3
1CCCCA .
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4.2.5 Unobserved Complementarities
The random vector S˜ has N ! 1 elements. Estimating a joint distribution of N ! 1 elements
is not practical in typical datasets. We now introduce the concept of unobserved comple-
mentarities as an intuitive, lower-dimensional random variable whose distribution is point
identified if and only if H
⇣
S˜
⌘
is point identified.
As described in the introduction, Becker (1973) shows that complementarities govern sort-
ing when there is one characteristic (schooling) per agent. Likewise, references such as Fox
(2010) and Graham (2011) prove that complementarities in observed agent or match char-
acteristics are identified using data on matches. Likewise, while it is not possible to identify
the distribution of unobserved match characteristics, we will show that the distribution of
unobserved complementarities can be identified.
Definition. The unobserved complementarity between matches hu1, d1i and hu2, d2i is
cu1,d1,u2,d2 = eu1,d1 + eu2,d2   (eu1,d2 + eu2,d1) . (4.2.6)
The unobserved complementarities capture the change in the unobserved production (un-
observed profits) when two matched pairs hu1, d1i and hu2, d2i exchange partners and the
matches hu1, d2i and hu2, d1i arise.
Fixing a realization of the unobserved match characteristics E, one can calculate the market-
level array (of four dimensions) comprising all unobserved complementarities
C = (cu1,d1,u2,d2 | u1, u2, d1, d2 2 N) . (4.2.7)
We only consider values C formed from valid values of E.
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There are N4 values cu1,d1,u2,d2 in C given any realization E. However, all unobserved com-
plementarities can be formed from a smaller set of other unobserved complementarities by
addition and subtraction. Let
bu,d = c1,1,u,d = e1,1 + eu,d   (e1,d + eu,1) (4.2.8)
be an unobserved complementarity fixing the identities of the upstream firm u1 and the
downstream firm d1 to both be 1. Let the matrix B be
B =
0BBBB@
b2,2 · · · b2,N
... . . .
...
bN,2 · · · bN,N
1CCCCA ,
which contains all unique values of bu,d for a market. B is a matrix of (N   1)2 elements.
The following lemma shows we can restrict attention to B instead of C and hence focus on
identifying the joint distribution F (B) of the heterogeneous matrix B.
Lemma 5.
1. Every element of C is a linear combination of elements of B. The specific linear
combination does not depend on the realizations of C or B.
2. For any CDF F (B), there exists G (E) generating F (B) by the appropriate change of
variables in (4.2.8).
3. If E is a exchangeable random matrix in upstream agent indices and also exchangeable
in downstream agent indices, then so is B.
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By the first part of the lemma, we can focus on identifying the distribution of the (N   1)2
elements in B instead of all N4 elements in C. By the second statement in the lemma,
we can restrict attention to identifying F (B) without restrictions on the support of B or
the dependence between the elements of B, as any F (B) is compatible with some distri-
bution G (E) of the primitive matrix of match-specific unobservables E. Further, the third
statement in the lemma shows that in the typical empirical context where the distribution
of primitive unobservables is exchangeable in agent indices, the distribution of unobserved
complementarities is also exchangeable in agent indices. The proof in the appendix of the
paper version of the chapter has a formal definition of exchangeability in agent indices. We
now present examples of some of the claims in the lemma.
Example. 4 (N = 3) There are 3! = 6 assignments. There are 12 unobserved complemen-
tarities cu1,d1,u2,d2 in C. There are 4 unobserved complementarities in B:
B =
0B@ b2,2 b2,3
b3,2 b3,3
1CA =
0B@ e1,1 + e2,2   (e1,2 + e2,1) e1,1 + e2,3   (e1,3 + e2,1)
e1,1 + e3,2   (e1,2 + e3,1) e1,1 + e3,3   (e1,3 + e3,1)
1CA . (4.2.9)
The first part of Lemma 5 claims that the 12 elements in C can be constructed from the 4
elements in B. For one example,
c2,2,3,3 = e2,2 + e3,3   (e2,3 + e3,2) = b2,2   b2,3   b3,2 + b3,3.
Example 6. Let the distribution G (E) be exchangeable in agent indices for upstream and
downstream firms separately. Also let G (E) be multivariate normal with zero means. Under
105
exchangeability, zero means and the multivariate normality of E, the variance matrix of the
distribution G is parameterized by four unique parameters as
Cov (eu1,d1 , eu2,d2) =  1, if u1 6= u2, d1 6= d2
Cov (eu1,d1 , eu2,d1) =  2, if u1 6= u2
Cov (eu1,d1 , eu1,d2) =  3, if d1 6= d2
Var (eu1,d1) =  
2.
One can use the properties of linear changes of variables for multivariate normal distributions
to algebraically derive the distribution F (B) of unobserved complementarities. F (B) is
itself exchangeable in agent indices (as Lemma 5.3 states) and is multivariate normal with
a variance matrix with diagonal and off-diagonal terms
Cov (bu1,d1 , bu2,d2) =
1
4
⌫2, if u1 6= u2, d1 6= d2
Cov (bu1,d1 , bu2,d1) =
1
2
⌫2, if u1 6= u2
Cov (bu1,d1 , bu1,d2) =
1
2
⌫2, if d1 6= d2
Var (bu1,d1) = ⌫
2,
where the new parameter ⌫2 = 4 ( 2 +  1    2    3). This example shows the reduction
of information from considering unobserved complementarities instead of unobserved match
characteristics. In this example, G (E) is parameterized by four parameters while the induced
F (B) has only one unknown parameter.
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4.2.6 Identification of Unobserved Complementarities
We have shown that H
⇣
S˜
⌘
is identified, where recall S˜ = (s˜ (A2, E) , . . . , s˜ (AN !, E)). We
now show that identification of H
⇣
S˜
⌘
gives the identification of F (B), the distribution of
unobserved complementarities.
Let
r˜ (A;B) =
X
hu,di2A
bu,d  
X
hu,di2A1
bu,d, (4.2.10)
where for notational compactness we define bu,1 = b1,d = 0 for all u and d. The term r˜ (A;B)
gives the sum of the unobserved complementarities in B corresponding to the indices of the
matches in A minus the same sum for A1 = {h1, 1i , . . . , hN,Ni}.
One of the main results of the paper is that the distribution F (B) of unobserved comple-
mentarities is identified.
Theorem 7.
1. s˜ (A;E) = r˜ (A;B) for any A and where B is formed from E.
2. r˜ (A;B1) = r˜ (A;B2) for all A if and only if B1 = B2.
3. Therefore, the distribution F (B) is identified because the distribution of H
⇣
S˜
⌘
is
identified.
The proof is in the appendix. The first part of the theorem states that the sum of unobserved
match production for an assignment can be computed using the elements of B. Therefore,
knowledge of B can be used to compute pairwise stable assignments, for example for coun-
terfactual analysis. Likewise, knowledge of F (B) lets one calculate assignment probabilities
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Pr (A | Z; F ). The second part of the theorem states that there is a one-to-one mapping
between the sums of unobserved assignment production for assignments and values of B.
Therefore, as the distribution H
⇣
S˜
⌘
of the sums of unobserved match production for as-
signments is identified, so is the distribution F (B) of unobserved match complementarities.
Example. 4 (N = 3) By definition,
0BBBBBBBBBB@
r˜ (A2;B)
r˜ (A3;B)
r˜ (A4;B)
r˜ (A5;B)
r˜ (A6;B)
1CCCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBBB@
b1,2 + b2,1 + b3,3   (b1,1 + b2,2 + b3,3)
b1,3 + b2,2 + b3,1   (b1,1 + b2,2 + b3,3)
b1,2 + b2,3 + b3,1   (b1,1 + b2,2 + b3,3)
b1,1 + b2,3 + b3,2   (b1,1 + b2,2 + b3,3)
b1,3 + b2,1 + b3,2   (b1,1 + b2,2 + b3,3)
1CCCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBBB@
 b2,2
 b3,3
b2,3   (b2,2 + b3,3)
b2,3 + b3,2   (b2,2 + b3,3)
b3,2   (b2,2 + b3,3)
1CCCCCCCCCCA
, (4.2.11)
where the second equality uses bu,1 = b1,d = 0 for all u and d. Then using (4.2.9) for
each of the four bu,d’s and (4.2.5) for each of the five s˜ (A;E)’s allows one to algebraically
verify Theorem 7.1 for N = 3. The interesting direction of Theorem 7.2 for N = 3 states
that B1 = B2 whenever r˜ (A;B1) = r˜ (A;B2) for all A. This direction can be verified
because r˜ (A2;B) through r˜ (A5;B) can be easily solved for the four elements of B. The
less interesting direction of Theorem 7.2 always holds by the definition of r˜ (A;B) to be
a function of B. Given that we previously showed that H
⇣
S˜
⌘
is identified, F (B) is also
identified.
4.2.7 Overidentification
The distribution of unobserved match characteristics G (E) is not identified. Despite the
model primitive G (E) not being identified, the distributions H
⇣
S˜
⌘
and F (B) are not
only identified, they are overidentified. The proof of Lemma 3 works by setting H
⇣
S˜?
⌘
=
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Pr (A1 | Z?), where S˜? is the point of evaluation of the CDF H, A1 is the diagonal assignment
{h1, 1i , . . . , hN,Ni} and Z? is a specific value of Z chosen based on the value S˜?. One can
identify the entire model if one only observes, in each market, whether assignment A1 occurs
or not. The assignment A1 is just one of N ! assignments. Given the adding up constraint
that the sum of probabilities of assignments is always 1, there are N !  2 other probabilities
Pr (A | Z) for each Z available to overidentify the model.
The necessity of using only one assignment probability in a proof of identification is anal-
ogous to the identification arguments for the single-agent multinomial choice model in the
frameworks of Thompson (1989) and Lewbel (2000). In such multinomial choice models,
only the probability of a single choice is necessary for identification. Given that choice
probabilities sum to one, all but two choices provide overidentifying restrictions. Overidenti-
fication in the semiparametric multinomial choice model has not been formally exploited to
form an operation testing procedure in finite samples. Given that the simpler multinomial
choice model should be explored before matching models, we leave the formal exploitation
of overidentification to further research.60
4.3 Generalizations of the Baseline Model
We consider two strict generalizations of identification result for the one-to-one matching
game where all agents are matched.
60Another source of overidentification arises if the researcher imposes that G (E) and hence, by Lemma
5.3, F (B) are exchangeable in agent indices. Exchangeability in agent indices is a restriction of the class of
allowable F ’s but F is identified without assuming such a restriction.
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4.3.1 Other Observed Variables X and Random Preferences
In addition to the large support match-specific characteristics Z, researchers often observe
other match-specific and agent-specific data, which we collect in the random variable X,
which we think of as a long vector. We also include in X the number of agents on each side,
N , to allow the size of the market to vary across the sample. An example of a production
function augmented by the elements of X is
(xu · xd)0  u,d,1 + x0u,d u,d,2 + µu,d + zu,d, (4.3.1)
where xu is a vector of upstream firm characteristics, xd is a vector of downstream firm
characteristics, xu · xd is a vector of all interactions between upstream and downstream
characteristics, xu,d is a vector of match-specific characteristics, µu,d is a random intercept
capturing unobserved characteristics of both u and d, and  u,d,1 and  u,d,2 are random co-
efficient vectors specific to the match. The two random coefficient vectors can be the sum
of the random preferences of upstream and downstream firms for own and partner char-
acteristics. In a marriage setting, we allow men to have heterogeneous preferences over the
observed characteristics of women, which is one explanation for why observationally identical
men marry observationally distinct women.
In this example,
X =
⇣
N, (xu)u2N , (xd)d2N , (xu,d)u,d2N
⌘
.
Now we define
eu,d = (xu · xd)0  u,d,1 + x0u,d u,d,2 + µu,d
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and, as before notationally,
cu1,d1,u2,d2 = eu1,d1 + eu2,d2   (eu1,d2 + eu2,d1) .
Using the same notation as before, we define the array of unobserved complementarities
as (4.2.7). This definition of C, and similarly of B, now depends on the realizations of
X. Our previous identification argument in Theorem 7 does not use X. Therefore we can
condition on a realization of X to identify the conditional-on-X distribution of unobserved
complementarities F (B |X). We of course require variation in Z as before, but now Z must
have full support conditional on each realization of X. We do not require that C, B and E
are independent of X, but all unobservables must still be independent of Z conditional on
X.
Corollary 8. The distribution F (B | X) of market-level unobserved complementarities con-
ditional on X is identified.
Our identification of distributions of heterogeneity conditional on X follows arguments in the
multinomial choice literature (Lewbel, 2000; Matzkin, 2007; Berry and Haile, 2009). This is
a standard object of identification in the cited literature
We could further attempt to unpack the identified F (B | X) into the distribution of individ-
ual random coefficients and additive unobservables, such as the vectors  u,d,1 and  u,d,2 and
the unobserved complementarities induced only by the scalar µu,d in the example production
function (4.3.1). We would need to assume full independence between the primitive unob-
servables and the elements of X. Using (4.3.1), we can think of the definition of bu,d (4.2.8)
as defining a system of (N   1)2 seemingly unrelated equations, relating bu,d to the elements
of X, the random coefficients and the additive unobservables. Masten (2015) studies in
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part seemingly unrelated regressions with random coefficients and shows that the marginal
distribution of each random coefficient or additive unobservable is identified but the joint
distribution of the random coefficients and additive unobservables entering all equations is
sometimes not identified. One intuition is that the number of elements of X must weakly
exceed the number of random coefficients and additive unobservables. Once F (B | X) is
identified and the problem of unpacking F into the joint distribution of random coefficients
and additive unobservables is placed in the framework of Masten (2015), the remaining
identification issues are less specific to matching and so are not considered further here.
4.3.2 Heterogeneous Coefficients on Match Characteristics
We now define the production to a match hu, di to be
eu,d +  u,d · zu,d, (4.3.2)
where  u,d 6= 0 is a match-specific coefficient. The coefficients  u,d vary across matches within
each matching market but not across markets. Therefore, the  u,d are fixed parameters
to be identified and not random coefficients. Fixing coefficients across markets but not
within markets makes sense in a context where firm indices like u and d have a consistent
meaning across markets. For example, the same set of upstream and downstream firms may
participate in multiple matching markets, as in Fox (2016), where each market is a separate
automotive component category.61 As we need the zu,d’s to identify F (B | X), we rule out
61In a marriage setting with different individuals in each market, we could assume that  u,d is the same for
all matches where the men are all in the same demographic class (such as college graduates) and the women
are all in the same demographic class (such as high-school graduates). This suggested use of demographic
classes is partially reminiscent of Chiappori, Salanié and Weiss (2015), who use data over time on the US
marriage market to estimate a different variance of the type I extreme value (logit) utility errors in a Choo
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the case where any  u,d = 0.
We apply a scale normalization on production by setting  1,1 = ±1. Because of transferable
utility, we can identify the relative scale of each match’s production. We use the matrix
  = ( u,d)u,d2N . It is first important to note that parts 1 and 2 of Theorem 7 are only
about the random variable unobservables B and E and so do not involve whether zu,d has
a parameter  u,d on it or not. So those statements in Theorem 7 still hold in this more
general setting. Next we state that the analog to the identification claim in the third part
of Theorem 7 holds in the setting with fixed parameters  u,d on zu,d.
Theorem 9. The distribution F (B | X) and the fixed matrix of parameters   = ( u,d)u,d2N
are identified.
The proof is in the appendix of the paper version of the chapter.
We could also study the production function (4.3.2) when each  u,d is a random coefficient
such that the random matrix   = ( u,d)u,d2N has some joint distribution J ( ) that describes
how   varies across markets. Again citing the results in Masten (2015) on seemingly unre-
lated regressions, we conjecture that the marginal distribution of each scalar  u,d is separately
identified but that the joint distribution J ( ) is not identified. Exploring estimation under
partial identification of a distribution such as J ( ) is outside the scope of the paper.
and Siow (2006) style model for each male demographic class and for each female demographic class. Our
suggested approach in this footnote lets  u,d vary by the intersection of male and female demographic classes,
instead of agents. For example, there could be a  age 40men,age 30women specific to the listed demographic
groups.
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4.4 Data on Unmatched Agents
Up until this point, we have considered matching games where all agents have to be matched.
We infer F (B | X) from sorting patterns in the data. This approach is reasonable when only
data on observed matches are available. For example, it may be unreasonable to assume
that data on all potential entrants to a matching market exist. In some situations, however,
researchers can also observe the identities of unmatched agents. Data are available, for
example, on potential merger partners in some industry that do not end up undertaking
mergers or on single people in a marriage market.62 When data on unmatched agents do
exist, we can go beyond unobserved complementarities B and identify the distribution of
match-specific unobservables E.
Here, X can contain separate numbers of downstream firms Nd and upstream firms Nu. Let
E =
0BBBB@
e1,1 · · · e1,Nd
... . . .
...
eNu,1 · · · eNu,Nd
1CCCCA .
Use hu, 0i and h0, di to denote an upstream firm and a downstream firm that are not matched.
An assignment A can be {hu1, 0i, hu2, d2i, h0, d2i}, allowing single firms. We do not require
match-specific characteristics zu,0 and z0,d for unmatched firms; they can be included in X
if present.
The data generating process is still (4.2.3). One difference is that a pairwise stable assignment
needs to satisfy individual rationality: each non-singleton realized match has production
greater than 0.
62For example, Uetake and Watanabe (2012) study mergers between rural banks, where each county is a
separate matching market.
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Theorem 10. The distribution G (E | X) of market-level unobservables is identified with
data on unmatched agents.
The proof shows that the distribution G (E | X) for some X can be traced using the proba-
bility that all agents are unmatched, conditional on Z. The individual rationality decision to
be single identifies G (E | X) while the sorting of matched firms to other matched firms iden-
tifies only F (B | X). Using an individual rationality condition is more similar to the utility
maximization assumptions used in the identification of single-agent discrete choice models
and discrete Nash games (Lewbel, 2000; Matzkin, 2007; Berry and Haile, 2009; Berry and
Tamer, 2006). An agent can unilaterally decide to become unmatched.
4.5 Agent-Specific Characteristics
Return to the case with only unmatched agents in the data. Match specific z’s with full
support are not always available in datasets. For example, in our venture capital work say
we observed only patents for startups and the total experience in past deals for venture
capitalists (in reality, we do observe match characteristics). Also say, for example, that the
induced match specific characteristic zu,d = zu·zd, where zu is the upstream firm characteristic
experience and zd is the downstream firm characteristic patents. Say the long vector of agent-
specific characteristics
 
(zu)u2N , (zd)d2N
 
has support in R2N . Even this product support on
agent characteristics will not allow the matrix Z with induced match-specific characteristics
zu,d = zu · zd to have support on say RN2 .
This is a problem for identification in the baseline model because the matrix of match-
specific unobservables E has N2 elements and the matrix of unobserved complementarities
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B has (N   1)2 elements. There needs to be some symmetry between the distributions of
observables and unobservables in the model. More prosaically, we cannot prove Lemma 3
when Z has limited support, such as when its constituents
 
(zu)u2N , (zd)d2N
 
vary only in
R2N while the match-specific unobservables E vary over RN2 .
The solution is to restrict attention to a production function where, in the primitive model,
unobserved characteristics enter symmetrically to observed characteristics. If observed char-
acteristics vary at the agent level, then unobserved characteristics should also be restricted
to only vary at the agent level. Taking the example of zu,d = zu · zd above, consider the
production function
eu · ed + zu · zd, (4.5.1)
where eu and ed are unobserved agent-specific characteristics.63 Unobserved agent character-
istics enter symmetrically to the observed agent characteristics in the production function.
Say the unobserved agent characteristics
 
(eu)u2N , (ed)d2N
 
take on support on R2N . Then
observed agent characteristics
 
(zu)u2N , (zd)d2N
 
also should vary on R2N in order for slight
extensions to the previous identification arguments to go through. Specifically, one can alter
the first lines of the proof of Lemma 3 and the lemma and hence the remainder of the iden-
tification machinery leading up to and including Theorem 7 will apply to the agent-specific
case.
Define eu,d = eu · ed and define unobserved complementarities using (4.2.6). We show that
the distribution of the matrix B of unobserved complementarities is identified.
Corollary 11. The distribution F (B | X) of unobserved complementarities B is identified
63All assignments would be pairwise stable if the match production was instead eu + ed + zu + zd.
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in the agent-specific case.
The short proof is in the appendix of the paper version of the chapter.
4.6 Many-to-Many Matching
Venture capitalists can make multiple investments during the same year. Likewise, star-
tups often contract with multiple venture capitalists, although for simplicity our application
considers only the lead venture capital investor in a startup. It is important to extend the
previous results to many-to-many, two-sided matching.
Consider a two-sided matching game where upstream firm u can make a quota of qu possible
matches and downstream firm d can make qd possible matches. The researcher has data
on qu and qd and the quotas can vary across firms in the same market and across markets.
The previous case of one-to-one matching is qu = qd = 1 for all firms. Leaving a quota slot
unfilled gives production of zero for that slot. The number of upstream firms Nu may differ
from the number of downstream firms Nd.
Let the production function for an individual match still be (4.2.1) and let the production
of the matches of the single upstream firm u with the pair of downstream firms d1 and d2 be
equal to
zu,d1 + eu,d1 + zu,d2 + eu,d2 .
This additive separability in the production of multiple matches involving the same firm yields
the many-to-many matching model of Crawford and Knoer (1981) and Roth and Sotomayor
(1990); Sotomayor (1999). Like in the one-to-one case, a pairwise stable assignment is proven
to exist, to be efficient and to be unique with probability 1. Redefine the following objects
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to allow Nu 6= Nd :
E =
0BBBB@
e1,1 · · · e1,Nd
... . . .
...
eNu,1 · · · eNu,Nd
1CCCCA , Z =
0BBBB@
z1,1 · · · z1,Nd
... . . .
...
zNu,1 · · · zNu,Nd
1CCCCA , B =
0BBBB@
b2,2 · · · b2,Nd
... . . .
...
bNu,2 · · · bNu,Nd
1CCCCA .
We also extend to many-to-many matching the model in Section 4.3.2, where the production
of a match between u and d is  u,d · zu,d + eu,d. The matrix of homogeneous parameters is
  = ( u,d)u2Nu,d2Nd .
Say first that the number of firms, quotas and production functions are such that all firms
make a number of matches equal to their quotas: there are no unused quota slots in equilib-
rium. Leaving no unused quota is feasible if
NuX
u=1
qu =
NdX
d=1
qd.
In this case, every mathematical argument for the baseline model in Section 4.2 and many of
the subsequent models extends to many-to-many matching. In particular, the distribution of
unobserved complementarities F (B | X) is identified using the sorting patterns in the data.
Likewise, if unmatched firms are in the data and so quota slots can be left unused, the same
analysis as Section 4.4 applies.
Corollary 12. Consider the many-to-many matching model.
1. The distribution of unobserved complementarities F (B | X) and the coefficients   (if
included) are identified from data on matches only.
2. The distribution of match-specific unobservables G (E | X) is identified if unmatched
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firms are in the data.
The proof is omitted as it just checks previous mathematical arguments to see that properties
unique to one-to-one matching with Nu = Nd = N are not used.
4.7 Matching with Trades
4.7.1 Simple Matching with Trades
Investigating a fairly general matching model is useful because many models of empirical
interest will be special cases. Consider matching with trades in the so-called trading networks
model in Hatfield, Kominers, Nichifor, Ostrovsky andWestkamp (2013), which is a significant
generalization of Kelso Jr and Crawford (1982). In matching with trades, agents engage in
trades ! from some finite set ⌦. A trade indexes the name of the buyer and the name of
the seller and can specify other aspects, such as the quality or other specifications of the
goods in question. In a labor market, trades could specify benefits such as health care plans
and vacation time. In venture capital, a trade could specify the number of board seats a
startup gives a venture capitalist. Trades generalize our previous notion of a match. We
require data on all aspects of the trade; if quality is part of a trade then the qualities for all
trades in the set ⌦ must be measured. The price of trade ! is p!, although, as before, we
study identification when prices are not observed in the data. Prices play the same role as
transfers in the earlier matching models.
Firms are not necessarily divided into buyers and sellers ex ante; a firm can be a buyer on
some trades and a seller on other trades. In a model of mergers, a firm is not ex ante either
a target or acquirer; these roles arise endogenously as part of a pairwise stable outcome.
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Two-sided, many-to-many matching is a strict special case of trading networks where the
profits of an upstream firm undertaking trades as a buyer are  1 and, likewise, the profits
of a downstream making trades as a seller are  1.
As there are no ex ante upstream and downstream firms, index a firm by i. Consider first
the case where the production of a trade ! between buyer i and seller j is
z! + e!. (4.7.1)
Notationally, the indices of i and j are subsumed into the trade !. If a trade should give
production of  1, we notationally remove it from ⌦. This matching with trades game is a
generalization of the two-sided many-to-many matching game in Section 4.6. In this simple
setup, trades that give positive production occur and trades that give negative production
do not occur. We observe the entire set of trades ⌦ for each market, so the data measures
whether a trade occurs or does not occur; firms that make no trades are therefore observed
as well. Let the vector Z = (z!)w2⌦ and, similarly, E = (e!)!2⌦ . Let X collect observables
entering E.
Theorem 13. Consider a trades model where the production of trade ! is z! + e!. Then
G (E | X) is identified.
4.7.2 Matching with Trades Under Submodularity
We now consider matching with trades where firms have profit functions defined over port-
folios of trades. Let ⌦i ⇢ ⌦ be the set of trades where i is either a buyer or a seller. The
120
individual profit of a firm i undertaking the trades  i ✓ ⌦i at prices p! for ! 2 ⌦ is
u (i, i) +
X
!2 i!
p!  
X
!2 !i
p!, (4.7.2)
where the set  i ! is the trades in  i where i is the seller and  !i is the trades in  i
where i is the buyer. Hatfield, Kominers, Nichifor, Ostrovsky and Westkamp prove that a
pairwise stable assignment (here a set of trades) exists and is efficient (and therefore unique
with probability 1) under a condition on preferences called substitutes. A companion paper
shows that the substitutes condition is equivalent to the indirect utility (profit) version of
the direct utility (profit) in (4.7.2) being submodular for all vectors of prices, p! for ! 2 ⌦
(Hatfield, Kominers, Nichifor, Ostrovsky and Westkamp, 2015, Theorem 6). See the cited
paper for a definition of submodularity. Submodularity of the indirect utility function is
restrictive for many empirical applications. However, submodularity is only a restriction
when the profit from a set of trades is not additively separable across the trades. Therefore,
the underlying direct utility firm profits justifying the production-of-a-trade (4.7.1) in Section
4.7.1 imply that the corresponding indirect utility functions are submodular.
For all firms i and trades  i ✓ ⌦i let the pre-transfer profit (or valuation) be
u (i, i) = zi, i + ei, i ,
where zi, i is an observable specific to firm i and the set of trades  i and ei, i is an unob-
servable specific to firm i and the set of trades  i. Let Z = (zi, i)i2N, i✓⌦i be the array of
observables corresponding to pairs of firms and sets of trades and let E = (ei, i)i2N, i✓⌦i be
a similar array for unobservables. The arrays Z and E are typically large but are always
finite as the set of trades ⌦ is finite. For identification, the support of  Z must be a weak
121
superset of the support of E. Further, the supports of E and Z should be restricted so that
the corresponding indirect utility functions are submodular for all players for all realizations
of E and Z. We leave to other work the question of how to enforce submodularity in empir-
ical applications.64 As before, observable characteristics other than the zi, i are collected in
a long vector X and can enter ei, i .
Say that the profit from making no trades is zero and that the researcher observes data on
firms that make no trades. Then the following identification result holds.
Theorem 14. The distribution of unobservables G (E | X) is upper bounded by an identified
function G¯ (E | X) in the trading networks model. G¯ (E | X) < 1 if, for each X and Z, there
exists E with positive probability where trades occur.
The statement means that we can identify a function G¯ (E | X) such that G (E | X) 
G¯ (E | X) for all arrays of unobservables E and conditioning observables X. A distribution
function is a probability, so the trivial bound G¯ (E | X) = 1 satisfies this property. However,
if some assignment other than the assignment with no trades occurs with positive probability,
then G¯ (E | X) is a tighter bound than the trivial bound of 1.65
The bound G¯ (E | X) in the proof Theorem 14 is actually Pr (A0 | Z?, X) for some Z?, where
A0 is the assignment where no trades are made. The proof of Theorem 14, in the appendix of
64If the submodularity condition fails, a stable assignment or a competitive equilibrium as defined in Hat-
field, Kominers, Nichifor, Ostrovsky and Westkamp (2013) may fail to exist. One practical but perhaps
inelegant approach is to ignore the lack of existence. As an example of this approach, the important con-
tribution by Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) estimates a Nash game of finite actions and restricts attention to
pure strategy equilibria, even though Nash’s existence theorem applies to mixed strategy equilibria. Note
that Hatfield, Kominers, Nichifor, Ostrovsky and Westkamp use a stability definition that is stronger than
pairwise stability. Under the models discussed earlier in the current paper, pairwise stability implies the
stronger notion of stability, while the equivalence does not hold in Hatfield, Kominers, Nichifor, Ostrovsky
and Westkamp. Theorem 14 uses the stability definition in Hatfield, Kominers, Nichifor, Ostrovsky and
Westkamp.
65The bound is likely not sharp. Indeed, it is possible G (E | X) is point identified and we do not know
the proof.
the paper version of the chapter, extends the argument in the proofs of Theorems 10 and 13.
In the proofs of Theorems 10 and 13, G (E | X) itself and not a bound equals Pr (A0 | Z?, X).
This is because the unobservables eu,d in Theorem 10 and e! in Theorem 13 correspond to
the production of a match or trade, which is the sum of profits of the two firms for the match
or trade. In Theorem 14, the unobservables ei, i correspond to the profit of an individual
firm i and not the production of all firms in the trades. The theorem shows that it is possible
to identify bounds on distributions of aspects of individual firm profit functions (up to scale)
and not just aspects of production functions for matches, as in earlier results. The reason
is that the individual profit functions are not additively separable across individual trades,
leaving no role for the concept of the production of a trade.
4.8 Biotech and Medical Venture Capital
We estimate the roles of observed match and firm characteristics as well as the distribution
of unobserved complementarities in the biotech and medical/health venture capital indus-
tries. In these industries, investment firms known as venture capitalists contribute money
to entrepreneurial startups. We seek to understand the role of venture capitalists in the
productive surplus of an investment; this contribution to match production is only present
if the venture capitalist adds value over and above offering financing. We present separate
parameter estimates for the biotech and medical industries.
In most cases, the first round of venture capital funding is secured well before an entrepreneur
is ready to market its products to consumers or even to undertake a final round of testing.
Therefore, the first round venture capital funding is essential to nurturing the entrepreneur
during a period where the entrepreneur has low or no revenues of its own. We study only the
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identity of the lead venture capital investor in the first round of funding. This lead venture
capitalist often takes more of an active management role in the startup than other investors.
We model each life science venture capital industry as a many-to-one, two-sided matching
market where each entrepreneur is funded by the lead venture capitalist and each venture
capitalist can fund multiple startups. We lack data on unfunded startups and venture capi-
talists who make no investments. Because we focus on many-to-one matching and consider
only matched firms, the appropriate nonparametric identification result is the many-to-one
special case of the many-to-many result in Corollary 12.1.
Sørensen (2007) uses a structural approach to estimate a matching game between entrepreneurs
and venture capitalists. Sørensen (2007) estimates a matching game where matched agents
could not exchange transfers, unlike the transferable utility matching game we study. His
assumption is that the unobservables are match-specific, normally distributed and indepen-
dent across matches involving the same or differing firms. By assuming independence across
matches involving the same firm, Sørensen (2007)’s model rules out that matches for many
firms tend to be unobservedly more productive than matches for many other firms. Allowing
for correlation in the matches involving the same firm may be important in venture capi-
tal, as such a correlation structure allows certain firms to contribute more to match profit
than other firms. These are the “high type” firms: highly capable venture capitalists or
entrepreneurial firms with great prospects in the life sciences industries.
4.8.1 Data and Observed Characteristics
We start with a carefully collected dataset on, ideally, all venture capital transactions in
the biotech and medical industries. The data come from ThomsonOne. We then merge the
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venture capital data with data from the US Patent and Trademark Office on the stock of
patents held by the entrepreneurial firms at the time of the first round investment that we
model. Our data showed that the number of venture capital deals increased substantially
after 1996 and our patent data have missing records after 2008. Therefore, we use data on
venture capital deals between 1997 to 2007, although we use earlier years of data to compute
venture capitalist experience.
4.8.2 Matching Markets
For computational reasons to be discussed, our method of simulated moments estimator can
handle only what we describe as medium sized matching markets. Therefore, our matching
market definition is made to keep the number of matches medium sized: small compared
to the entire biotech and medical venture capital industries but still large compared to the
number of potential entrants in the entry literature in industrial organization (Bresnahan
and Reiss, 1991; Berry, 1992; Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009). We define a matching market to
be one of the eleven two-digit biotech sectors in Table 4.24 in a particular calendar year of the
data. Based on our matching market definitions, in our model venture capitalists consider
matching only with the set of entrepreneurs in the same two-digit biotech/medical sector
and year that, in the data, the venture capitalist’s match partner was in.66 The assumption
that venture capitalists pre-commit to a two-digit sector is strong; relaxing the restriction
to two-digit sectors requires addressing computational concerns.67
66Our market definition differs from Sørensen (2007), who defines a matching market as a six month period
in one of two US states, California and Massachusetts. We use worldwide data and impose no limits that
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs look for partners only within one narrow geographic region, which
corresponds with our data.
67Sheng (2014) is an estimator for large network games that could likely be applied to matching games in
future work. The computational savings of the estimator result in set instead of point identification in the
limit, which is not in the spirit of our paper’s theoretical results about point identification.
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Table 4.24: Two Digit Biotech and Medical Sectors Used to Define Matching Markets
Biotech Medical
Human Diagnostics
Agricultural and animal Therapeutics
Industrial Health products
Biosensors Health services
Research & production equipment Pharmaceuticals
Research & other services
We only consider two-digit sectors with fewer than 30 startups in a year. We estimate the
model parameters separately for the biotech and medical industries. For biotech, we have
38 matching markets. The mean number of startups per matching market is 7.2 with a
maximum of 27. The mean number of venture capitalists per matching market is 6.8 with a
maximum of 25. The 6.8 venture capitalists per matching market is only a little lower than
7.2 startups because there are only a small number of venture capitalists making multiple
matches in the same two-digit biotech sector and year. Now consider the medical industry,
which has larger numbers of startups per two-digit sector and year. There are 15 matching
markets with fewer than 30 startups. Among those 15 markets, the mean number of startups
is 22.3 with a maximum of our chosen upper bound of 30. The mean number of venture
capitalists is 21.5 with the maximum, in the estimation sample, of 30.68
Again, we model the lead (largest) venture capital investor in the first round of venture
capital funding. Each entrepreneur appears once in the data, reflecting this first round.
Each venture capitalist can occur multiple times. A venture capitalist can be engaged in
multiple investments within a year and can be observed in multiple years. If a venture
capitalist makes multiple first round investments as the lead investor in a given year and
68We use servers with up to twenty cores for estimation. Using a cluster of multiple servers could allow us
to increase the number of agents per matching market some, but not tremendously so because of the curse
of dimensionality with computing a pairwise stable assignment to the matching game.
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two-digit sector, it is treated as a single firm with a quota (the maximum number of matches
it can make) equal to the number of matches that venture capitalist made in the data for
that year and two-digit sector. A venture capitalist with a single match in the data has a
quota of one. Our model’s use of these quotas focuses on time constraints as the reason a
superstar venture capitalist is not the lead investor in all entrepreneurial startups. Indeed,
a lead venture capital investor takes seats on the board and an active management role in
its entrepreneurial firms. The venture capitalist has scarce time to do this and so carefully
selects a small number of investments, in the context of a matching model where it competes
with other venture capitalists for these deals.
We do not model synergies between multiple entrepreneurs matched to the same venture
capitalist; the production of a set of matches involving the same venture capitalist is equal
to the sum of the production of the individual matches, as in our Corollary 12 but not
our Theorem 14. Therefore, we do not study venture capitalist financial strategies such
as portfolio diversification. We also do not model post-matching externalities in match
production caused by, say, multiple entrepreneurs competing to treat the same, narrowly
defined medical condition. It is rare for entrepreneurs in the same two-digit sector and
year of the initial investment to be directly competing in the sense of treating, say, the same,
narrowly defined medical condition. Therefore, in our model an entrepreneur cares about the
outcome of the venture capital market for matches only because it affects the entrepreneur’s
own final venture capital match and corresponding transfer, not because a rival’s match with
a top venture capitalist could create a fierce competitor for consumers.
Unlike, say, a dataset on mergers, there are no unmatched firms in our data. While presum-
ably there are entrepreneurial firms that fail to secure a first round of venture capital funding
and venture capitalists with the equivalent of free quota slots (say spare time to help manage
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an additional startup), our data do not cover them. In what follows, our model operates as
if these unmatched entrepreneurs and venture capitalist quota slots do not exist.69
4.8.3 Observables in the Match Production Function
The production function for the output of a match involving one entrepreneur d and one
venture capitalist u is
±1 ·Distanceu,d+ Sector ·SectorExperu,d+ ExperPatents ·TotalExperu · log (Patentsd + 1)+eu,d.
(4.8.1)
In this section, we discuss the contribution of each of the listed observable (in the data)
variables; we postpone a discussion of the unobservables until the next section. Overall, we
feel we have collected close to the best firm and match characteristics on a broad portion
of the VC sector that academic researchers could have access to. As we will see, even these
rich characteristics will leave room for unobservables.
Table 4.25 reports the means and standard deviations across realized matches for the key
observable characteristics in the production function. Estimating the matching model re-
quires us to compute these characteristics for both actual and counterfactual matches. In
estimation, we rescale many of the variables as discussed separately for each variable; the
table reports the variables before and after rescaling.70
The scale normalization of match production is in terms of the match-specific variable dis-
tance. Distance is measured as the distance on the surface of the Earth from the headquarters
69The matching maximum score estimator of Fox (2016) is robust to missing data on quotas in part because
it does involve computing pairwise stable assignments as part of a nested fixed point procedure.
70The table reports summary statistics by realized matches but some rescalings are based on other samples,
like all venture capitalists or all startups for agent-specific characteristics.
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Name Pre-Rescaling Rescaled
Biotech Medical Biotech Medical
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
log (Patent count + 1) 0.45 0.85 0.46 0.87 -0.04 0.97 0.01 1
VC overall experience 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.14 0.22 1.19 0.25 1.36
VC four-digit sector specific experience 0.19 0.26 0.13 0.18 0.04 1.05 -0.02 0.98
Distance: km/1000 1.74 3.08 2.07 3.2 0.05 1 -0.02 1
# of Patents (no logs) 2.12 7.48 2.35 11.16
Interaction term: patents * log(patents) 0.02 1.08 0.18 1.62
Table 4.25: Summary Statistics for Realized Matches
of the venture capitalist to the headquarters of the entrepreneur. We have worldwide data so
some of these distances are quite large: from Europe to Australia, say. Table 4.25 measures
distance in thousands of kilometers. Hence, the table reports that the mean distance across
realized matches is around 1700 kilometers. We allow the coefficient on distance to be either
positive or negative, estimating the model once for a positive coefficient and a second time
for a negative coefficient, taking the parameter estimates with the lowest objective function
value.71 Not surprisingly, we will find that the coefficient on distance is indeed negative. We
rescale distance to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1.
Distance plays an important role in the venture capital literature. The literature has ar-
gued that geographic proximity helps investors and entrepreneurs find out about each other,
thereby increasing investment likelihood (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Furthermore, Lerner
(1995) finds that VCs are more likely to sit on boards of their portfolio companies the closer
are the companies, a finding consistent with lower governance costs associated with geo-
graphically proximate investments. As a result, geographic proximity is likely to be a factor
71As discussed in Section 4.3.2, the assumption that distance is valued the same across all matches is
more than a mere normalization. Using the fact that each venture capitalist appears in multiple markets,
Theorem 9 allows us to identify a coefficient on distance specific to each venture capitalist. However, all of
the parameters in (4.8.1), not just distance, have a homogeneous coefficient.
129
in selecting investment opportunities. Such governance considerations are likely to be espe-
cially important in empirical settings like ours in which startup assets are mainly intangible,
the length of product development can be decades, and product development often costs
hundreds of millions of dollars (Lerner, Shane and Tsai, 2003). Co-location can help for
governance and monitoring reasons, as well as for facilitating the provision of value-added
business development services such as organizational professionalization (Hellmann and Puri,
2000).72
While VCs tend to specialize by factors such as the startup lifecycle stage of development,
perhaps the most-mentioned aspect of specialization is industry experience (Hsu, 2004;
Sørensen, 2007). Industry domain experience may be important in both assessing invest-
ment opportunities as well as intermediating startup business development services (such as
connecting to executive-level managers in an industry domain or striking alliance relation-
ships with industry incumbents) – indeed Sørensen estimates that the former factor is twice
as important as the latter in explaining the likelihood that a startup goes public. Further-
more, Sorenson and Stuart (2001) find that industry domain experience can allow VCs to
invest in more geographically distant portfolio firms.
Our measure of a venture capitalist’s past experience in all biotech and medical sectors is
equal to the number of past deals where that venture capitalist was the lead investor in
the first round, which typically corresponds to knowledge in a startup domain. Experience
is constructed using the complete history of our data, which starts in 1960. We do not
wish for our measure of experience to trend over time, so we normalize experience each year
72Our estimates are in units of distance instead of monetary units, such as dollars. Therefore, we cannot
definitively say that the differences we estimate in match production correspond to large differences in
monetary values. Nevertheless, the prior importance of distance in academic research on venture capital
suggests that distance is economically important in monetary terms.
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to be between 0 and 1, with 1 being the venture capitalist with the most experience that
year and 0 being the venture capitalist with the least experience. Table 4.25 reports that
the mean level of the venture-capitalist specific variable experience across realized matches
(not venture capitalists) in the estimation samples are 0.06 for biotech and 0.07 for venture
capital.73 This means the venture capitalist with the most experience in a given year typically
has around 20 times the past deals as the mean venture capitalist. In estimation, we scale
venture capitalist experience to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1. This
makes the standard deviation of experience similar to the standard deviation of distance.74
We also compute the venture capitalist’s experience in the specific four-digit sector of an
entrepreneur. There are 85 four-digit sectors in our biotech and medical data. Again, we
normalize sector-specific experience to be between 0 and 1 for each year of data by making the
venture capitalist with the most sector-specific experience have a value of 1. The mean level
of four-digit, sector-specific experience across realized matches for biotech is 0.19, or about
1/5 of the past deals of the venture capitalist with the most sector-specific experience. For
the medical industry, the mean sector-specific experience is 0.13. In estimation, we rescale
sector specific experience to have close to a mean of zero and a standard deviations of 1. Note
that for a given venture capitalist, four-digit experience varies across entrepreneurs within
the same two-digit sector. Sector experience is therefore a match-specific characteristic. We
73Table 4.25 reports summary statistics for realized matches, so a venture capitalist’s overall experience is
counted twice if the venture capitalist makes two matches in a given year.
74Total experience is a count of past matches and so could be considered to be a function of a lagged
dependent variable in another matching model where venture capitalists were allowed to be unmatched
or have vacant quota slots and so the number of matches of each venture capitalist (in addition to the
identity of the startup partners) was an outcome of the matching model. Past observed agent and match
characteristics are statistically exogenous shifters of the outcomes of past matching games and so provide
exogenous variation in past matches and hence lagged dependent variables. While this variation could lead
to an approach that distinguishes venture capitalist serially correlated (over time) unobserved heterogeneity
from true state dependence from experience, we do not explore that here as we assume that unobserved
complementarities are statistically independent of experience.
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do not measure an entrepreneurial firm’s experience because we observe no information on
the founders of the startup.
The most important asset of an entrepreneurial startup is likely its intellectual property.
Perhaps the only way for an outside researcher to directly measure this intellectual property
is to look at patents. We have data on the number of patents held by the entrepreneurial firm
at the time of the first round of venture capital investment. The literature has identified at
least two distinct roles of patenting for startups: as a legal instrument to exclude others from
using intellectual property in the product market (or to license those rights to others in the
market for technology) and as signaling devices to capital providers. Patents are important
in the biotechnology and medical industries for both reasons (Levin et al., 1987). Table 4.25
shows that the mean number of patents is just over 2 for both biotech and medical, with
high standard deviations of 7.5 for biotech and 11.1 for medical. 32% of entrepreneurs have
zero patents at the time of the initial round of venture capital investment. The production
function uses the logarithm of the patent count plus one, rescaled to have a mean close to
zero and a standard deviation close to 1. We recognize that patent counts are not a perfect
measure of intellectual property; this partly motivates this paper’s focus on unobservable
characteristics.
As discussed in the identification sections, complementarities between matched firms drive
matching. Therefore, the firm-specific but not match-specific characteristics venture capital-
ist experience and startup patent count would drop out of the calculation of the production
maximizing assignment if included without interactions. The production function includes
the interaction between overall venture capital experience and the log of the patent count
plus one. There may be positive complementarities between startups’ patent position and
more experienced (and therefore more reputable) venture capitalists. In patenting’s exclu-
132
sionary role or in patenting’s role of facilitating markets for technology, startups with more
patents may wish to match with more experienced venture capitalists. Similarly on the
signaling side, more experienced venture capitalists may value startup patents more highly
(Hsu and Ziedonis, 2008). Table 4.25 reports sample statistics for the interaction term across
actual matches (not hypothetical matches). For biotech, the interaction term has a mean of
around zero and a standard deviation of 1.1. For medical, the mean is 0.2 and the standard
deviation is 1.6.
4.8.4 Distribution of Unobserved Complementarities
In our empirical work, we will treat firm indices as having no common meaning across match-
ing markets. For entrepreneurs, firm indices do in fact lack meaning, as each startup appears
in exactly one matching market. Venture capitalists may appear in multiple matching mar-
kets, but we still treat the same venture capitalist in different matching markets as being a
different firm.
The production function in (4.8.1) has match-specific unobservables. The identification argu-
ment in Corollary 12.1 uses match-specific characteristics, which in (4.8.1) are the distance
between the headquarters of the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist and the venture
capitalist’s experience in the entrepreneur’s four-digit sector. We impose that unobservables
and observables are distributed independently.
Given our data and approach of treating firm indices as irrelevant within a market, we impose
that the joint distribution of unobserved complementarities is exchangeable in firm indices.
Lemma 5.3 states that if G (E) is unobservable in agent indices, then so is F (B). This result
extends naturally to many-to-one matching. Even though the number of venture capitalists
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can be less than the number of entrepreneurs, we treat each venture capitalist as a single
firm and not a number of synthetic firms equal to the venture capitalist’s quota.75
We operationalize our ideas about exchangeability using the following parametric structure.
We assume the joint distribution F of the unobserved complementarities in B will be mul-
tivariate normal with the following properties
Corr (bu1,d1 , bu2,d2) = ⇢1, if u1 6= u2, d1 6= d2
Corr (bu1,d1 , bu2,d1) = ⇢2, if u1 6= u2
Corr (bu1,d1 , bu1,d2) = ⇢3, if d1 6= d2
SD (bu1,d1) =  .
There are different correlations between pairs of unobserved complementarities depending
on whether the venture capitalists u1 and u2 are the same and whether the startups d1 and
d2 are the same. Keep in mind that the unobserved complementarity bu,d always involves the
upstream firm 1 and the downstream firm 1, in addition to the listed firms u and d. We will
estimate ⇢1, ⇢2, ⇢3 and  2 in addition to the parameters in the production function (4.8.1).
We collect these parameters into the vector ✓ = (±1,  Sector,  ExperPatents, ⇢1, ⇢2, ⇢3,  ), where
the ±1 corresponds to the coefficient on distance.
By Lemma 5.2, there exists a distribution G (E) for the unobserved match characteristics
that induces our multivariate normal F (B) by the transformation (4.2.8). By Example 6,
the underlying distribution G (E) giving our F (B) is not in general the simple multivariate
normal distribution in the text of the example.
75A venture capitalist firm typically has multiple employees known as venture capitalists. Our model and
data focus on a VC firm, not its individual employees. One interpretation of eu,d might be that it includes
information on the VC employee that would be assigned to the startup if the match forms.
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4.8.5 Estimator
The many-to-one matching model is a special case of Sotomayor (1999), and therefore has
a unique pairwise stable assignment with probability 1. Furthermore, this pairwise stable
assignment can be computed with the linear program described in that paper. Therefore, a
simulated nested fixed point estimator is appropriate, where the objective function involves
an integral over the unobserved complementarities B and the corresponding integrand in-
volves solving the linear program for each realization of B.
A likelihood exists because we have fully specified the data generating process. Let the
object Xm collect all the match and firm-specific observables (including the number of firms
on each side of the market and the elements that in the discussion of identification would
instead be in Z) for realized and counterfactual matches for market m and let Am be the
assignment in the data for market m. The likelihood contribution for market m involves the
computation of Pr (Am | Xm; ✓), or
Pr (Am | Xm; ✓) =
ˆ
B
1 [Am stable | Xm, B; ✓] d˜FB (B; ✓) . (4.8.2)
The indicator function 1 [Am stable | Xm, B; ✓] is equal to 1 if Am is computed to be the
pairwise stable assignment for marketm with draw B, using the linear program in Sotomayor
(1999). The symbol d˜ in d˜F stands in for the common integration symbol “d” from calculus,
to distinguish this use from our notation d for a downstream firm.
A computational challenge with the likelihood contribution (4.8.2) is that Pr (Am | Xm; ✓)
will typically be intractably close to 0. Consider the simple example of one-to-one matching
without the option of being unmatched. There are N ! possible assignments with N upstream
and N downstream firms. Typically, Pr (Am | Xm; ✓) will be on the order of 1/N !. As N ! can
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be close to the number of atoms in the universe with N = 50, the likelihood will involve the
computation of intractably small numbers. The same issue with intractably small numbers
will apply to generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators using the efficient choice
of moments, which are based on the scores of the likelihood (Hajivassiliou and McFadden,
1998; McFadden, 1989).
Instead of attempting to compute Pr (Am | Xm; ✓) directly, we work with a simulated mo-
ments estimator that uses moments that are easier to compute. Our chosen estimator is
statistically inefficient but is tractable to compute. Let g (A,X) be a function of an assign-
ment A and agent and match characteristics X that gives some market-level output. Let
A (X,B; ✓) be the pairwise stable assignment of a market with observablesX and unobserved
complementarities B, evaluated at the parameter ✓. With data on M markets, an empirical
moment as a function of ✓ is
Qg,M (✓) =
1
M
MX
m=1
ˆ
B
g (A (Xm, B; ✓) , Xm) d˜FB (B; ✓)  g (Am, Xm)
 
. (4.8.3)
The moment condition is that Qg,M (✓) = 0. Each choice of g indexes a separate empirical
moment Qg,M (✓).76 The exact choices of g (A,X) are described in the appendix of the paper
version of the chapter.77 We have separate moments based on agent-specific and firm-specific
moments. For example, a moment might be based on the quantiles of the match-specific
characteristics for only the matches in the pairwise stable assignment. These selections for
the moments Qg,M (✓) provide an estimator that uses only the sorting patterns captured by
76For readability, the above notation suppresses the reality that the dimension of the random matrix B
depends on the numbers of entrepreneurial and venture capitalist firms in Xm.
77The outcome A (X,B; ✓) of an assignment being pairwise stable is discrete and hence induces a non-
differentiability in the simulated GMM objective function. We use a non-gradient based, global optimization
routine known as a genetic algorithm to maximize the function. We vary optimization routine settings, such
as the population size of points, in order to check that our estimates appear to be a global minimum.
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the choices for g. Inside the integral over the random matrix B in each moment Qg,M (✓),
the portion of the integrand g (A (Xm, B; ✓) , Xm) is typically nonzero. This is unlike the
integrand of the likelihood contribution in (4.8.2), which involves an indicator function that
will be be 0 for an intractably large number of realizations of B for matching markets with the
numbers of agents in our data. Intuitively, our moments work only with agent characteristics
while the likelihood contribution (4.8.2) exploits agent indices fully to compute the exact
probability of the assignment in the data. Our estimator is statistically inefficient but easier
to compute. We use the usual optimal weighting matrix from two-step GMM.
The integral in each moment Qg,M (✓) is approximated on the computer using simulation
over the random matrix of unobservable complementarities B (McFadden, 1989; Pakes and
Pollard, 1989). The method of simulated moments estimator is consistent for ✓ as M !1
for a fixed number of simulation draws for the matrix B. In practice, we use Halton sequences
to sample B while reducing simulation error at the risk of introducing some small bias from
the deterministic simulation draws. The number of draws of the entire matrix B is 1000 for
biotech and 500 for medical. The integral that is simulated has a dimension equal to the
number of elements in the matrix B, (Num   1) ·
 
Ndm   1
 
for market m. In the estimation
sample, our market size cap means that the maximum number of elements of B is 841.
The standard errors are adjusted for simulation error. The standard errors use the usual
sandwich formulas with numerical derivatives approximating the actual derivatives, as the
assignment outcome A (X,B; ✓) is discrete and hence not differentiable in the simulation
estimator (it is smoothed by the integral over the multivariate normal distribution for B in
an estimator without numerical integration error). We calibrate the stepsize of the numerical
derivatives to achieve somewhat decent confidence interval coverage in the Monte Carlo
studies to be discussed now.
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4.8.6 Monte Carlo Study
We conduct a Monte Carlo study at the reported point estimates to ensure that our chosen
moments are informative in that they lead to low bias in the estimates of ✓, as done, for
example, in Eisenhauer, Heckman and Mosso (2015). We also use the Monte Carlo study to
calibrate the stepsizes of the numerical derivatives used for the standard errors.
We perform one Monte Carlo study based on the biotech industry and a separate Monte
Carlo study based on the medical industry. For each industry, the true parameters are taken
from the actual point estimates described below in Table 4.27. Each replication proceeds
as follows. We randomly sample 35 matching markets for biotech and 15 matching markets
for medical; these are similar to the numbers of matching markets used in the real data
estimation. Sampling a matching market means using the number of startups, the number
of venture capitalists, the match characteristics, and the agent characteristics from the data
for that market. We then also sample a matrix B of unobserved complementarities and
compute the pairwise stable assignment. We then use the data on assignments and observable
characteristics to estimate the parameter vector ✓. We conduct 100 Monte Carlo replications
for the biotech industry and, for computational reasons, 45 Monte Carlo replications for the
medical industry.78
Table 4.26 reports the two Monte Carlo studies, one for biotech and one for medical. For
each parameter in ✓, the table reports the bias, the root mean squared error (RMSE) and
the coverage of the nominal 95% confidence intervals, adjusted for simulation error. RMSE
78We use a non-gradient based, global optimization routine known as a genetic algorithm to minimize
the method of simulated moments objective function. We vary optimization routine settings, such as the
population size of points, in order to check that our estimates appear to be a global minimum.
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is calculated as vuut1
I
IX
i=1
⇣
✓ˆsyni   ✓true
⌘2
,
where ✓ˆsyni is the estimator using synthetic data for the ith out of I Monte Carlo replications.
Table 4.26 shows that our choice of moments do lead to relatively low bias and RMSE; the
absolute value of bias is always less than or equal to 0.05 for all parameter values.79 For
matching markets with much larger numbers of firms, the same number of simulation draws
and the same number of markets in the data, unreported Monte Carlo studies indicate that
the finite-sample bias from simulation error will be more substantial. Table 4.26 shows that
the coverage of the nominal 95% confidence intervals are above 90% for all but one parameter
for the biotech industry and two parameters for the medical industry. The RMSEs are small
so we are not worried about the undercoverage on these three parameters leading to falsely
rejecting the hypothesis that a parameter is zero.
Table 4.26: Monte Carlo Study
Biotech Medical
True Bias RMSE Cover. True Bias RMSE Cover.
Sector experience 1.28 0.04 0.15 0.98 0.31 0.03 0.10 0.80
Total experience * log(patents+1) 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.88 0.67 0.05 0.18 0.84
Standard deviation of UC 2.08 0.01 0.03 0.94 1.96 0.02 0.04 1.00
Correlation, no common firm 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.94 0.74 -0.02 0.04 0.93
Correlation, common startup 0.23 0.01 0.02 0.94 0.74 0.00 0.04 0.98
Correlation, common VC 0.94 -0.01 0.02 0.91 0.77 -0.02 0.04 0.96
Both studies uniformly sample matching markets with replacement from the corresponding real-data matching markets.
Biotech: sample size of 38 markets, 100 Monte Carlo replications.
Medical: sample size of 15 markets, 45 Monte Carlo replications
79As discussed in the section on the point estimates, the economic magnitude of Monte Carlo’s true value
on the interaction term between total experience and patents is close to zero (0.02) for the biotech industry.
Therefore, the bias of 0.01 is also small in economic magnitude even it is large compared to the true parameter
in the Monte Carlo.
139
4.8.7 Estimates
Table 4.27 reports the estimates and standard errors. There are four separate sets of esti-
mates: two for the biotech industry and two for the medical industry. For each industry, we
report estimates without and with the term interacting startup patents and venture capi-
talist total experience. The parameters on the match-specific characteristics are not overly
sensitive to the inclusion of the agent-specific characteristics, so we focus on the estimates
with the interaction term. The top half of Table 4.27 reports the estimates of the produc-
tion function parameters and the bottom half reports the estimates of the parameters of the
multivariate normal distribution of unobserved complementarities.
Table 4.27: Venture Capital Parameter Estimates
Measure Biotech Medical
Distance -1 -1 -1 -1
(-) (-) (-) (-)
Sector experience 1.32 1.28 0.22 0.31
(0.30) (0.20) (0.03) (0.06)
Total experience * log(patents+1) 0.02 0.67
(0.02) (0.11)
Standard deviation of 2.52 2.08 2.36 1.96
unobserved complementarities (0.19) (0.04) (0.17) (0.10)
Correlation 0.41 0.17 0.66 0.74
no common firms (0.06) (0.02) (0.13) (0.06)
Correlation 0.45 0.23 0.66 0.74
same startup (0.06) (0.05) (0.12) (0.06)
Correlation 0.96 0.94 0.79 0.77
same venture capitalist (0.38) (0.01) (0.08) (0.04)
We first consider the production function parameter estimates for the biotech industry in
Table 4.27. Both distance and sector experience are match characteristics that have been
normalized to have a standard deviation of around 1. The point estimate of 1.28 on VC
experience in the four-digit sector of the startup indicates that sector experience is more
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important than distance, although the confidence interval for the sector experience parameter
contains the absolute value of the normalized coefficient on distance, 1. The coefficient on
the interaction between startup patents and venture capitalist experience is 0.02. A change
in the number of patents from 1 to 2 is equivalent to a 0.18 change in the rescaled log of
patents measure. At say a value of the rescaled VC total experience of 0.5, this change
in patents results in a change in match production of 0.02 · 0.18 · 0.5 = 0.002 units of the
standard deviation of distance, an economically tiny effect. Another way to interpret the
coefficient on the interaction term is to look at the standard deviation in the value of the
interaction across realized matches, which is 1.1 in Table 4.25. An one standard deviation
increase in the interaction term then results in a 0.02 · 1.1 = 0.02 change in production in
units of the standard deviation of distance. Patents and total experience do not seem to
play a role in match production in biotech.
Now consider the production function parameter estimates for the medical industry in Table
4.27. The parameter of 0.31 on sector experience, with a low standard error, is economically
and statistically lower than the normalized coefficient of 1 on distance. So distance is more
important than sector experience in the medical industry. The coefficient on the interaction
between patents and VC total experience is 0.67, 34 times the coefficient of 0.02 in biotech.
Still, the change from 1 to 2 patents at a rescaled total VC experience of 0.5 results in a
change of production of 0.06 distance standard deviations, still not a large effect in economic
magnitudes. Table 4.25 reports the standard deviation of the interaction term across realized
matches is 1.6. A one standard deviation change in the interaction term then results in
production increasing by 0.67 · 1.6 = 1.1 distance standard deviations. Interpreted using
the standard deviation of the interaction term across realized matches, the effect of the
interaction term is about the same as distance and greater than the effect of sector experience.
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Next, we interpret the parameters of the multivariate normal distribution of unobserved com-
plementarities. Recall the definition in (4.2.6): an unobserved complementarity is indexed
by four firms and is the sum and difference of unobserved match characteristics involving
four matches. For the unobserved complementarities bu,d from (4.2.8), two of the four firms
are always fixed at upstream firm 1 and downstream firm 1, although firm indices have no
meaning across markets in our analysis. The other two firms, the u and d in bu,d, vary
across the unobserved complementarities in the matrix B. Interpreting the distribution of
unobserved complementarities requires subtlety; it is easier to think in terms of unobserved
match characteristics. Unfortunately, the distribution of unobserved match characteristics
is not identified.
Consider the standard deviations of the unobserved complementarities. For biotech, the
standard deviation is 2.08, with a small standard error. The standard deviation can be
interpreted to mean, in a loose sense, that unobserved complementarities are twice as im-
portant as distance, which has a coefficient of -1 and a standard deviation of 1. In the same
loose sense, the point estimate is that unobserved complementarities are 2.08/1.28 = 1.6
times as important as sector experience. For the medical industry, the standard deviation of
unobserved complementarities is 1.96, meaning that, again in a loose sense, that unobserved
complementarities are twice as important as distance and 2.08/0.31 = 6.3 times as important
as sector experience.
There are three correlation parameters in the multivariate normal distribution. The first
correlation is Corr (bu1,d1 , bu2,d2), the correlation between two unobserved complementarities
when neither of the upstream firms or downstream firms (other than upstream firm 1 and
downstream firm 1) are the same. For biotech, this correlation is positive and low, at 0.17,
with a small standard error. Presumably the positive correlation reflects the presence of
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upstream firm 1 and downstream firm 1 in all unobserved complementarities bu,d. For the
medical industry, the correlation is much higher, at 0.74, also with a low standard error.
When upstream firm 1 and downstream firm 1 contribute to unobserved complementarities
in one set of four matches, they do so in others.
The second correlation is Corr (bu1,d1 , bu2,d1), the correlation between two unobserved com-
plementarities when the startup is the same. The correlation for biotech of 0.23 has the same
sign but is lower than the correlation for the medical industry of 0.74. The third correlation
is Corr (bu1,d1 , bu1,d2), the correlation between two unobserved complementarities when the
venture capitalist is the same. For biotech, this correlation of 0.94 is quite high. For the
medical industry, the correlation of 0.77 is a little lower. For biotech, the correlation between
two complementarities involving upstream firm 1, downstream firm 1 and the same venture
capitalist is much higher than the correlation between complementarities involving upstream
firm 1, downstream firm 1 and the same startup as well as the correlation when only upstream
firm 1 and downstream firm 1 are the same. This seems to mean that venture capitalists
are playing more of systematic role in unobserved complementarities across a variety of sets
of four matches than the more idiosyncratic role of startups. In the medical industry, the
three correlations are all high and about the same. The distribution of B is close to being
equicorrelated and hence exchangeable in all the elements of B, not just exchangeable in the
agent indices (which is imposed by our choice of distribution).
4.8.8 Discussion of Unobserved Complementarities
The somewhat subtle interpretation of the estimated distribution of unobserved complemen-
tarities showcases the loss of information from using data on only matched agents, which
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is common in empirical work on matching. Nevertheless, the distribution of unobserved
complementarities is in the same units as the contribution of observables to the produc-
tion function and the two can be compared. For both the biotech and medical industries,
we found that the standard deviation of unobserved complementarities was greater than
the individual contributions of distance, VC sector experience, startup patents and VC to-
tal experience. However, combining the contributions of all observables in the production
function, particularly sector experience and distance, suggests that the role of unobserved
complementarities is roughly the same as the role of all observables.
Reporting the standard deviation of the unobserved complementarities has some analogs to
reporting the standard deviation of error terms in other empirical literatures. For example,
the standard deviation of wage regression residuals is often thought of as representing the
dispersion in unobserved worker ability. The standard deviation of production function
residuals is typically called the dispersion in total factor productivity. There are thousands
of papers on understanding the often unmeasured factors that affect worker ability and firm
total factor productivity. Likewise, our estimates of large standard deviations of unobserved
complementarities in venture capital suggest that there is good motivation for additional
academic research on the factors making venture capital investments more productive.
4.9 Conclusion
Matching models that have been structurally estimated to date have not allowed rich distri-
butions of unobservables. It has been an open question whether data on who matches with
whom as well as match or agent characteristics are enough to identify such distributions of
unobservables. In this paper, we explore several sets of conditions that lead to identification.
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Using data on only matched firms, one can identify distributions of what we call unob-
served complementarities but not the underlying primitive distribution of match-specific
(or agent-specific) unobservables. The distribution of complementarities is enough to com-
pute assignment production levels and therefore counterfactual assignment probabilities. In
extensions, we can include other covariates X and identify distributions of unobservable
complementarities conditional on X. We show that it is possible to identify heterogeneous-
within-a-market coefficients on the large support match characteristics. The results extend
naturally to two-sided, many-to-many matching.
If the data contain unmatched firms, the individual rationality decision to not be unmatched
helps identify the distribution of primitively specified unobserved match characteristics, not
just the distribution of unobserved complementarities. We extend this result to the fairly
general case of matching with trades, as in Hatfield et al. (2015).
Our empirical work studies biotech and medical venture capital. We estimate the degree to
which venture capitalists change the production of matches. Among many other empirical
results, we find that the standard deviation of unobserved complementarities is roughly of
the same order of magnitude as the contribution to production from the observables match
and agent characteristics.
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CHAPTER V
Conclusions
This dissertation develops new methods to analyze firm behaviors and provides estimates
and predictions that inform antitrust and innovation policies. The first chapter shows that
horizontal merger policies may be tougher when taking into account a merger’s effects on the
composition of product offerings in addition to the merger’s price effects. The second chap-
ter quantifies and decomposes the effects of vertical integration. I show that the investment
coordination effects are pro-innovation and dominate the price effects. The results suggest
that vertical integration policies should fully consider the potentially positive dynamic im-
plications of a vertical merger. Both chapters are empirical studies in the context of the
US smartphone industry. The third chapter develops identification strategies for a general
class of matching games and estimates the formation of investment relationships between
venture capitalists and biomedical startups. The estimates show that unobservables may
be as important as observables in determining which VC invests in which startup firm, and
understanding these unobserved factors is important for innovation policies.
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